Idealists, Pragmatists, and Textualists: Judging Electoral Districts in America, Canada, and Australia by Daly, Erin
Boston College International and Comparative Law Review
Volume 21 | Issue 2 Article 2
8-1-1998
Idealists, Pragmatists, and Textualists: Judging
Electoral Districts in America, Canada, and
Australia
Erin Daly
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/iclr
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the Election Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law
School. For more information, please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Erin Daly, Idealists, Pragmatists, and Textualists: Judging Electoral Districts in America, Canada, and
Australia , 21 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 261 (1998), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/iclr/vol21/
iss2/2
Idealists, Pragmatists, and Textualists: 
Judging Electoral Districts in America, 
Canada, and Australia 
Erin Daly* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the 1960s, the United States Supreme Court entered the political 
thicket of voting rights cases in which plaintiffs challenged apportion-
ment and districting plans. In the 1970s, the Australian High Court 
heard its first districting case, and in the 1980s, the Canadian courts 
entered the fray. This decade has seen renewed and intensified interest 
in voting rights as the highest courts of all three countries have issued 
landmark decisions in this area. With a surprising degree of consensus, 
the Canadian and Australian courts have held that their respective 
Constitutions do not guarantee that electoral districts must be of equal 
size; in other words, they rejected the one person, one vote standard 
that has been a staple of American law for nearly 35 years. 1 A pro-
foundly divided American Supreme Court, by contrast, has held that, 
in addition to this equipopulosity requirement, the U.S. Constitution 
also requires that electoral districts be drawn without predominant 
attention to the race ofvoters.2 
Although there is some common ground among these sets of cases, 
they ultimately exemplifY three very different jurisprudential attitudes 
towards redistricting questions,3 and towards constitutional questions 
* Associate Professor of Law, Widener University School of Law. BA., Wesleyan University 
(1983); J.D., University of Michigan (1989). My thanks to David Williamson, Tony Blackshield, 
Robert Lipkin, and Laura Ray. I am also particularly grateful to Patrick Kelly and to Widener 
University's International Law Institute in Sydney, 1996. 
I See Reference re: Electoral Boundaries Commission Act [1991] 78 D.L.R. 449; McGinty v. 
Western Australia (1996) 134 A.L.R. 289. Both cases rejected the requirement of equipopulosity 
or equipopulous districts of Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
2 See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993) (Shaw I), and its progeny: United States v. Hays, 515 
U.S. 737 (1995); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 116 S. Ct. 
1894 (1996) (Shaw II); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952,116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996); Abrams v.Johnson, 
117 S. Ct. 1925 (1997). These cases are collectively known as the Shaw cases. 
3 (Re-)apportionment is the process of determining how many people should vote in each 
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generally. In fact, the different results in these cases are largely attrib-
utable to the jurisprudential choices each Court has made. In these 
cases, the Canadian Court has taken a pragmatist stance, while the 
Australian approach is more textualist; the American redistricting cases 
may be characterized as idealist. Since no Constitution mandates any 
particular jurisprudential model, a court adopting one approach is 
clearly choosing from among available options. Whatever model the 
court chooses determines (and is determined by) not just its approach 
to constitutional interpretation, but also the court's perception of its 
own role in the nation's political system, and its conception of the 
nation's electoral process. This article will describe the principal redis-
tricting cases from each country so as to expose the particular para-
digm that each court has chosen to govern its approach. The article 
then suggests that, for the redistricting cases that are currently occu-
pying so much of the courts' time, the pragmatism of the Canadian 
Supreme Court is preferable to either the American Supreme Court's 
idealism or the Australian High Court's textualism. 
The complicated story told by these decisions reveals how the high 
courts of these three countries approach each other, converge on 
certain issues, then turn and go their separate ways, then sometimes 
meet up again. Nonetheless, while the courts of Canada and Australia 
are acutely aware of each move made by the others, the U.S. Supreme 
Court plods along, seemingly oblivious to what is going on around it. 
This indifference to other countries' experiences is not unique to 
voting rights law,4 even though, as Justice Breyer has recently suggested, 
"[other countries'] experiences may nonetheless cast an empirical 
light on the consequences of different solutions to a common legal 
problem."5 By looking at other countries' resolution of similar issues, 
district of a particular jurisdiction. (Re-) districting is the process of determining where the lines 
should be drawn for each district. They are distinct, but related concepts: both are used when 
"the governors and their political agents ... select their electors." T. Alexander Aleinikoff & 
Samuel Issacharoff, Race and Redistricting: Drawing Constitutional Lines after Shaw v. Reno, 92 
MICH. L. REv. 588, 588 (1993). Districting seems to be the broader concept, because it includes 
head-counting which is a prerequisite to line-drawing; the term "districting" will thus be used to 
refer both to districting per se and to the combined issues raised in both processes. 
4 But see Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 s. Ct. 2258, 2274 (1997), for a rare discussion of 
another country's experience in a majority opinion. In this case, Chief Justice Rehnquist referred 
to Holland's experience with assisted suicide. Even this, however, was a comparison of underlying 
facts, not constitutional interpretation. In Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2377 n.11 
(1997), the Court rejected ~e dissent's discussion of European federated republics because "such 
comparative analysis [is] inappropriate to the task of interpreting a constitution, though it was 
of course quite relevant to the task of writing one." 
5 Linda Greenhouse, Appealing to the Law's Brooding Spirit, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 1997, at E4. 
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the American courts can learn from their experiences, as other coun-
tries have learned from ours. 
It is especially illuminating to study the constitutional traditions of 
Australia and Canada because in some ways they are so similar to our 
own, particularly in their underlying values: all three nations, of course, 
were spawned by Great Britain but unlike her, all three developed 
written constitutions early on. In all three countries, moreover, the 
constitutional systems are similar: they are among the few federated 
republics of the world and in each case separation of powers-particu-
larly between the judiciary and the political branches-is a salient 
feature. In addition, in all three countries, representatives to one or 
both houses of the bicameral federal legislature are chosen by popular 
election, and the same is true for most state or provincial legislatures. 
Finally, it is worth noting (although this can only be stated in the most 
general terms), in all three countries, democratic governance, includ-
ing equality as an essential component, is fundamental to the nations' 
political self-consciousness. Despite these basic similarities, each coun-
try's highest court has reached different conclusions about the degree 
to which their Constitutions define and guarantee equal voting rights 
in the context of districting. 
The keystone in this area was the 1964 American case of Reynolds v. 
Sims, which propounded the one person, one vote rule.6 While the 
incontrovertible success of this rule must be acknowledged,7 it has 
resulted in a complacency of two sorts. As a psychological matter, 
American pride in the rule has fostered a confidence in home-grown 
6 See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 554-58. 
7 This is a descriptive point, not a value judgment. See, e.g., DA..'1IEL HAYS LOWENSTEIN, ELEC-
TION LAw: CASES AND MATERIALS 102 (1995) (''Though Wesberry and Reynolds were fiercely 
controversial when they were decided, the one person, one vote standard has become widely 
accepted in the United States. "); Samuel Issacharoff,Judging Politics: The Elusive Quest Fur Judicial 
Review of Political Fairness, 71 TEx. L. REv. 1643, 1657 n.72 (and sources cited therein) (noting 
that "the appeal of individual equality in the political process proved so strong that these decisions 
did not spark an outcry similar to that arising in response to the Court's forays into the civil rights 
and criminal justice areas"). This article makes no claim as to whether the Reynolds Court was 
correct either as a constitutional or as a political matter. See, e.g., Jesse Choper, Consequences of 
Supreme Court Decisions Upholding Individual Constitutional Rights, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1, 90-91 
(1984) (explaining that "in the first half decade after Reynolds v. Sims, despite complying altera-
tions in virtually every state legislative and congressional district in the nation, the studies 
undertaken came to conflicting conclusions as to the effect of reapportionment on state policy 
and the extent to which reapportioned legislatures were more likely than malapportioned ones 
to expend funds, respond to urban needs and have a competitive political system. Subsequent 
empirical efforts, however, have vindicated the criticism that those who had earlier discounted 
the political and policy consequences of reapportionment had failed to prove their case."). 
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. solutions that supplants the need to look outside for alternatives, 
particularly in matters of democracy where Americans think of them-
selves as the standard-bearers. Independent of American psychological 
isolationism, the rule's success has led to the conviction, as a substan-
tive matter, that the one person, one vote rule is the only legitimate 
way to achieve true democracy. Another aim of this article, then, is to 
suggest that other solutions that incorporate a different array of values 
may also achieve some legitimate conception of democracy. These 
values, some of which are recognized to a greater degree in Australia 
and Canada, include group representation, electoral fairness, respon-
siveness of representatives to electors, electoral convenience, protec-
tion of political subdivisions, stability, consistency, and local traditions, 
among others. 
Accepting that these, along with equipopulosity, may all contribute 
to democracy in one way or another means recognizing that democracy 
cannot be measured along a single continuum, with one country mer-
iting a higher rating than another. There are too many factors that a 
nation might value, in varying amounts and combinations, for one 
approach to be deemed the best, and it is impossible to ascertain 
that one element is absolutely indispensable. For instance, Americans 
might consider that popular sovereignty can only exist where the 
Constitution's authority rests on the assent of 'We the People." The 
constitutions of Australia and Canada, however, are acts of the British 
Parliament implemented with royal assent; yet these countries are no 
less committed to the principle of popular sovereignty and to the need 
for fair and effective representation as a means of exercising that 
power. 
Part II of this article describes how the recent districting decisions 
of the three high courts valued this constellation of factors. Part III 
shows how these cases manifest three contrasting jurisprudential ap-
proaches (idealism, textualism, and pragmatism), and argues that it is 
primarily these different attitudes that explains the courts' inclinations 
to go their separate ways. Part IV argues that the American Court's 
jurisprudence and its understanding of the nature of race-conscious 
districting claims would be significantly enhanced if the Court incor-
porated the pragmatist attitude of the Canadian Court into its think-
ing. The article concludes with a brief hypothetical response that a 
pragmatist court might make to the race-conscious districting claims. 
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II. THE CASES: DEVELOPING THEORIES OF VOTING EQUALITY 
A. Prelude: Historical Background 
The fundamental charters of America, Australia, and Canada incor-
porate their British heritage, but like any self-respecting offspring, they 
also rebel in certain ways from that heritage. America's Constitution 
was the first of the three, and by far the most influential. In fact, it was 
the first ever to create a federal republic.s Other nations attempting to 
unify distinct and far-flung colonies into a cohesive and sovereign unit 
looked to the American example, adapting many of our framers' ex-
periments to their own purposes. The British North America Act of 
1867 unified several provinces of Canada, creating the first federation 
within the United Kingdom; Au·stralia's federal Constitution followed 
in 1900. 
The roots of the three charters, however, and the relationships 
between America and the other two countries, go back even further. 
Australia and America, half a world apart, are linked inexorably by 
history. This has been evident from the earliest days of white occupa-
tion in each country. As one Australian newspaper noted in 1837: 
Throughout the whole of their [American] history, there are 
certain broad features bearing no imaginary resemblance to 
our own [Australia's]. America was once a British depend-
ency; Australia is so now. America was once the receptacle of 
those whom Britain banished from her bosom; Eastern Aus-
tralia is that receptacle now. America received her manners, 
her literature and germ of her laws and political institutions 
from the British Isles; so has Australia. America at length 
outgrew the trammels of national juvenility, and asserted the 
prerogatives of mature manhood, which she in the end com-
pelled her reluctant parent to acknowledge: it is perfectly 
consistent with loyalty and with common sense to predict, at 
8 As Justice Kennedy has recently explained: 
Federalism was our Nation's own discovery. The Framers split the atom of sovereignty. 
It was the genius of their idea that our citizens would have two political capacities, one 
state and one federal, each protected from incursion by the other. The resulting Con-
stitution created a legal system unprecedented in form and design, establishing two 
orders of government, each with its own direct relationship, its own privity, its own set 
of mutual rights and obligations to the people who sustain it and are governed by it. 
u.S. Term Umits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779,838 (1995). 
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some future period, far distant no doubt as it is, Australia will 
pursue a similar course, and with similar success.9 
This sense of slow yet inexorable distancing from Great Britain 
marked the consciousness of early white Australians. Indeed, it is said 
that one critical difference between America and the other two coun-
tries is that in America, independence from Great Britain was marked 
by swift and dramatic revolution, whereas in the latter two it has been 
marked by continuing evolution.1o 
The Australian Constitution, like America's, created a nation by 
unifying separate colonies-not yet states-which found themselves on 
the same plot of land, but far from anywhere else that mattered to 
them. In some ways, the Australians copied the American model with 
disarming specificity. For example, they established a bicameral na-
tional legislature with a House of Representatives and a Senate' in 
which the states are equally represented,11 they created a federal Su-
preme Court possessing constitutional as well as common law powers,12 
and they followed the American constitutional structure. 13 
The differences between the two Constitutions, however, are equally 
significant. Among the more obvious ones are that the form of govern-
ment created by the Australian Constitution is parliamentary and so 
9 (bJoted in PHILIP BELL & ROGER BELL, IMPLICATED: THE UNITED STATES IN AUSTRALIA 20 
(1993). Indeed, some coincidences are truly striking: ''The move of the American States toward 
'a more perfect union' had come just as European settlement in Australia began. The First Fleet 
[of convicts from England] set sail for New South Wales on May 13, 1787; the Philadelphia 
Convention began work the next day." Tony Blackshield, A Tale o/Two Charters, THE AUSTRALIAN, 
Mar. 29, 1996, at 8 [hereinafter Blackshield, Two Charter.\']. There is even evidence of a causal 
relationship between the United States and Australia: "The decision to occupy Australia as a penal 
colony was initially an attempt to 'atone for the loss' of Britain's American colonies, which had 
accommodated more than 50,000 British convicts." BELL & BELL, supra, at 19. 
IOThe distinction does not appear to have significant current day-to-day impact, although it 
may have important jurisprudential ramifications. See infra notes 315-17 and accompanying text. 
II While the original American Constitution provided for popular election of Representatives, 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, and appointment of Senators by state legislators, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, 
the Australian Constitution provided for popular election of members of both houses, AUSTL. 
CONST. §§ 7, 24, a practice that was not adopted in the United States until the Seventeenth 
Amendment was ratified in 1913. 
12 This represents a significant departure from the British principle of parliamentary sover-
eignty which precludes judicial review of parliamentary acts. 
15 The first three chapters of the Australian Constitution correspond to the first three articles 
of the American one, dividing the government into three separate but interdependent branches. 
Furthermore, the Australian Constitution "adhered to the American pattern of listing specific 
areas in which alone the new federal parliament had power to make laws-leaving an unspecified 
residue of general lawmaking power to the states." Blackshield, Two Charter.\', supra note 9, at 8. 
Compare AUSTL. CONST. § 51, cls. i-xxxix with U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1-18. 
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does not partake of the more extreme separation of powers that the 
American presidential system entailsl4 and it contains no Bill of Rights 
(although some individual rights have been included).15 Perhaps even 
more important are differences in authority and constituency. Austra-
lia's Constitution was passed as an Act of the Imperial Parliament 
which, theoretically at least, means that sovereignty rests in England, 
not in Australia. 16 Furthermore, the relevant constituent groups are the 
states: the Australian Constitution opens with ''We the people of New 
South Wales, Victoria, South Australia, Queensland, and Tasmania, 
humbly relying on the blessings of the Almighty God, have agreed to 
unite .... Be it therefore enacted by the Queen's most Excellent 
Majesty ... as follows:-.... "17 This resembles the United States' Ar-
ticles of Confederation more than its Constitution, which self-eon-
sciously opens with "We the People of the United States .... "18 As 
presently in force, then, the Australian Constitution seems to be am-
biguous as to whether its ultimate source of authority is the people of 
Australia (as one would expect to find in a republic) or the Queen of 
England. As one pair of scholars has written, "[t]o the extent that the 
constitution of a government retaining allegiance to a foreign mon-
arch can be based on that of a democratic republic, the Australian 
system of government was derived from that of the U.S."19 In 1986, the 
British Parliament passed the Australia Act,20 which might have re-
solved some of these incongruities. The Act formally severed any re-
maining links between the Parliament of Britain and the parliaments 
of the Australian states and the Commonwealth.21 The full implications 
of the Act have been hotly debated in Australia, the ultimate question 
being the extent to which the Act either prospectively or retroactively 
14 "Both systems seek to guard against excessively powerful executive government. [1.] The 
[Australian] model does this by keeping the ministry in the legislature and responsible to it; the 
American model does it through 'checks and balances'; playing off institutions against one 
another. In practice, governments have grown more powerful under both systems." Blackshield, 
Two Charters, supra note 9, at 8. 
l5See AUSTL. CONST. § 41 (right to vote); § 80 (criminal trial by jury); § 116 (freedom of 
religion); § 117 (right to interstate travel). 
16 See Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, 1900, ch. 12 (Austl.) (Covering Clauses). 
17 Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, 1900, ch. 12 (Austl.) (pmbl.). But see Commu-
nique of Constitutional Convention, Feb. 2-13, 1998, available at <http://www.dpmc.gov.au/con-
vention.html> (proposing that if Australia becomes a republic, the preamble to the Australian 
Constitution contain introductory language in the form of "We the people of Australia"). 
ISU.S. CONST. pmbl. 
19 BELL & BELL, supra note 9, at 48. 
20 See generally Australia Act, 1986 (U.K.). 
21 See id. 
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transforms the Australian constitutional regime from one whose un-
derlying authority was ambiguous to one wholly committed to embody-
ing popular sovereignty.22 
The questions spawned by the Australia Act have developed into a 
full-fledged debate over the character of the Australian nation at the 
beginning of the 21st century. In the first two weeks of February 1998, 
152 delegates met in a Constitutional Convention in Canberra to 
discuss whether Australia should convert from a monarchy into a 
republic and, if so, when and what form the republic should take. 23 
The Convention resolved that it supported, in principle, Australia 
becoming a republic, and that a referendum on the question be sched-
uled for 1999, with the new republic coming into effect by January 1, 
2001, exactly one hundred years to the day after the current Constitu-
tion came into effect.24 Thus, Australia is now poised to transform itself 
into a full-fledged independent republic. 
Canada and America are linked by historical experiences, as well as 
by one of the world's longest common borders. Like Australian consti-
tutional history, Canada's is marked by several evolutionary develop-
ments, rather than one momentous act. The British North America 
Act of 1867 created the Canadian nation (thirty-three years before 
Australia would be united as a nation) and gave it a Constitution that 
established the basic parliamentary form of government over federated 
provinces.25 Canada did not entrench individual rights until 1982,26 
when the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms came into effect 
22 As stated in Australian Capital Television: 
The very concept of representative government and reptesentative democracy signifies 
... that the sovereign power which resides in the people is exercised on their behalf by 
their representatives. In the case of the Australian Constitution, one obstacle to the 
acceptance of that view is that the Constitution owes its legal force to its character as a 
statute of the Imperial Parliament enacted in the exercise of its legal sovereignty; the 
Constitution was not a supreme law proceeding from the people's inherent authority to 
constitute a government .... The Australia Act 1986 (U.K.) marked the end of the legal 
sovereignty of the Imperial Parliament and recognized that ultimate sovereignty resided 
in the Australian people. The point is that the representatives who are members of 
Parliament and Ministers of State are not only chosen by the people but exercise their 
legislative and executive powers as representatives of the people. 
Australian Capital Television v. Commonwealth (1992) 177 C.L.R. 106, 137-38 (Mason, CJ.). 
23 See Final Communique of Constitutional Convention, <http://www.dpmc.gov.au/conven-
tion.html>. 
24 See id. 
25 See grmeraUy North America Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict. (U.K.). 
26 The Canadian Parliament passed a Bill of Rights in 1960, but this can be repealed by ordinary 
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by Proclamation of Queen Elizabeth 11.27 Like the American Constitu-
tion, then, fundamental Canadian law consists of a basic document 
setting forth the organic law, and amendments thereto amplifYing, 
sometimes in profound and radical ways, the relationship between 
individuals and their government. 
Many of the rights found in the U.S. Constitution and its amend-
ments (as authoritatively interpreted) also found their way into the Ca-
nadian Charter.28 Yet, in many ways, the Charter resembles the Ameri-
can Constitution less than the Australian Constitution does. It tends to 
be more thorough and more explicit than either the American or 
Australian Constitutions, leaving less for future judges to fill in.29 By 
the time Canada adopted its Charter, it knew what the nation was and 
what the Charter was trying to achieve; it had centuries of experience 
in trying to reconcile individual and social rights, made all the more 
complex by the competing claims of unity by many citizens, of separa-
tism by French Canadians, and of special participation rights by Abo-
legislation of Parliament and does not override other acts of Parliament nor does it disturb the 
principle of parliamentary sovereignty. Furthermore, it is limited in scope as it applies only to 
federal and not provincial legislation. It can be (and has been) suspended during national 
emergencies. See 4 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, Canada ~7 (Albert P. 
Blaustein & G.H. Flanz eds., 1991 & Supp. 1997); see also Clare F. Beckton, Pre-Charter Constitu-
tionalism, in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, supra at 19-22. 
27 The Canada Act, 1982 (like the Australian Constitution) was an Act of the British Parliament. 
See Canada Act, 1982, ch. 11 (U.K.). The Act contains the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms [hereinafter Charter) (in part I of Schedule B, which is known as the Constitution Act, 
1982). The Canada Act also renamed the British North America Act, 1867, as the Constitution 
Act, 1867. See id. 
28 See, e.g., Charter, supra note 27, § 2 (freedom of religion, freedom of expression, freedom 
of the press, freedom of assembly, freedom ofassociation); § 3 (right to vote); § 6 (right to travel); 
§ 7 (right to life, liberty, the security of the person); § 8 (right against unreasonable search and 
seizure); § 10 (right to counsel); § 11 (right to speedy trial, against self-incrimination, procedural 
due process, against ex post facto laws, against double jeopardy); § 12 (right against cruel and 
unusual punishment); § 15 (right to equal protection). 
29 Compare, e.g., Charter, supra note 27, § 15(1) ("Every individual is equal before and under 
the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimi-
nation and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, 
religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability") with U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No state 
shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws") and Leeth 
v. Commonwealth (1992) 174 C.L.R. 455, 467, 469 (finding no express or implicit constitutional 
guaranty of equal treatment for equals in criminal sentencing procedures) and Kartinyeri v. 
Commonwealth (1998) HCA 22 at , 56 (noting "that there is no general requirement that 
Commonwealth laws should have uniform operation throughout the Commonwealth, nor is there 
any general impediment to the Parliament distinguishing between the different needs or respon-
sibilities of different people or different localities.") (Gummow & Hayne,lJ.) opinion found at 
<http://www.austliLedu.au/au/cases/cth/high_ct/1998/22.html>. 
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riginal Canadians. Having been adopted relatively late in the nation's 
history, the Canadian Charter suggests the wisdom and moderation of 
maturity, rather than the youthful idealism of a people constituting 
themselves as their first act of nationhood. 
Whether the framers of these constitutions accepted or rejected 
specific aspects of the American Constitution, there is no dispute that 
it was a most influential model. One critical question raised by the 
voting rights cases, then, is the extent to which the American Supreme 
Court's interpretation of the U.S. Constitution controls other Courts' 
interpretations of theirs. The answer, it turns out, is not very much.30 
The next three sections will describe how the three Courts have ap-
proached the question of electoral equality in the redistricting context 
and how they have converged and diverged at various points.31 
B. The American Experience: Origins of Absolutism 
The history of the U.S. Supreme Court's districtingjurisprudence is 
well known and need be described here only cursorily. For most of the 
nation's history, the Court did not hear challenges to states' power to 
draw district lines for their own elections or for federal elections under 
30 As a matter of international law, no judicial decision can control another country's courts in 
the sense of binding them. litigants in Canada and particularly in Australia, however, have argued 
that the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of similar or identical constitutional provisions 
should at least be very persuasive to those courts. See, e.g., McGinty, 134 A.L.R. at 321-22 (Toohey, 
J.). What is surprising is not that these claims are ultimately rejected, but that they are taken as 
seriously as they were. In some instances, the authority of American law is treated as if it were 
incorporated. See, e.g., Kartinyeri, HCA 22 at 1 89 (Gummow & Hayne, lJ.) ("the doctrine of 
Marbury v. Madisun ensures that courts exercising the judicial power of the Commonwealth 
determine whether the legislature and the executive act within their constitutional powers."). 
31 I have attempted to organize this article in roughly chronological order by country. This has 
proven difficult because of the way events stretch over time and overtake one another. It is 
impossible to say, for instance, whether the Australian Constitution of 1900, was adopted before 
or after the Canadian Constitution of 1867 and 1982. The rough chronology of relevant events 
is as follows: U.S. Constitution 1789; British North America Act 1867; Fourteenth Amendment 
1868; Australian Constitution 1900; first U.S. reapportionment cases 1962-64; first Australian 
reapportionment case 1975; Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 1982; Australia Act 1986; 
first Canadian reapportionment case 1991; Australian representative government cases 1992; the 
Shaw cases 1993-97; second Australian reapportionment case 1996; Australian Constitution 
Convention (for republic) 1998. At the very least, it seems clear that America's was the first of 
the three constitutions and that the American reapportionment cases were the model for cases 
in the other two countries. Thus, the American experience is discussed first in this part and the 
next. For purposes of describing the cases, it seems more appropriate to discuss Australia last 
because its 1996 decision was influenced by the American and Canadian cases. In Part III, 
however, where jurisprudential attitudes are discussed, it seems more appropriate to address 
Australian textualism before Canadian pragmatism because the former is necessary for a complete 
understanding of the latter, whereas the opposite is not true. 
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Article I, Section 4.32 In 1962, the Court changed course and decided 
in Baker v. Carr that electoral malapportionment presented a justici-
able issue that was not barred under the political question doctrine, 
although the Court did not in that case identifY how it would measure 
the constitutionality of districting plans.33 
Bakerwas decided against a backdrop of rampant malapportionment 
throughout the nation. Even by mid-century, enormous urbanization 
had changed the face of many states, arguably imposing upon state 
legislators an affirmative duty to conform electoral maps to the new 
demographic realities. But state legislators had traditionally represent-
ed rural communities and were slow to give up their power to benefit 
urban dwellers. The combination of urban growth and legislative in-
transigence was increasing overrepresentation of rural interests at the 
expense of cities.34 As then-Senator John F. Kennedy wrote in the New 
York Times Magazine: 
the urban majority is, politically, a minority and the rural mi-
nority dominates the polls. Of all the discriminations against 
the urban areas, the most fundamental and the most blatant 
is political: the apportionment of representatives in our Leg-
islatures and (to a lesser extent) in Congress has been either 
deliberately rigged or shamefully ignored so as to deny the 
cities and their voters that full and fair proportionate voice 
in government to which they are entitled. The failure of our 
governments to respond to the problems of the cities reflects 
this basic political discrimination .... Our legislatures still 
represent the rural majority of half a century ago, not the 
urban majority of today. 35 
The problem was particularly pernicious because, as Kennedy ex-
plained and as plaintiffs in all the early cases recognized, since state 
32 See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 555-56 (1946). 
33 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198-99 (1962). 
34 As the Court said in Lucas u. Forty-Fourth Colorado GeneralAssembly, 377 U.S. 713, 729 (1964): 
"Divergences from population-based representation in the [state] Senate are growing continually 
wider, since the underrepresented districts in the Denver, Pueblo, and Colorado Springs metro-
politan areas are rapidly gaining in population, while many of the overrepresented rural districts 
have tended to decline in population continuously in recent years." In Maryland, for instance, 
75% of the state's population lived in the five most populous subdivisions in 1960, while one-
quarter lived in the remaining 19 counties. See Maryland Committee v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656, 664 
(1964). That case arose because the 75% urban residents controlled one-third of the state senate 
seats, while the remaining quarter controlled two-thirds of the senate. See id. at 665. 
35John F. Kennedy, The Shame of the States, N.Y. TIMES (Magazine), May 18, 1958, at 37. 
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legislators had no incentive to act, there would be no reliefifthe courts 
abstained.36 The problem transcended racial politics and pervaded the 
nation, crossing the Mason-Dixon line.37 Thus, despite well reasoned 
and convincing dissenting opinions, the Court simply had no choice 
but to break the "rural stranglehold. "38 
1. The Germinal Cases 
The first voting rights case after Baker v. Carr was Gray v. Sanders, 
which set the tone for the Court's subsequent districting jurispru-
dence.39 The Gray plaintiffs challenged Georgia's county unit system, 
which essentially functioned as an electoral college, with the effect of 
overvaluing the rural vote.40 The Court's opinion in Gray is absolutist 
(though not textualist) in its interpretation, unrestrained in its asser-
tion of authority over the states, and individualist in its orientation. 
These themes-not to mention the slogan "one person, one vote,"41 
which originated in Gray-have marked the Court's districting juris-
prudence for the last 35 years; in the recent Shaw cases, they have 
resurfaced with a vengeance. 
The District Court in Gray would have upheld any county unit system 
"if the disparity against any county is not in excess of the disparity that 
exists against any state in the most recent electoral college. "42 But the 
Supreme Court took a harder line.43 No system is permissible, the 
Court said, that "in end result weights the rural vote more heavily than 
the urban vote and weights some small rural counties heavier than 
S6 "Reform of our state legislatures depends upon the unselfishness of our state legislators. They 
are both the perpetrators and the beneficiaries of the present malapportionment." Id. at 40. 
Kennedy continued: "[alppeal to the courts is an unlikely avenue of relief, for the Supreme Court 
has made clear its belief that such change depends basically upon political, not judicial processes." 
Id. (referring to Colegrove, 328 U.S. 549). See also Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 554 (discussing impracti-
cability of political resolution and finding judicially enforceable right to voter parity). Coinciden-
tally, most of the reapportionment cases decided on the merits were argued in November 1963, 
within days of President Kennedy's assassination. 
S? Within nine months of the courthouse doors opening in Baker v. Carr, litigation challenging 
state apportionment schemes had been instituted in thirty-four states. See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 
556 n.30. All regions of the country were represented in the first group of cases to be decided 
with Reynolds. 
S8 See id. at 543; if. Lucas, 377 U.S. at 736-37 (judicial remedy not contingent on exhaustion 
of political remedies). 
S9 See generaUy Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963). 
40 See id. at 370. 
41Id. at 381. 
42Id. at 378 (quoting Grayv. Sanders, 203 F. Supp. 158, 170 (1962)). 
4S See id. at 384 (Harlan,]., dissenting). 
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other larger rural counties."44 This was true despite (or perhaps be-
cause of) the long history of this scheme in Georgia, and it was true 
despite the constitutional electoral college on which the Georgia sys-
tem was modeled. The Court would simply accept no excuse for valu-
ing one person's vote more than another's. 
Once the geographical unit for which a representative is to 
be chosen is designated, all who participate in the election 
are to have an equal vote-whatever their race, whatever their 
sex, whatever their occupation, whatever their income, and 
wherever their home may be in that geographical unit. This 
is required by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.45 
The Court's holding that the Fourteenth Amendment governed plain-
tiffs' vote dilution claim seems more by default than for any affirma-
tively compelling reason.46 The Court noted that the Fifteenth Amend-
ment prohibits discrimination against blacks, and the Nineteenth 
against women, and then jumped to the conclusion that the Four-
teenth must prohibit discrimination on every other ground, although 
there is nothing in the Fourteenth Amendment that would appear to 
speak to the issue.47 Indeed, the Court went beyond the Constitution 
to the Declaration of Independence and Lincoln's Gettysburg Address 
to find authority for its particular "conception of political equality. "48 
But ultimately it was the preamble to the Constitution that provided 
the Court with the underpinnings of its political philosophy. ''The 
concept of 'we the people,'" the Court explained, ''visualizes no pre-
ferred class of voters but equality among those who meet the basic 
qualifications. "49 Thus, the Court linked the guarantee of an· equally 
weighted vote directly to the principle of popular sovereignty: we can-
44 Gray, 372 u.s. at 379. 
45 [d. 
46 See id. at 374. 
47 See id. at 379. Indeed, the existence of the other amendments might suggest the opposite 
conclusion. Furthermore, the Court might have, but did not, consider that the privileges and 
immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment grounded the right to equal voting power. See 
MICHAEL]' PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE CoURTS: LAw OR POLITICS? 122-33 (1994) (argu-
ing for the relevance of the privileges or immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); 
DAVID AJ. RICHARDS, CONSCIENCE AND THE CONSTITUTION: HISTORY, THEORY, AND LAW OF THE 
RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS (1993) (arguing for broader interpretation of privileges or im-
munities clause); but see The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873). 
48 Gray, 372 U.S. at 381. 
49 [d. at 379-80. 
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not consider ourselves self-governing if we do not each share equally 
in our power to govern, exercised by the franchise and embodied in 
the words 'We the People. "50 
The Court was absolutist in its insistence that equal really does mean 
equal. It did not address the difficulties raised by either factual or 
textual nuances,5l In dissent, Justice Harlan argued that "[a] matter 
which so profoundly touches the barriers between federal judicial and 
state legislative authority" demands full development of a factual re-
cord, and full explanation based on the factual record, of the reasons 
for the Court's invalidation ofa state electoral plan.52 Harlan's criticism 
is particularly apt in the context of voting rights. Voting rights may be 
the most fundamental of all civil rights (because they are preservative 
of all other rights),53 but they are also contingent on "complex and 
subtle political factors"54 and thus trigger heightened judicial sensitiv-
ity, if not scrutiny. 
The complete lack of deference to the states was also dubious as a 
constitutional matter. The Constitution authorizes states to establish 
rules for the conduct of federal elections,55 but it is silent on the matter 
of state elections, which suggests federal indifference or impotence 
with respect to the composition of state legislatures. On the other 
hand, reliance on the Fourteenth Amendment,56 which specifically 
cabins state power, might have justified the Court's intervention into 
state politics. The problem is not that the Court reached the wrong 
result-it was probably justified given the states' vigorous resistance to 
reapportionment. The problem is that the Court ignored all the factual 
and legal ambiguities, steadfastly insisting on its own definition of 
equality. 
Another indication of the Court's absolutism was its refusal to con-
sider the relevance of any unit of measurement other than the individ-
ual. Again,Justice Harlan pointed out, as he had in Baker, that "a state 
might rationally conclude that its general welfare was best served by 
apportioning more seats in the legislature to agricultural communities 
50 See id. at 380. 
51 In this aspect as well, Gray presages the more recent Shaw cases which are striking in their 
inattention to the facts. See infra text at notes 347-62. 
52 Gray, 372 U.S. at 390 (Harlan,]., dissenting) (arguing that the Court's holding, "on the basis 
of mere numbers, unilluminated by any factors, amounts to a judicial fiat."). 
53 See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886); see also Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 562. 
54 Gray, 372 U.S. at 388 (Harlan,]., dissenting). 
55 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4. 
56 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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than to urban centers,"57 but the Court insisted on treating voting as 
an autonomous exercise, rather than as an affiliational one; in the 
Court's view, popular sovereignty means that individuals, not commu-
nities, hold the sovereign power. 58 
The following year, the Court decided a slew of mal apportionment 
cases from around the country. In each case, the plaintiffs prevailed. 
Wesberry v. Sanderf9 is notable largely for having added the "as nearly 
as practicable" gloss on the simple "one person, one vote" command 
of Gray.60 In Wesberry, the Court found that the unequal sizes of Geor-
gia's federal electoral districts violated not the Preamble nor the Four-
teenth Amendment, but Article I's mandate that Representatives be 
chosen "by the People. "61 "To say that a vote is worth more in one 
district than in another would not only run counter to our fundamen-
tal ideas of democratic government, it would cast aside the principle 
of a House of Representatives elected 'by the People,' a principle 
tenaciously fought for and established at the Constitutional Conven-
tion."62 What is curious about this leap from "chosen by the People" to 
"our fundamental ideas of a democratic government" is that it was 
effectuated by Justice Black, probably the most committed textualist 
ever to sit on the Court.63 And yet, it is not at all self-evident that 
"chosen by the People" demands that each vote be weighted equally 
or that the relevant unit of measurement for the people is the individ-
ua1.64 Article I, Section 2 itself deviates from the principle of equipopu-
losity in significant ways.65 And nowhere else does the constitutional 
57 Gray, 372 U.S. at 386 (Harlan,]., dissenting). 
58 See id. at 380-81. 
59 See generally Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964). 
60 [d. at 7-8. 
61 U.S. CaNST. art. I, § 2. 
62 Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 8. 
63 See HOWARD BALL, HUGO L. BLACK: COLD STEEL WARRIOR 109 (1996) (describing history, 
literalism, and absolutism as the three essential components of Black's jurisprudence); see also 
Charles A. Reich, The Living Constitution and the Court's Role, in HUGO BLACK AND THE SUPREME 
COURT: A SYMPOSIUM 133, 133-51 (Stephen Parks Strickland ed., 1967) (describing Black's 
approach as one of "faithful adherence" to the Constitution). 
64 Indeed, this is precisely the conclusion that the Australian High Court, faced with exactly 
the same language, refused to make. See infra notes 232-34 and accompanying text. 
65 Most notoriously, Section 2 counts only free persons, but excludes "Indians not taxed" and 
counts "all other Persons" as three-fifths. Although this was superseded by the Fourteenth 
Amendment, it was the intent of the original framers that some people have more voting power 
than others. Furthermore, the section mandates that "each State shall have at Least one Repre-
sentative," so that even among the states, some districts will have fewer electors than others. U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. Beyond this, of course, stands the Senate as a paradigm of non-population 
based representation. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3. 
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text mention anything akin to equipopulosity or even democracy. Tell-
ingly, the two guarantees that are super-entrenched in the Constitu-
tion-entrenched beyond just being included-are guarantees of bla-
tant inequality: Article V provides for constitutional amendment but 
prohibits abrogating the euphemistically referred to slave trade or de-
priving the states of their non-population based suffrage in the Sen-
ate.66 Recognizing the limitations of the text, Justice Black seamlessly 
moved on to the history of this Section. As Justice Harlan's dissent 
demonstrates, however, this history is at best ambiguous and, most 
likely, refutes the majority position-a point of which the Australian 
Supreme Court was to take careful notice.67 
Four months after Wesberry, the Court announced its opinions in six 
cases challenging state reapportionment schemes (or lack thereof). In 
each case, plaintiffs successfully argued that the electoral maps placed 
too few people in rural districts and too many people in urban dis-
tricts.68 In Reynolds v. Sims, the Court began the substantive portion of 
66 See u.s. CON ST. art. V. 
67 Perhaps because of the ambiguities of Article I, or perhaps because the Fourteenth Amend-
ment gives the Court greater leeway to intervene in state affairs generally, Justice Clark would 
have relied on the Equal Protection Clause even for challenges to federal districting. See Wesberry, 
376 U.S. at 18-19. Justice Black's broader approach, however, is reconcilable with Article I's 
function of establishing representative government. The theory goes something like this: narrow 
constitutional construction is only legitimate in a democracy where the political institutions are 
healthy; if they are distorted, then the courts must be willing to read the text more broadly in 
order to do the people's work. Given the widespread electoral distortions throughout the country, 
Justice Black had to fathom the text's deeper meaning in order to restore the health of state 
legislative institutions. It is of course for this reason that Chief Justice Warren wrote that the most 
important case of his tenure on the Court was not Brown as some might have guessed, but the 
voting rights cases. See EARL WARREN, THE MEMOIRS OF EARL WARREN 306-{)7 (1977). 
68 See generally Reynolds, 377 U.S. 533 (Alabama); WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 u.s. 633 (1964) 
(New York); Tawes, 377 U.S. 656 (Maryland); Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678 (1964) (Virginia); 
Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695 (1964) (Delaware); Lucas, 377 u.s. 713 (Colorado). 
There are many ways to measure malapportionment. Among the most common are: 
I} assessing the percentage of the population that is required to elect a majority of the 
legislative body. For instance, in Alabama in 1960, approximately 25% of the U[sltate's total 
population resided in districts represented by a majority of the members" of the state legislature. 
Reynolds, 377 u.s. at 545. The ideal would be if 51 % percent of the population was represented 
by 51 % of the state's legislators. See id. 
2} determining the ratio of the number of people in the most populous district to the number 
in the least populous, assuming one representative per district. For instance, in Alabama in 1960, 
each county had only one state senator, whether it had 634,864 residents or 15,417 residents, 
yielding a ratio of 41-to-1. See id. at 545-46. Where each district has the same number of voters, 
the ratio is I-to-l. 
3} determining the percentage variance from the average number of people per district. For 
instance, if a state has 4,000,000 voters, and 10 legislative districts, the ideal population of each 
district would be 400,000. A district that contains 440,000 deviates by 10% from the ideal or 
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its opmIOn by emphasizing the importance of the right to vote in 
this society. "The right to vote freely for the candidate of one's choice 
is of the essence of a democratic society, and any restrictions on that 
right strike at the heart of representative government. ''69 Although in 
Reynolds and its companion cases, the Court relied on the Equal Pro-
tection Clause rather than the right to vote for federal representatives, 
the same ideology of popular sovereignty and representative democ-
racy is eviden t. 70 
Themes of absolutism, individualism, and judicial activism that were 
initially intimated in Gray were fully expounded in Reynolds. The 
Court's attempt to explain how equipopulosity will be judged exem-
plifies its excessive absolutism. Although the Court grants that "mathe-
matical nicety" may be impossible,71 it then holds that only a standard 
exceedingly close to that will do.72 At the very least, something like near 
absolute equality is required.73 
The Court's intolerance of mathematical inequality is emphasized 
in its skepticism of the justifications that the states might assert to 
average; if another district contains 360,000, the total deviation in the state is 20% or plus or 
minus 10%. See, e.g., Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 529 (1969). In Australia and Canada, 
and currently in the United States, this is the most commonly used method. See Abrams, II7 S. 
Ct. at 1935-36 (explaining basics of reapportionment analysis). 
69 Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 555. The Court said, "[u]ndeniably the Constitution of the United States 
protects the right of all qualified citizens to vote, in state as well as in federal elections," citing 
"[a] consistent line of decisions by this Court" but not the constitutional text. fd. at 554. Although 
the U.S. Supreme Court does not, generally, distinguish between the Constitutional text and the 
Court's interpretation of the Constitutional text, the Australian High Court has made this 
distinction in, inter alia, the voting rights cases. See McGinty, 134 A.L.R. at 347-48 (McHugh,].) 
("it is the duty of justices of this Court to apply [the Constitution's] text and not the judicial 
decisions on the text. "). 
70 As the Reynolds Court noted: 
[0] ur decision in Wesberry was of course grounded on that language of the Constitution 
which prescribes that members of the Federal House of Representatives are to be chosen 
"by the People," while attacks on state legislative apportionment schemes, such as that 
involved in the instant cases, are principally based on the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. Nevertheless, l%sberry clearly established that the funda-
mental principle of representative government in this country is one of equal repre-
sentation for equal numbers of people, without regard to race, sex, economic status, or 
place of residence within a State. 
Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 560-61. "As long as ours is a representative form of government, and our 
legislatures are those instruments of government elected directly by and directly representative 
of the people, the right to elect legislators in a free and unimpaired fashion is a bedrock of our 
political system." fd. at 562. 
71 See id. at 569, 577. 
72 See id. at 568. 
73 Reynolds is ambiguous both as to what the correct formulation is and as to how it will be 
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excuse inequality.74 Although the Court would permit "legitimate con-
siderations incident to the effectuation of a rational state policy"75 to 
justifY deviation from equipopulous districting, it immediately removed 
from consideration the most likely legitimate considerations.76 The 
language used has been so influential on American, Australian, and 
Canadian courts that it is worth quoting at length: 
But neither history alone, nor economic or other sorts of 
group interests, are permissible factors in attempting to justifY 
disparities from population-based representation. Citizens, 
not history or economic interests, cast votes. Considerations 
of area alone provide an insufficient justification for devia-
tions from the equal-population principle. Again, people, not 
land or trees or pastures, vote. Modern developments and 
improvements in transportation and communications make 
rather hollow, in the mid-1960s, most claims that deviations 
from population-based representation can validly be based 
solely on geographical considerations. Arguments for allow-
ing such deviations in order to insure effective representation 
for sparsely settled areas and to prevent legislative districts 
from becoming so large that the availability of access of citi-
zens to their representatives is impaired are today, for the 
most part, unconvincing.77 
The Court thereby rejected nearly every reason a state might assert 
for deviating from absolutely equal size districts.78 The rationale for 
rigid adherence to the ideal of equipopulosity is that "all voters, as 
citizens of a State, stand in the same relation regardless of where they 
interpreted. See id. at 587-88 (Clark, J., concurring) (''Whether 'nearly as is ,practicable' means 
'one person, one vote' qualified by 'approximately equal' or 'some deviations' or by the impos-
sibility of 'mathematical nicety' is not clear from the majority'S use of these vague and meaningless 
phrases"). In Lucas,Justice Clark, unlike the majority, interpreted a deviation of "4.9% of being 
perfect" as within the "as nearly as practicable" mandate of Reynolds. Lucas, 377 U.S. at 741. This 
issue would occupy the Court in the ensuing decades. 
74 See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 579-81. 
75/d. at 579. 
76 See id. 
77 See id. at 579-80. 
78 See id. The Court did suggest that the desire to "maintain the integrity of political subdivi-
sions" may be a legitimate interest, thereby recognizing only those associational interests that 
have been formalized into law by political subdivision maps. See id. at 580. Even here, though, 
the Court said, population must not be "submerged as the controlling consideration." [d. at 581; 
see id. at 623 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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live."79 Thus, "[a]ny suggested criteria for the differentiation of citizens 
are insufficient to justifY any discrimination. "80 Since most of these 
proffered criteria would be associational interests-the common bonds 
people develop from shared neighborhoods, work, or values-the ef-
fect of the Court's approach is to preclude any consideration of group 
or associational interests.8l 
Indeed, the opinion is a paean to individual rights. "A predominant 
consideration in determining whether a State's legislative apportion-
ment scheme constitutes an invidious discrimination violative of rights 
asserted under the Equal Protection Clause is that the rights allegedly 
impaired are individual and personal in nature. "82 The Constitution 
guarantees each individual the right to vote, and the right to have her 
or his vote counted fairly and equally.83 The Constitution, under this 
individualist view, does not speak to people's interests in associating 
and in making their electoral voices heard on the basis of these asso-
ciations. 
Despite the fervently individualist orientation of Reynolds, certain 
undercurrents in the Court's opinion suggest that it was also con-
cerned with "effective representation. "84 Effective representation is, at 
least in some aspects, a group-related interest.85 It might mean that 
79 Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 565. 
80Id. 
81 Cf Lucas, 377 U.S. at 748-49 (Stewart,]., dissenting) ("I [can] not join in the fabrication of 
a constitutional mandate which imports and forever freezes one theory of political thought into 
our Constitution, and forever denies to every State any opportunity for enlightened and progres-
sive innovation in the design of its democratic institutions, so as to accommodate within a system 
of representative government the interests and aspirations of diverse groups of people, without 
subjecting any group or class to absolute domination by a geographically concentrated or highly 
organized majority. ") . 
82 Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 561. "Simply stated, an individual's right to vote for state legislators is 
unconstitutionally impaired when its weight is in a substantial fashion diluted when compared 
with votes of citizens living in other parts of the State." Id. at 568. 
83 See U.S. CONST. amends. XV, XIX, XXVI. 
84 See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 565. Much has been written about the competing interests of 
individual rights and fair and effective representation. See, e.g., John R. Low-Beer, The Constitu-
tional Imperative of Proportional Representation, 94 YALE LJ. 163 (1984); Bernard Grofman, Fair 
and Equal Representation, 91 ETHICS 477 (1980). 
85 See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 166-67 (1986) (Powell,]., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part): 
The concept of "representation" necessarily applies to groups: groups of voters elect 
representatives, individual voters do not. Gross population disparities violate the man-
date of equal representation by denying voters residing in heavily populated districts, as 
a group, the opportunity to elect the number of representatives to which their voting 
strength otherwise would entitle them. While population disparities do dilute the weight 
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each person should have equal access to her representative,86 or the 
same likelihood of casting a winning ballot.87 But it might also mean 
that people should have effective representation based on their affili-
ations.88 For instance, if farmers are to be effectively represented, they 
may need to be represented in the legislature in numbers that exceed 
their small proportional share of the population, but that match their 
importance to the community.89 
If this is the meaning of "effective representation," it could be not 
just distinct from but inconsistent with the promise of equipopulos-
ity.90 Indeed, the Canadian and Australian courts have concluded that 
mathematical equality may detract from effective representation be-
cause representation cannot be effective if it does not represent com-
munities of interests among voters.91 The Reynolds Court's response to 
this point is that "[o]ur constitutional system amply provides for the 
protection of minorities by means other than giving them majority 
control of state legislatures ... the democratic ideals of equality and 
majority rule, which have served this Nation so well in the past, are 
hardly of any less significance for the present and the future. "92 The 
of individual votes, their discriminatory effect is felt only when those individual votes 
are combined. Thus, the fact that individual voters in heavily populated districts are free 
to cast their ballot has no bearing on a claim of malapportionment. 
Id.; see also Bush, 116 S. Ct. at 2000, (Souter, j., dissenting) (noting the "basically associational 
character of the right to vote"). 
86 See Lani Guinier, Groups, Representation, and Race-Conscious Districting: A Case of the Emperor's 
Clothes, 71 ThXAS L. REv. 1590, 1599 (1993). 
87 See Jonathan Still, Political Equality and Elections Systems, 91 ETHICS 375 (1980) (discussing 
criteria for political equality). 
88 Representation is probably most accurately conceived as comprising both individualist and 
associational interests. One commentator has called this the 'Janus character" of the right to vote. 
Albert P. Weale, Representation, Individualism, and Collectivism, 91 ETHICS 457, 465 (1980). See 
also Conference: The Supreme Court, Racial Politics and the Right To Vote: Shaw v. Reno and the 
Future of the Voting Rights Act, 44 AM. V.L. REv. 1,76 (1993) ("it's a breath mint and a candy at 
the same time") (Professor Pamela Karlan speaking) [hereinafter Conference]; Aleinikoff & 
Issacharoff, supra note 3, at 588. 
89 Both apportionment and districting can achieve this purpose by ensuring that fewer farming 
votes will not be canceled out by a greater number of non-farming votes. "The instrumental 
purpose of voting-having one's preferences taken into account in choosing public officials--
necessarily involves aggregating the votes of individuals to achieve a collective outcome .... The 
way in which districts are drawn often determines which voters will be able to elect their preferred 
candidates and which voters will have their preferences go unsatisfied." Pamela S. Karlan, All 
Over the Map: The Supreme Court's Voting Rights Trilogy, 1993 SUP. CT. REv. 245, 249 [hereinafter 
Karlan, All Over the Map]. 
90 See Reynolds, 377 V.S. at 624 (Harlan,j., dissenting). 
91 See infra notes 206-09, 248-49 and acco~panying text. 
92 Reynolds, 377 V.S. at 566. This is not completely responsive, since mathematical equality 
precludes any disproportionate share of power, not just giving minorities majority control. See id. 
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Court saw no need to reconcile the two principles; to the extent that 
they are distinct at all, the Court clearly submerged the interest in 
effective representation, thereby marginalizing associational interests.93 
In a single breath, the Court imbued the Constitution with the promise 
of effective representation and compromised that promise for the sake 
of individual rights.94 
The effect of this individualist orientation was two-fold. First, it was 
enormously influential on later decisions which reinforced the indi-
vidualist approach and concomitantly minimized the importance of 
effective representation insofar as it responds to associational inter-
ests.95 Second, it facilitated the marriage, in the Shaw cases, of equal 
protection law and voting rights law that might otherwise have been 
more awkward to effectuate. Because the case law did not emphasize 
effective representation and because equal protection law is also indi-
vidualist, the Court was able to treat voting rights as one of many 
incidents of equal protection, without recognizing its distinctive na-
ture.96 Thus, in the Shaw cases, the Court imported its affirmative 
action jurisprudence into its districting cases as if no other (read 
associational) interest existed.97 
The third theme in timated in Gray and elaborated on in Reynolds is 
judicial activism. One measure of the Court's activism is the effect of 
the ruling on the states. As Justice Harlan suggested (still in dissent), 
"these decisions cut deeply into the fabric of our federalism."9s He 
estimated that the ruling would invalidate the legislative schemes (not 
93 See id. 
94 See id. 
95 But see Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 167 (Powell,]., dissenting in part, concurring in part); Bush, 
116 S. Ct. at 2000 (Souter,]., dissenting) quoted at supra note 85. 
96 See, e.g., Shaw /, 509 U.S. at 642 (The "central purpose [of the Equal Protection Clause] is 
to prevent the States from purposefully discriminating between individuals on the basis of race."); 
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976); see also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Perra, 515 
U.S. 200, 230 (1995) (referring to a "long line of cases understanding equal protection as a 
personal right."); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1,22 (1948) (" ... rights created by the first section 
of the Fourteenth Amendment are, by its terms, guaranteed to the individual."). 
97 This is the thrust of much of the current scholarly dissatisfaction with the redistricting cases. 
See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan & Daryl]. Levinson, lWiy Voting is Different, 84 CALIF. L. REv. 1201 
(1996); Aleinikoff & Issacharoff, supra note 3, at 588. On the other hand, some commentators 
have applauded the Court's merging of the two areas of law, arguing that there is nothing 
particularly distinctive about voting rights. See, e.g., James F. Blumstein, Racial Gerrymandering 
and Vote Dilution: Shawv. Reno in Doctrinal Context, 26 RUTGERS LJ. 517 (1995) Uustifying Shaw's 
reliance on race cases rather than voting rights cases). The point of disagreement would seem 
to lie primarily in the extent to which one recognizes that the associational character of voting 
distinguishes it from other interests protected under the Equal Protection Clause. 
98 Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 624 (Harlan,]., dissenting). 
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to mention delegitimize the legislatures) in all but a few of the 50 
states.99 
Beyond its immediate effect, the Reynolds case authorized federal 
district courts and, to a lesser extent, state courts, to supervise appor-
tionment of state legislatures, without any particular guidance from the 
Supreme Court to limit their discretion. loo This legacy is still with us 
today.10l Without evident trepidation, the Court brushed aside princi-
ples of federalism and separation of powers in order to ensure the 
effectiveness of its proposed remedy. As noted above, there may have 
been ample reason in cases like Baker, Reynolds, and Tawes for the 
Court's impatience: as in the ongoing school desegregation sagas, 
there was little reason to expect that states would suddenly begin 
protecting the individual rights newly identified by the Court. On these 
facts, the problem lies not with the result, but with the Court's failure 
to link the result to the facts, to recognize that it is the egregious facts, 
and not the Court's whim or a predilection for bright lines, that 
justifies overriding federalism and separation of powers interests. 
Thus, where the facts were not egregious, the Court could also 
impose its bright line on the state. In Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Colorado 
General Assembly, Colorado voters had actually chosen to have repre-
sentation in the upper house of the state's bicameral legislature based 
on geographic factors. The case was therefore unusual because it could 
not be alleged that a minority had entrenched itself. 102 Furthermore, 
the districts for the lower house were "as nearly equal in population as 
may be. "103 Thus, Lucas presents the closest analogy to the recent high 
99 See id. at 589. He also stated that the constitutions of all but eleven states "recognized bases 
of apportionment other than geographic spread of population, and to some extent favored 
sparsely populated areas by a variety of devices." [d. at 610; see also Lucas, 377 U.S. at 746 (Stewart, 
J., dissenting). 
100 See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 615-21 (Harlan, J., dissenting); cJ. id. at 586 ("legislative reappor-
tionment is primarily a matter for legislative consideration and determination, and judicial relief 
becomes appropriate only when a legislature fails to reapportion according to federal constitu-
tional requisites in a timely fashion after having had an adequate opportunity to do so"). While 
this may have been the Court's intent, it has not turned out that way. 
101 See gerteraUy Upham v. Seamon, 456 U.S. 37 (1982) (requiring district courts to defer to 
legislative proposals when drawing electoral plans). But see Abrams, 117 S. Ct. at 1941 (preferring 
federal district court plan over state legislative proposals that the Court said were tainted by 
Department of Justice pressure). 
102 Lucas, 377 U.S. at 717-20, 732-34. "Lucas presents that troubling case where in effect a 
majority of Colorado voters chose a less equipopulous districting plan than would have been 
required by one-person, one-vote. Chief Justice Warren finessed this issue by relying on individual 
conceptions of rights rather than a group-based equality claim." Issacharoff, supra note 7, at 
1667-68 n.123. 
103 Lucas, 377 U.S. at 734. 
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court cases in Australia and Canada, where political remedies appear 
to be available and where population is always at least an important 
factor (if not the controlling factor).104 Nonetheless, the Court invali-
dated the entire plan because the upper house districts deviated sub-
stantially from population equality and the Constitution, the Court 
said, stands for nothing if not the proposition that a majority of the 
people can not infringe on the constitutionally protected right of any 
citizen. 105 The lesson later courts have learned from these cases is not 
to tread carefully where federalism and separation of powers interests 
are at risk, but rather that these interests should not interfere with 
protection of individual rights, no matter the particular facts. 
2. Application of the Equipopulosity Standard 
The Court soon made clear that the Reynolds rule imposed different 
requirements on federal and state electoral districts. With respect to 
congressional districts, the Court would not accept any deviation 
from the mathematical ideal: "[a]s between two standards-equality or 
something-less-than equality--only the former reflects the aspirations 
of Article I, Section 2. "106 Thus, a plaintiff's proof that the deviation, 
104 See Reference re: Electoral Boundaries Commission Act [1991] 81 D.L.R. 16 (Ref re: EBCA); 
McGinty, 134 A.L.R. 289. 
105 Lucas, 377 U.S. at 735-37 ("A citizen's constitutional rights can hardly be infringed simply 
because a majority of the people choose that it be"). The Court does not explain why this mandate 
applies with equal vigor where the majority is burdening itself rather than an outnumbered 
minority-the question that has perplexed judges and commentators in the context of affirmative 
action as well. In Lucas, as in the usual affirmative action context, the majority gave some of its 
power to the minority that could not otherwise get it. See City of Richmond v. j.A. Croson Co., 
488 U.S. 469, 528-62 (1989) (Marshall, j., dissenting); Adarand, 515 U.S. at 243 (Stevens, j., 
dissenting) ("The Court's concept of 'consistency' assumes that there is no significant difference 
between a decision by the majority to impose a special burden on the members of a minority 
race and a decision by the majority to provide a benefit to certain members of that minority 
notwithstanding its incidental burden on some members of the majority. In my opinion that 
assumption is untenable."). 
I06Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 727 (1983) (invalidating a deviation in New Jersey's 
congressional districts of less than one percent, less than the predictable undercount in the 
available census data). The Court suggested that reasons for rejecting any permissible variation 
included the arbitrariness of any standard other than absolute equipopulosity and the possibility 
that the legislature would aim for the outer limit. See id. As explained in J(jrkpatrick, since each 
state has its particular history, geography, and demography, the Court had no basis for determin-
ing the extent to which these factors would justifY deviation from the ideal. J(jrkpatrick, 394 U.S. 
at 530-31. Rather than fixing an arbitrary standard for permissible deviation, the Court would 
permit no deviation at all from mathematical equality without proper justification: 
[w]e reject Missouri's argument that there is a fixed numerical or percentage population 
variance small enough to be considered de minimis and to satisfY without question the 
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however small, could have been avoided, is sufficient to shift the bur-
den to the state to justiry it.107 Once the burden has shifted, the state 
may justiry the deviation only by a legitimate (rather than substantial 
or compelling) justification,108 but as noted, virtually no justification is 
even legitimate. 
By contrast, the Court's application of one person, one vote to state 
legislative districting was downright lax. Two years after its strict con-
gressional rule was laid down in Kirkpatrick and Wells,l09 the Court in 
Abate v. Mundt, upheld a county legislative plan with a total deviation 
of 11.9% (virtually the same as in Wells).uo Here, the Court gave 
deference to the "considerable flexibility in municipal arrangements" 
"as nearly as practicable" standard. The whole thrust of the "as nearly as practicable" 
approach is inconsistent with adoption of fixed numerical standards which excuse 
population variances without regard to the circumstances of each particular case. The 
extent to which equality may practicably be achieved may differ from State to State and 
from district to district. Since "equal representation for equal numbers of people [is] 
the fundamental goal for the House of Representatives," Wesberry v. Sanders, the "as 
nearly as practicable" standard requires that the State make a good-faith effort to achieve 
precise mathematical equality. See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 577. 
Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S. at 530-31 (rejecting "practical politics" as justification for total population 
deviations of6%). See alm White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 797 (1973) (deviation of 4.13% invalid); 
Abrams, 117 S. Ct. at 1939-40 (upholding court-devised plan with overall population deviation of 
0.35%). 
107 As the Karcher Court noted: 
First, the court must consider whether the population differences among districts could 
have been reduced or eliminated altogether by a good-faith effort to draw districts of 
equal population. Parties challenging apportionment legislation must bear the burden 
of proof on this issue, and if they fail to show that the differences could have been 
avoided, the apportionment scheme must be upheld. If, however, the plaintiffs can 
establish that the population differences were not the result of a good-faith effort to 
achieve equality, the State must bear the burden of proving that each significant variance 
between districts was necessary to achieve some legitimate goal. 
Karcher, 462 U.S. at 730-31. 
108Id. at 732. 
109 Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542 (1969), invalidating New York's federal plan which con-
tained maximum deviations above and below the mean of approximately 6.5% (for a total 
deviation of 12%) on the ground that: 
" ... to accept population variances, large or small, in order to create districts with 
specific interest orientations is antithetical to the basic premise of the constitutional 
command to provide equal representation for equal numbers of people." To accept a 
scheme such as New York's would permit groups of districts with defined interest 
orientations to be overrepresented at the expense of districts with different interest 
orientations. 
Id. at 546 (quoting Kirkpatrick, 294 U.S. at 531). 
11°403 U.S. 182,187 (1971). 
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that are necessary if local governments are to "meet changing societal 
needs .... "lll The high water mark of deference to state policies came 
in the 1983 Wyoming case of Brown v. Thompson, where the Court 
decided that a deviation of 89% was permissible in order to ensure 
that each county would have specific representation in the state's 
house of representatives. 112 Furthermore, the standard for shifting the 
burden is different in state districts. The Court has held that a devia-
tion of less than 10% is de minimis and does not even make a prima 
facie case of an equal protection violation. ll3 The Court appears most 
comfortable in sanctioning plans that deviate less than a total of 25% 
from the population quota. 114 
111 [d. at 185. The Court also relied on the fact that "some local legislative districts may have a 
much smaller population than do congressional and state legislative districts," and "on the long 
tradition of overlapping functions and [constituting the government this way] and on the fact 
that the plan before us does not contain a built-in bias tending to favor particular political 
interests or geographic areas." [d. at 185, 187. Nonetheless, not all state apportionment plans 
after Reynolds were upheld. In Swann v. Adams, for instance, where the Court imposed on the 
state the burden of justifying a significant deviation from equipopulosity, it invalidated a plan 
with overrepresentation of 15.09% (senate) and 18.28% (house) and underrepresentation of 
10.56% (senate) and 15.27% (house) where the state offered no evidence to justifY it. Swann v. 
Adams, 385 U.S. 440, 443-44, 446, 447 (1967). By comparison, under the Canadian system, this 
might not be sufficient to shift the burden; under the Australian system, it would not raise a 
constitutional issue. See also White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973) (upholding state house of 
representatives plan that ranged from maximum overrepresentation of 5.8% to maximum un-
derrepresentation of 4.1 %). 
112 See Brown v. Thompson, 462 U.S. 835 (1983). The precedential value of this case is not clear, 
since four justices dissented and two concurrers did not read the majority as upholding a 
"statewide legislative plan" with an 89% maximum deviation, but as upholding the decision to 
give one county its own representative thereby increasing the deviation only about 23%, from 
66% (what it would be without the additional representative) to 89%. See id. at 850 (O'Connor, 
]., concurring), 850-51 (Brennan,]., dissenting). The constitutionality of the initial 66% deviation 
was not before the Supreme Court. 
Il3See &gester; 412 U.S. at 764; Brown, 462 U.S. at 842-43 (opinion), 852 (Brennan,]., 
dissenting). Whether the burden shifts at 10% total deviation, or at any deviation that could have 
been avoided, the state need only justify its deviation with a rational reason. 'The ultimate inquiry, 
therefore, is whether the legislature's plan 'may reasonably be said to advance [a] rational state 
policy' and, if so, 'whether the population disparities among the districts that have resulted from 
the pursuit of this plan exceed constitutional limits.'" Brown, 462 U.S. at 843 (quoting Mahan v. 
Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 328 (1973». See also Karcher, 462 U.S. at 731. More reasons are considered 
rational with respect to state legislative plans. See also Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 750-51 
(1973) (deviation of 8% is minor and does not make a prima facie case under the Equal 
Protection Clause); Brown, 462 U.S. at 851-52 (O'Connor,]., concurring). 
114 Compare, e.g., Mahan, 410 U.S. at 329 (upholding deviation of 16%) with Whitcomb v. 
Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 162 (1971) (invalidating total deviation of 24.78%) and Swann, 385 U.S. at 
443-44 (invalidating total deviation of 25.65%). 
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The Court has never provided a satisfactory explanation for its 
adoption of two different standards. It has said that: 
absolute population equality [must] be the paramount objec-
tive of apportionmen t only in the case of congressional dis-
tricts, for which the command of Art[icle] I, [Section] 2 as 
regards the National Legislature outweighs the local inter-
ests that a State may deem relevant in apportioning districts 
for representatives to state and local legislatures, but we have 
not questioned the population equality standard for congres-
sional districts. 115 
Yet the Court has not explained why this should be so: that is, why do 
local interests prevail for representation to state houses more than for 
representation to Congress? Certainly good arguments for using the 
same standard abound: among them, that the harm of an unequally 
weighted vote is the same whether the vote is for a state or federal 
representative; that the state's sovereign interest in constituting its own 
legislature is not substantially different given that some states have 
been drawing federal district lines since 1842, longer than some others 
have had state legislatures; and that despite some ambiguous language 
in Reynolds v. Sims, the more straightforward reading of it and its 
companion cases is that the 1964 Court did not contemplate a different 
standard.1l6 Beyond this, one might legitimately argue that if the Court 
is committed to two standards, the stricter one ought to apply to state 
legislatures: the source of the guarantee of equal state representation 
(the Equal Protection Clause) explicitly guarantees equality, while the 
source of the guarantee of equal federal representation would seem 
to be more concerned with effective than with mathematically equal 
representation;1l7 there is a greater likelihood that state legislators will 
manipulate district lines to their own benefit than to the benefit of 
their federal counterparts; and, historically, it was the state legislatures 
that were more grossly malapportioned. In other words, if a 20% 
deviation is arbitrary and conduces to noncompliance with respect to 
congressional districts, it is not clear why it is acceptable for state 
115 Karcher, 462 U.S. at 732-33. 
116 See id. at 782 n.14 (White,]., dissenting) (arguing that there no longer remains any 
justification for using a different standard for legislitive and congressional reapportionment, and 
noting that Wesberryand Reynolds "were frequently cross-cited, and the formulation 'as nearly of 
equal population as is practicable' appears in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. at 589, as well as Wesberry 
v. Sanders, 376 U.S. at 7-8."). 
117 Karcher, 462 U.S. at 746-47 (Stevens,]., concurring). 
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districts. Alternatively, if the state has sound reasons for deviating from 
equipopulosity for its own legislature, why wouldn't those reasons out-
weigh any individual's interest in an equally weighted vote for the 
federal legislature at least as well?118 
The two-tiered approach seems to be explainable on two grounds, 
neither related to the actual conditions that obtain when states draw 
district lines. One is simple frustration with the process of achieving 
equipopulosity.ll9 The other is the trading of one abstract standard 
(absolute equipopulosity) for another (federalism). In Mahan v. How-
el~ for instance, where the Court first made clear that h would apply a 
more lenient standard for state districts, virtually no attention was given 
to the question of why state legislatures are dissimilarly situated when 
they district for themselves or for Congress.120 In the absence of any 
other explanation and given that the right to share equally in the 
practice of self-government is the same in either event, the difference 
between state and federal representation would seem to depend on 
some conception of federalism, not on the factual difference in repre-
sentation between having a vote that is worth 10% more or less than 
that of another person. Federalism is an abstract principle in this 
context because it is not linked to any factual necessity: there is no 
explanation as to why it was abandoned in Reynolds or Lucas or Karcher 
and no explanation as to why it was reinvoked in Mahan or Brown. In 
none of these cases is the presence or absence of federalism explained 
in terms of achieving "fair and effective representation. "121 Nor has the 
118 One could argue that federal districts must be more constrained because each one contains 
more individuals so that each percentage deviation affects more people. While this may be true, 
it is not an argument that the Court has focused on. 
119 See, e.g., Gaffney, 412 U.S. at 749-50 (''That the Court was not deterred by the hazards of 
the political thicket when it undertook to adjudicate the reapportionment cases does not mean 
that it should become bogged down in a vast, intractable apportionment slough, particularly when 
there is little, if anything, to be accomplished by doing so"). Justice White argued in his dissent 
in Karcher that, as a result of Kirkpatrick, "[mlost estimates are that between 25 percent and 35 
percent of current house district lines were drawn by the courts." Karcher, 462 U.S. at 778 (quoting 
A.B.A., CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTING 20 (1981». The Court continues to be unable to control 
judicial oversight of redistricting, and it continues to be ambivalent towards judicial participation 
in this quintessentially legislative function. Litigation increased inordinately after the 1990 redis-
tricting. See Issacharoff, supra note 7, at 1690 n.236 (as of December 20, 1992, "36 of the 49 states 
that redistricted after the 1990 Census and the District of Columbia are or have been involved 
in litigation over their congressional or state legislative redistricting lines. In addition, Iowa has 
been involved in litigation over access to the database and software used in its process, although 
the lines themselves were unchallenged. To date, 114 lawsuits have been filed, with more suits 
expected. "). 
120 See 410 U.S. 315 (1973). 
121 See Karcher, 462 U.S. at 775 (White,]., dissenting). 
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Court articulated any normative rule for when federalism interests 
should control in future cases. 122 Federalism just seems to appear and 
disappear like a rabbit pulled at whim from the Court's constitutional 
hat. 
What the Court's approach lacked in justification, it made up for in 
clarity. States knew how to abide by the Court's rulings and did so with 
little difficulty.123 To the extent that state legislators continued to have 
less-than-honorable designs, they were able to achieve their personal 
or political goals while still adhering to the Reynolds rule (thanks in 
part to improved computer technology which permitted states to ex-
periment with alternative plans while comporting with the Court's 
standards).124 The equipopulosity rule may even have facilitated the 
age-old practice of gerrymandering. Indeed, the Court was slow to 
recognize that rigidly insisting on the Reynolds standard would solve 
one aspect of the problem of unfair representation, but might exacer-
bate others.125 In his concurrence in Karcher, Justice Stevens argued 
that the Court ought to be more attentive to other kinds of harms 
caused by manipulation of voting districts against which the Equal 
Protection Clause also protects.126 
3. Gerrymandering 
Although the Court has been deciding gerrymandering cases since 
the early 1960s,127 the last few years have seen un preceden ted judicial 
122 For the present Court's ambivalence toward federal courts drawing districting plans, compare 
Growe v. Emerson, 507 u.s. 25, 33 (1993), requiring "federal judges to defer consideration of 
disputes involving redistricting where the State, through its legislative or judicial branch, has 
begun to address that highly political task itself' with Lawyer v. Dept. of Justice, 117 S. Ct. 2186 
(1997), permitting district court to adopt redistricting plan without invalidating state legislature's 
plan. 
123 See supra note 7. 
124 See, e.g., Karcher, 462 U.S. at 752 n.1O (Stevens,J., concurring), 785 (Powell,J., dissenting) 
(''The plain fact is that in the computer age, this type of political and discriminatory gerryman-
dering can be accomplished entirely consistently with districts of equal population. "); IssacharofI, 
supra note 7, at 1654. In North Carolina, where the Shaw claim arose, "[sleven of the districts 
have a population of 552,386, and the other five districts have a population of 552,387." Pope v. 
Blue, 809 F. Supp. 392, 395 (W.D.N.C. 1992). 
125 "[Elxcept in the minds of the most naive, there was no assurance that giving city people 
adequate legislative representation would necessarily bring the solution of urban problems. But 
it did seem clear that a solution would not be reached without such representation." Carl Brent 
Swisher, History's Panorama and Justice Black's Career, in HUGO BLACK AND THE SUPREME COURT: 
A SYMPOSIUM 1, 32 (Stephen Parks Strickland ed., 1962). 
126 Karcher, 462 U.S. at 747 (Stevens, J., concurring), 786-90 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
127 See, e.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 339 (1960) (holding that Alabama violated 
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attention to what the Court has described as "racial gerrymander-
ing. "128 These cases all emerged after the 1990 round of redistricting: 
when the 1990 Census authorized a number of states to create addi-
tional congressional districts, state legislatures created some districts in 
which racial minorities constituted a majority of voters. l29 While this 
enabled racial minorities who constituted cohesive voting blocs to elect 
the candidates of their choice, it also created a large class of white 
voters who would be in the minority in their districts. In Shaw v. Reno, 
the Court held that these voters stated a cause of action for unlawful 
race discrimination because the districts they were put in were drawn 
with attention to voters' race. 130 The Court said that "a plaintiff chal-
lenging a reapportionment statute under the Equal Protection Clause 
the Fifteenth Amendment when it redrew Tuskegee's city limits to exclude virtually every black 
voter). In later cases, the Court would decide that Gomillion was more properly conceived as an 
Equal Protection case, thus reinforcing the treatment of voting as an incident of equality rather 
than as a value in and of itself. See id. at 349 (Whittaker,]., concurring); Whitcomb, 403 U.S. at 
127; City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 86 (1980) (Stevens,]., concurring in judgment); 
Karcher, 462 U.S. at 748 (Stevens,]., dissenting); Shaw l, 509 U.S. at 645. 
128 This is unfortunate nomenclature, because it renders a complex process unidimensional, 
and focuses attention, perhaps unduly, on group interests defined by race. AsJustice Stevens has 
recognized, "[i]n the line-drawing process, racial, religious, ethnic, and economic gerrymanders 
are all species of political gerrymanders . . . the motivation for the gerrymander turns on the 
political strength of members of the group, derived from cohesive voting patterns, rather than 
on the source of their common interests." Karcher, 462 U.S. at 749-50 (quoting Mobile, 446 U.S. 
at 88 (Stevens,]., concurring in the judgment»; see also Cousins v. City Council of Chicago, 466 
F.2d 830, 852 (7th Cir.) (Stevens,]., dissenting), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 893 (1972). Describing the 
districts at issue in the Shaw cases simply as racial gerrymanders denies that they were drawn to 
effectuate political gains, as well as to unify people of similar interests based on political and 
socio-economic ties. For instance, these were the first districts ever drawn in North Carolina and 
Louisiana to unify the less aflluent. See Conference, supra note 88, at 35; see also Frank P. Parker, 
Factual Errors and Chilling Consequences: A Critique of Shaw v. Reno and Miller v. Johnson, 26 
CUMB. L. REv. 527, 531 (1996) [hereinafter Parker, FactualErrors] (describing the commonalities 
among people within the challenged districts in Georgia). 
129 A number of theories have been asserted to explain the sudden increase of these districts 
after 1990. The most likely suspects are far-sighted Republican strategists who sought to destabilize 
the Democratic party in the South; rigorous enforcers of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U .S.C. § 1973c 
(1988 ed.), in the Department of Justice; incumbent state legislators; black caucuses at both the 
federal and state levels; and liberal interest groups such as the American Civil Liberties Union. 
See Miller, 515 U.S. at 905-11; Abrams, 117 S. Ct. at 1929-33 (describing the provenance of the 
various proposed districting plans); Conference, supra note 88, at 56; Karlan, All Over the Map, 
supra note 89, at 269-71. Professor Parker also attributes some responsibility to the press and 
even to the Supreme Court's decision in Thornburgv. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986). Parker,Factual 
Errors, supra note 128, at 528. Although most of these majority-minority districts were drawn to 
create an effective Mrican-American voting bloc, some were designed to benefit other racial 
minorities as well. See, e.g., Bush, 116 S. Ct. 1941 (invalidating majority-Hispanic district). 
130 Shaw l, 509 U.S. at 630. 
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may state a claim by alleging that the legislation, though race-neutral 
on its face, rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an 
effort to separate voters into different districts on the basis of race, and 
that the separation lacks sufficient justification. "131 Such a claim would 
be subject to strict scrutiny, requiring the state to justity with a compel-
ling interest any reapportionment plan that appeared to be substan-
tially motivated by consideration of voters' race.132 
In subsequent cases, the Court refined what has been called the 
constitutional tort of "wrongful districting. "133 In Miller v. Johnson, the 
Court explained that the plaintiff must prove that: 
race was the predominant factor motivating the legislature's 
decision to place a significant number of voters within or 
without a particular district. To make this showing, a plaintiff 
must prove that the legislature subordinated traditional race-
neutral districting principles, including but not limited to 
compactness, contiguity, respect for political subdivisions or 
communities defined by actual shared interests, to racial con-
siderations.134 
In United States v. Hays, the Court established that only voters living in 
the allegedly gerrymandered district had standing to bring such a 
claim.135 The Court has now closed the circle by holding, on the merits, 
that districts in North Carolina and Texas which had been challenged 
as racial gerrymanders did not survive strict scrutiny.136 
A Shaw claim is valid regardless of the race of the plaintiffs-indeed 
the Shaw plaintiffs did not identity their race in their complaint137-al-
mId. at 649. 
132Id. at 658 ("If the allegation of racial gerrymandering remains uncontradicted, the District 
Court further must determine whether the ... plan is narrowly tailored to further a compelling 
governmental interest"). 
m Pamela S. Karlan, Still Hazy After All These Years: Voting Rights in the Post-Shaw Era, 26 CUMBo 
L. REv. 289, 289 (1996) [hereinafter Karlan, Still Hazy]. 
134 Miller, 515 U.S. at 916. 
135 Hays, 515 U.S. at 737. "Where a plaintifIresides in a racially gerrymandered district ... [she 
or he] has been denied equal treatment because of the legislature's reliance on racial criteria, 
and therefore has standing to challenge the legislature's action." Id. at 744-45. The Court did 
not explain why reliance on racial criteria constitutes unequal treatment or why such unequal 
treatment is of constitutional stature, and even if it is, why it only violates the rights of those who 
were districted in and not those who were districted out. See id. at 750 (Stevens,].). 
136 See Bush, ll6 S. Ct. at 1951; Shaw II, ll6 S. Ct. at 1899. 
137 Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 641. 
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though, as with any affirmative action program, whites are far more 
likely to challenge the state action than are racial minorities. And it is 
valid regardless of whether the plaintiffs' votes were in fact diluted; 
thus, plaintiffs need not show any actual injury to their right to vote. 138 
Nor need plaintiffs show that they were placed in their district because 
of their (white) race; they need only show that others (blacks) were. 
Thus, they need not allege or prove invidious intent. 139 This signi-
ficantly reduces plaintiffs' burden because invidious intent has histori-
cally been one of the most difficult burdens for minority plaintiffs to 
carry in challenging racial discrimination. l4O The alleged harm here is 
that the line drawers thought too much about some voters' race at the 
expense of other criteria. l41 As so conceived, a Shaw claim looks more 
like an affirmative action claim than a voting rights claim; indeed, the 
Court relied more on affirmative action cases like Richmond v. fA. 
u8Conference, supra note 88, at 5l. 
1~9 Shaw l/, 116 S. Ct. at 1900; see also Parker, Factual ErrUT'S, supra note 128, at 532 (" ... 
plaintiffs [in Shaw I and Millerdid not] allege or prove racially discriminatory purpose or effect"). 
In most cases invidious intent would be impossible to prove because the race of the plaintiffs will 
have been irrelevant to the disUicting decision. A racially gerrymandered disUict will have been 
designed by, first, determining the number of people who should be in a congressional disUict 
according to the principle of equipopulosity; second, determining the number of minorities 
needed to gain an electoral victory; third, identifYing where such minorities live and drawing 
lines around their homes; and fourth, filling in the remainder of the district's population with 
whoever lives nearby (with due attention to such other factors as incumbency protection and 
residence, partisan balance of power, etc.) but with no attention to their race. See, e.g., Bush, 116 
S. Ct. at 1954. Once more than 50% of the voting population in the district is selected according 
to the desired criteria, the traits of the remaining voters do not matter. Thus, the plaintiffs in a 
Shaw claim are those most likely to be placed in the disUict without regard to their race. See 
Karlan, Still Hazy, supra note 133, at 290. Even if some regard were given to plaintiffs' race, it is 
unlikely that the lines would have been drawn because of their adverse effect on people of 
plaintiffs' race, as is usually required in non-affirmative action equal protection cases. That is, 
one does not include a white voter in a majority-minority disUict because being in the disUict 
will devalue her vote. See generally id. at 302 n.86 (noting that Shaw claims are unlikely to meet 
the standard for intent set out in Personnel Admin. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)). The 
Court's response to the Feeney criticism is that no invidious discrimination need be proven because 
the districts are so bizarrely shaped that they are inexplicable on grounds other than race. Shaw 
I, 509 U.S. at 643-44 (quoting Arlington Heights v. Metro Housing Devel. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 
266 (1977)). This is both factually and legally incorrect. The district shapes are atUibutable to 
political, non-racial motivations, and even if they were racially motivated, this standard substitutes 
invidious discriminatory intent for mere race-consciousness. 
140 See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
HI See Shaw II, 116 S. Ct. at 1900 (stating that since "a legislature may be conscious of the voters' 
races without using race as a basis for assigning voters to districts ... [t]he constitutional wrong 
occurs when race becomes the 'dominant and controlling' consideration.") (citing Shaw I, 509 
U.S. at 645-47 and Miller, 515 U.S. at 911-12,916). 
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Croson CO.,t42 and later Adarand Constructors v. Peiia 143 than on Wesberry 
v. Sanders. The Shaw Court did not explain why it was supplanting 
voting rights law with equal protection law, except to say, ipse dixit, that 
the Shaw claim was "analytically distinct" from a traditional voting 
rights claim.144 
The decision to treat districting claims like equal protection claims 
rather than like voting rights claims reveals how the three principal 
themes of Gray and Reynolds reverberate throughout the Shaw cases. 
The contemporary Court's absolutism is evidenced in its refusal to 
consider the factual subtleties of various types of race consciousness. 
All governmental race consciousness should be subjected to strict scru-
tiny, the Court says, because it constitutes impermissible racial stereo-
types that "bear[] an uncomfortable resemblance to political apart-
heid."145 This is true regardless of the intent or the effect of the gov-
ernment's awareness of race (here, to enhance minority representation 
in Congress) and regardless of the political motivations (the white 
majority benefiting the black minority). Although the Court has tried 
to soften the impact of this rule by suggesting that not all race con-
sciousness will fall under the strict scrutiny guillotine,146 Shaw II and 
142 488 u.S. 469 (1989) (plurality opinion) (applying strict scrutiny to a municipal program to 
set aside a percentage of city contracts to minority businesses). 
143 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (applying strict scrutiny to a federal set-aside program). 
144 Shaw /, 509 U.S. at 652. This language seems to be most acceptable to those who already 
agreed that equal protection law should control. See, e.g., Blumstein, supra note 97, at 592-93 
(finding analytical distinction to be warranted by principle and precedent). A cynic might suggest 
that the only distinction is that a Shaw claim is a voting rights claim without an injury. I make 
the point only to illustrate how the Court missed an opportunity to explain its rationale; I leave 
to others the task of assessing whether or not the claims are distinct by any analytically coherent 
measure. 
145 Shaw l, 509 U.S. at 647. 
146 See itl. at 642 (stating that "this Court never has held that race-conscious state decisionmaking 
is impermissible in all circumstances."); see also Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237 (suggesting that strict 
scrutiny is not fatal in fact). The Court has not identified any interest that counts as compelling. 
Justice O'Connor has argued that the need to avoid violations of Section 2 of the Voting Rights 
Act is a compelling governmental interest, although she needed a separate opinion in which to 
say it. Bush, 116 S. Ct. at 1968. Furthermore, it raises the question of whether the Court should 
accept actual or reasonably anticipated violations of Section 2 as the prompt. In his dissent in 
Abrams, 117 S. Ct. at 1943,Justice Breyer criticizes the prohibition on all race consciousness except 
as necessary to avoid actual violations. This rule, Breyer argues, precludes race consciousness 
where it furthers the remedial purposes of the Equal Protection Clause. It also further embroils 
the district courts in redistricting because it permits race consciousness only where a court has 
determined that a violation would occur, rather than where a legislator reasonably believed a 
violation would occur. Finally, the "actual violation" standard contains no "simple, administrable 
stopping place-a principle that could serve the same function in this context as does the 
one-person-one-vote rule in the context of reapportionment." [d. at ·1950. Of course, none of this 
resolves the narrow tailoring question. 
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Bush demonstrate that there is virtually no difference between saying 
that strict scrutiny applies to a plan and invalidating it. Despite abun-
dant evidence indicating that other factors, at least as important as 
race, motivated the legislatures in these cases, and that even if race 
were the predominant factor, the challenged districts were narrowly 
tailored to serve the compelling interest of alleviating centuries-old 
race discrimination in North Carolina and Texas, a divided Court in 
both cases struck down the districts as impermissible race conscious-
ness. 147 
Using the framework of equal protection rather than voting rights 
law also achieved two collateral goals that echo the Gray and Reynolds 
cases. It permitted the Court to cast the claim solely in terms of indi-
vidual rights, without referring to "effective representation" at all.l48 
The only concern here is that individuals not be treated differently 
because of race; there is no discussion at all of the purpose of district-
ing in the first place or the value to society as a whole of enhanced 
minority representation. 149 Finally, since the Fourteenth Amendment 
condones federal court intervention in state affairs, relying on the 
Equal Protection Clause permitted the Court to devalue federalism 
interests; by contrast, both Article I, Section 2 and especially Article I, 
Section 4 delegate power to the states, arguably imposing on the Court 
some obligation to be deferential. The Court's rejection of deference, 
along with its exclusive commitment to individual rights and to abso-
lutism distinguish its approach from that of both the Canadian Su-
preme Court and the Australian High Court to the detriment of Ameri-
can voters, the legitimacy of the political process generally, and the 
Court's own stature. 
147 Shaw II, 116 s. Ct. at 1899; Bush, 116 s. Ct. at 1951. 
148 See, e.g., Shaw II, 116 S. Ct. at 1906 (the "right to an undiluted vote (to cast a ballot equal 
among voters), belongs [not] to the minority as a group [but] to its individual members." citing 
42 U.S.C. § 1973 ("the right of any citizen"». 
149Districting was designed to help any minority interest that would otherwise be perpetual 
losers by the winner-take-all nature of statewide elections. As the Court itself has explained on 
various occasions, "[t]he very essence of districting is to produce a different-a more 'politically 
fair' -result than would be reached with elections at large, in which the winning party would take 
100% of the legislative seats." Bandemer, 478 u.s. at 128 (quoting Gaffney, 412 u.s. at 752-53). 
One problem with Shaw is that, in treating race differently, it prevents political minorities who 
identify on the basis of race (as opposed to political minorities who identify, for instance, on the 
basis of common farming interests) to reap the benefits of districting. For racial minorities, it is 
winner-take-all throughout the state and, by definition, they are never sufficiently numerous to 
take all. 
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C. The Canadian Cases: Fulfilling the Charter's Purpose 
In the last few years, courts allover Canada have been called upon to 
decide whether the district boundary lines drawn by election commis-
sions violate Canada's constitutional guarantee of the right to vote.150 
Although Canada had a form of constitutional democracy since 
1867,l5l the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Charter) came 
into effect only in 1982.152 The explicit protection for individual rights 
in the Charter inaugurated what one judge has called the judicializa-
tion of society," in which, as has been the case in the United States 
since before de Tocqueville visited, every important issue is ultimately 
determined by a court.153 This is a role which, in Canada, "the judiciary 
did not seek but which has been thrust upon us" by the Canadian 
Charter. 1M It is no surprise then that sooner, rather than later, the 
Canadian courts would have to decide questions of apportionment and 
districting. 155 And it would not be too long before the Canadian Su-
preme Court would issue a definitive decision, establishing the general 
principles by which these questions should be decided and guiding the 
lower courts. 
The Supreme Court case was from Saskatchewan. In many respects, 
the underlying facts were typical of the Canadian experience and, in 
at least one fundamental respect, typical of the American experience 
150 Appellate courts in Alberta, British Columbia, Prince Edward Island, and Saskatchewan have 
heard such cases since 1986. See Alberta: Reference re: Electoral Divisions Statutes Amendment 
Act 1993 (Alta.) [1994]119 D.L.R 1 (Alberta 1994); Reference re: Electoral Boundaries Commis-
sion Act (Alta.) [1991] 83 Alta. L.R. 210, 86 D.L.R. 447; Lac la Biche (Town) v. Alberta [1993] 
102 D.L.R. 499 (Alta. C.A.); British Columbia, re: Dixon and Attorney-General of British Columbia 
[1986] 31 D.L.R. 546 (B.C.S.C.) (Dixon 1986), on remand, re: Dixon and Attorney-General of 
British Columbia [1989] 59 D.L.R. 247 (B.C.S.C) (Dixon 1989); Prince Edward Island: Charlot-
tetown (City) v. Prince Edward Island [1996] 142 D.L.R. 343 (P.E.I.S.C.) (PEl 1996); MacKinnon 
v. Prince Edward Island [1993] 104 Nfld., P.E.I.R. 232 (P.E.I.S.C.), 101 D.L.R. 362; Saskatchewan: 
Reference re: Electoral Boundaries Commission Act (Sask.) [1991] 5 C.R.R. 1 sub nom. Carter v. 
Saskatchewan (Attorney General) [1991] 2 S.C.R. 158,94 Sask. R. 161,81 D.L.R. 16. 
151 See Constitution Act (1867) (the former British North America Act). 
152 See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
15S Dixon 1986, 31 D.L.R. at 548. This provincial case held that districting claims are justiciable 
under Section 3 of the Canadian Charter; it is analogous to Baker v. Carr. 
154 Id. at 548. See also Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 415 (1977) (referring to judicial authority 
over districting plans as an "unwelcome obligation."); Lawyer, 117 S. Ct. at 2196 (Scalia, j., 
dissenting) . 
155 While in America, the two issues were severed, the Canadian courts have considered them 
jointly, so that a question about whether boundary lines were drawn consistently with the Charter 
requires consideration both of the number of people in each district (or riding as it is called) 
and of where on the map the lines were drawn. 
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as well. Almost all of the Canadian cases arise out of the provincial 
legislatures' failure to adjust electoral boundaries to reflect increasing 
urbanization and concomitant loss of population in traditionally well-
represented rural areas. Although in no case has the legislatures' 
recalcitrance been as extreme as was that of some American legisla-
tures in the 1950s and 1960s, the same impulses are at work. For 
instance, in Saskatchewan, by the time of the 1989 redrawing of bound-
ary lines, "[t]he rural areas ha[d] 53.0% of the seats and 50.4% of the 
population. Urban areas ha[d] 43.9% of the seats and 47.6% of the 
population. "156 In Alberta, 60% of the people lived in metropolitan 
areas, but were represented by only 51.8% of the Legislative Assembly 
or 43 out of 83 seats. 157 Indeed, in most cases, it was noted that the 
legislatures had been moving toward valuing urban and rural votes 
equally, albeit not as quickly as some (urban voters) would have liked. 15s 
The Alberta Court referred to this as "[t]he political prudence that 
encourages gradual but steady change," with which it had some but 
not unlimited patience. 159 Furthermore, in Saskatchewan, as in other 
provinces, the rural preference had proven decisive in recent elections; 
in 1986, the Saskatchewan Conservatives, whose base is largely rural, 
had won a second mandate, gaining 38 seats, as against the New 
Democratic Party's 25 seats, even though the latter received more 
votes. 160 
1. The Electoral Boundaries Commission Act 
Unlike most American jurisdictions, most Canadian provinces use 
independent electoral boundary commissions to draw boundary lines, 
although such commissions are not required by the Charter. 161 These 
commissions, which have been used for more than thirty years in 
156 &f re: EBCA, 81 D.L.R. at 42 (Opinion of McLachlin,j.). All references to this case are to 
the opinion of McLachlin, j., unless otherwise noted. Justice McLachlin wrote for four other 
members ofthe Court;Justice Sopinka agreed with her result and "substantially with her reasons," 
(Sopinka,j., concurring); two other justices dissented. ld. at 20. In addition to writing the main 
opinion in this case, Justice McLachlin also wrote one of the most significant provincial court 
opinions as Chief Justice of the British Columbia Supreme Court. See Dixon 1989,59 D.L.R. 247. 
157 Alberta 1994, 119 D.L.R. at 5. 
158 See, e.g., PEl 1996, 142 D.L.R. at 347. 
159 Alberta 1994, 119 D.L.R. at 19 (" ... the idea of achievement of full electoral rights over 
time, but with all deliberate speed, warrants judicial restraint."). 
160 Brian Bergman & Dale Eisler, A Hard, Cold Choice, MCLEAN'S, Mar. 18, 1991, at 19. 
161 &f re: EBCA, 81 D.L.R. at 21 (Sopinka, j.) ("It was not necessary for the Saskatchewan 
legislature to create an independent commission, and, had it simply legislated the impugned 
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Canada,162 vary in their autonomy depending on the extent to which 
they comprise sitting members of the Legislative Assembly for which 
the redistricting was conducted, and on the degree of detailed instruc-
tion they are given by those legislatures. 
In many cases, the enabling legislation is quite specific in its instruc-
tions to the independent commission. For instance, in Saskatchewan, 
the Electoral Boundaries Commission Act (Electoral Act) "required 
the electoral commission to create 29 urban, 35 rural, and two north-
ern ridings. "163 In terestingly, the fact that the legislature predetermines 
boundaries, the process itself would not have been subject to judicial scrutiny. "). Indeed, in Prince 
Edward Island, the first boundary proposal was made by a commission consisting of five sitting 
members of the legislature and three non-members which received "much public participation," 
while the second one (which was ultimately accepted by the legislature) was made by a provincial 
government employee who "more or less locked himself away and did not consult anyone or 
receive representation from anyone" during the month he worked on the plan. PEl 1996, 142 
D.L.R. at 345-46. The Court implicitly upheld the former process and explicitly upheld the latter. 
See also Alberta 1994, 119 D.L.R. at 19 ("We accept that there is no authority to say that the Charter 
mandates an independent commission"). Commissions are common in the British tradition. 
"[T)here would be scope for embarrassment if politicians were to be required to redraw those 
boundaries without independent advice." Regina v. Boundary Comm'n for England, ex parte Foot 
and Others (1983) 1 Q.B. 600, 2 WL.R. 458, 464, 1 All E.R. 1099. American districting processes 
seem to run the gamut. Compare Abrams, 117 S. Ct. at 1944 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (describing 
"most redistricting efforts [as) the culmination of committee meetings, public hearings, exami-
nation of various districting proposals, and many hours spent with an extremely sophisticated 
computer") with ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 88-90 (1990) (recounting his expe-
rience as a special master designing a Connecticut reapportionment plan with 2 graduate students 
and the census tracts). 
162Alberta 1994,119 D.L.R. at 7. 
163Electoral Boundaries Commission Act, S.S. 198~7-88, ch. E-6.1, § 14 [hereinafter Elec-
toral Act); see Ref re: EBCA, 81 D.L.R. at 40. Large portions of some Canadian provinces are 
extraordinarily sparsely populated. These districts are usually guaranteed representation not in 
accordance with their numbers, and are thus exempt from any equipopulosity requirement that 
might otherwise apply. In doctrinal terms, it is said that although the representation in these 
ridings violates the right to vote guaranteed in Section 3 of the Charter, the violation is justified 
under Section 1 of the Charter which acknowledges "reasonable limits" on Charter rights to the 
extent that they can be "demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society." See Dixon 1989, 
142 D.L.R. at 270. See also discussion of Sections 1 and 3, infra notes 183-89 and accompanying 
text. Thus, the two northern ridings mandated by the Electoral Act were upheld by the lower 
court and not challenged in the Supreme Court even though they constituted approximately the 
northern half of the territory of the province and had 50% fewer voters than the provincial 
average. See Ref re: EBCA, 81 D.L.R. at 40. These ridings were found to be: 
in a class by themselves. The geography of these sparsely settled regions clearly demon-
strates a pressing and substantial need for two northern constituencies. The creation of 
these constituencies is certainly rationally connected to the concept that these vast, 
underpopulated areas need effective representation. In short, the creation of the two 
northern ridings meets all the requisite conditions and they are justified under [Section) 
1 of the Charter. 
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the number of urban and rural ridings is not per se unconstitutional; 
it only becomes problematic if the particular designation violates the 
constitutional right to vote by disproportionately favoring one group.I64 
In Alberta, for instance, the legislature had determined that there 
should be 43 urban seats and 40 rural seats, which would not have been 
suspicious but for the fact that 60% of the population lived in urban 
areas.165 Thus, the rural minority was able to minimize substantially its 
numerical disadvantage. I66 
The Saskatchewan Act further established that "the voter population 
of each constituency [must be] within plus or minus 25% of the 
provincial quotient."167 This latitude is common in Canada: legislation 
in Newfoundland, New Brunswick, Quebec, Ontario, Alberta, Yukon, 
British Columbia, and Prince Edward Island, as well as federal law 
permits total deviations of up to plus or minus 25% of the provin-
cial quotient or average. I6S In Saskatchewan, for example, where the 
ld. at 27-28 (Cory, J., dissenting). 
164 Ref re: EBCA, 81 D.L.R. at 21. "[W]hile [Section] 14 of the Electoral Boundaries Commis-
sion Act, which mandates a fixed number of rural and urban ridings, could have resulted in 
producing variations from the objective which were so extreme as to amount to a breach of the 
right to vote, it did not have that effect in this case." ld. (Sopinka,J., concurring). Justice Cory, 
however, noted in dissent that both earlier and subsequent versions of the Act under review 
omitted "any reference to the numbers of urban and rural ridings." ld. at 24, referring to 
Constituency Boundaries Commission Act, 1972, S.S. 1972, ch. 18 and the Electoral Boundary 
Commission Act 1991, S.S. 1991, ch. E-6.11, §§ 9,11. This suggested to Justice Cory and to Chief 
Justice Lamer that the challenged legislation unduly constricted the "independent" commission. 
See id. 
165 Alberta 1994, 119 D.L.R. at 9. 
166 See id. America tends to shy away from what could be called either "precommitment 
strategies," (Issacharoff, supra note 7, at 1668) or quotas or unscrupulous gerrymandering. 
Furthermore, depending on the axes along which the predeterminations are made, the United 
States shies away from even proportional or less than proportional representation. For instance, 
in the Shaw cases, what seems to bother the Court is the Justice Department's insistence on 
establishing a predetermined number of minority opportunity districts not that the plan would 
result in disproportionate representation for minorities. For instance, whereas in Georgia, blacks 
constitute 27% of the population which would equate to 3 out of 11 districts, the Court objects 
to even 2 out of eleven districts being designated as minority opportunity. Thus, even where the 
majority is favored and even where the predetermination is made pursuant to a general federal 
law, the American Court resists permitting such a priori designations. See Miller, 515 U.S. 900; 
Abrams, 117 S. Ct. 1925. 
167 See Ref re: EBCA, 81 D.L.R. at 40, 42. Section 20 of the Act requires the commission first to 
determine the "constituency population quotient" by dividing the voter population of the entire 
province by the number of constituencies or districts. See id. at 42; Electoral Act, § 20(a). It further 
mandates that no southern constituency should vary from this quotient by more than 25% and 
neither of the northern ones should vary by more than 50%. See Ref re: EBCA, 81 D.L.R. at 42; 
Electoral Act, § 20(a). 
168 PEl 1996, 142 D.L.R. at 355. The Court further noted that Manitoba permits variations of 
only plus or minus 10% and the Nova Scotia limit is 15%. ld. 
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provincial quotient was 10,147, the most populous district contained 
12,567 voters, while the least populous district contained 7,684.169 
Beyond establishing these numerical parameters, the Electoral Act 
also imposed various qualitative restraints on the commission. Spe-
cifically, having authorized the commission to deviate from the popu-
lation quotient, it further defined the purposes for which such devia-
tion may be used: 
§ 20: A commission, in determining the area to be included 
in and in fixing the boundaries of all proposed constituen-
cies: ... 
(b) may use the allowable variation from the population 
quotient ... to accommodate: 
(i) the sparsity, density or relative rate of growth of popula-
tion of any proposed constituency; 
(ii) any special geographic features including size and 
means of communication between the various parts of the 
proposed constituency; 
(iii) the community or diversity of interests of the popula-
tion, including variations in the requirements of the popula-
tion of any proposed constituency; and 
(iv) other similar or relevant factors. 170 
Thus, under this scheme, a commission may deviate from the provin-
cial quota by up to 25%, but only for any of these broadly enumerated 
criteria. 
2. The Court's Analysis 
If there is a constitutional right to equipopulous districts in Canada, 
it would be found in Section 3 of the Charter. l7l Before analyzing this 
1ff.lR£j re: EBCA, 81 D.L.R. at 47. 
170 Electoral Act, § 20, quoted in R£j re: EBCA, 81 D.L.R. at 42-43; see Aleinikoff & Issacharoff, 
supra note 3, at 625 (reprinting analogous state statutes used in Montana and Hawaii). 
171 Every court that has considered the question, has analyzed it under Section 3's right to vote; 
no court has analyzed the claim under Section 15 of the Charter which guarantees equal rights. 
See Charter, supra note 27, § 15 ("Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the 
right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particu-
lar, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or 
mental or physical disability"). This contrasts with the American Court's treatment of voting rights 
under the Fourteenth Amendment and its explicit (and post hoc in the case of Gomillion) rejection 
of the Fifteenth Amendment as grounding voting rights. 
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particular constitutional provision, however, the Court first surveys the 
general jurisprudential principles that will guide its interpretation. 
a. Understanding the Charter 
Justice McLachlin's approach is clearly stated at the outset. ''The 
content of a charter right is to be determined in a broad and purposive 
way, having regard to historical and social context."172 Here the Court 
quotes Justice Dickson (later to become Chief Justice): 
In my view, this analysis is to be undertaken, and the pur-
pose of the right or freedom in question is to be sought by 
reference to the character and the larger objects of the Char-
ter itself, to the language chosen to articulate the specific 
right or freedom, to the historical origins of the concepts 
enshrined, and where applicable, to the meaning and pur-
pose of the other specific rights and freedoms with which it 
is associated within the text of the Charter. The interpretation 
should be ... a generous rather than a legalistic one, aimed 
at fulfilling the purpose of the guarantee and securing for 
individuals the full benefit of the Charter's protection. At the 
same time it is important not to overshoot the actual purpose 
of the right or freedom in question, but to recall that the 
Charter was not enacted in a vacuum, and must therefore ... 
be placed in its proper linguistic, philosophic and historical 
contexts. 173 
The metaphor most commonly used to describe the Canadian Con-
stitution, including the Charter, is that of "a living tree capable of 
growth and expansion within its naturallimits."174 This metaphor is, as 
it were, deeply rooted in Canadian jurisprudential tradition, deriving 
from an opinion of the Imperial Privy Council interpreting the 1867 
Constitution.175 This doctrine has been widely accepted so its implica-
172 Ref re: EBCA, 81 D.L.R. at 32. 
173 [d., quoting Regina v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd. [1985) 1 S.C.R. 295, 18 D.L.R. 321, 359-60 
(Opinion of Dickson, J.) (interpreting the constitutional guarantee offreedom of conscience and 
religion). 
174 Ref re: EBCA, 81 D.L.R. at 32. Professor Swinton, of the University of Toronto, calls this 
phrase "over-used." Katherine Swinton, Federalism Under Fire: The Role of the Supreme Court in 
Canada, 55 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., 121, 126 (1992). 
175 Edwards v. Attorney General (Canada) re: Section 24 of the B.N.A. Act [1930) 1 D.L.R. 98, 
106-07, [1929) 3 W.W.R. 479, 1 App. Cas. 124, 136 (P.C. 1930) (appeal taken from Supreme 
Court of Canada [1928) 4 D.L.R. 98) (Opinion of Lord Sankey). 
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tions are worth considering.176 First, the "living tree" doctrine precludes 
a stringently originalist interpretation of the Charter: "[The] meaning 
of the concept of the [constitutional provision] is not to be determined 
solely by the degree to which that right was enjoyed by Canadians prior 
to the proclamation of the Charter. "177 The Court neither categorically 
rejects historical evidence nor permits it to delimit its interpretations; 
rather it uses such evidence to inform its decision.178 "The right to vote, 
while rooted in and hence to some extent defined by historical and 
existing practices, cannot be viewed as frozen by particular historical 
anomalies. What must be sought is the broader philosophy underlying 
the historical development of the right to vote-a philosophy which is 
capable of explaining the past and animating the future. "179 History is 
a guide, not a master. 
Another implication of the "living tree" metaphor is "the general 
principle that practical considerations must be borne in mind in con-
stitutional interpretation. "180 Here, the Court cites a variety of Cana-
dian cases as well as Justice Frankfurter's opinion in McGowan v. 
Maryland, in which he refers to the "practical living facts" to which a 
legislature must respond.18l Although this maxim applies to all consti-
tutional interpretation, the Court points out that it is "nowhere more 
176 In this case, for instance, the majority opinion, which upheld the legislation, used this broad 
approach; the dissenters interpreted the constitutional guarantee even more broadly. See also 
Reference re: An Act to Amend the Education Act, 40 D.L.R. 18,40 (1987) (Howland, CJ.O. & 
Robins, ].A., dissenting) ("If any doubt exists as to whether an exception to the guaranteed 
fundamental rights and freedoms is authorized by the Charter, the doubt must be resolved in 
favour of the application of the Charter and not the extension of the exception."). 
177 Ref. re: EBCA, 81 D.L.R at 33 (citation omitted). 
178 "History is important in so far as it suggests ... the philosophy underlying the development 
of the right to vote in this country .... " Id. at 38. 
179 Id. at 33. 
lBOld. 
181 Ref. re: EBCA, 81 D.L.R at 33 (quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 524 (1961) 
(Separate Opinion of Frankfurter,].)}. The passage reads as follows: 
Neither the Due Process nor the Equal Protection Clause demands logical tidiness. No 
finicky or exact conformity to abstract correlation is required of legislation. The Con-
stitution is satisfied if a legislature responds to the practical living facts with which it 
deals. Through what precise points in a field of many competing pressures a legislature 
might most suitably have drawn its lines is not a question for judicial re-examination. It 
is enough to satisfy the Constitution that in drawing them the principle of reason has 
not been disregarded. 
Id. at 523-24. The appeal of the passage, however, is mitigated by Frankfurter's reliance on 
Goesaert.v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (upholding prohibition against female bartenders). See 
also Ref. re: EBCA, 81 D.L.R at 38. 
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true than in considering the right to vote, where practical considera-
tions such as social and physical geography may impact on the value 
of the citizen's right to vote. "182 The legislature's presumed responsive-
ness to the practical living facts counsels the Court against unnecessary 
interference. 
Finally, the Court removes all doubt that a strict interpretation might 
be possible by quoting another influential opinion by former Chief 
Justice Dickson: 
The court must be guided by the values and principles essen-
tial to a free and democratic society which I believe embody, 
to name but a few, respect for the inherent dignity of the 
human person, commitment to social justice and equality, 
accommodation of a wide variety of beliefs, respect for cul-
tural and group identity, and faith in social and political 
institutions which enhance the participation of individuals 
and groups in society.183 
The Court's reference to a "free and democratic society" is taken 
from Section 1 of the Charter which subjects the rights and guarantees 
set out in the rest of the Charter "to such reasonable limits prescribed 
by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic 
society."I84 Not surprisingly, this Section is very controversial. On one 
view, it is a burden-shifting provision: once a violation of a substantive 
provision is found, the burden shifts to the government to justify its 
breach. 185 But Section 1 is also read, not just as an evidentiary rule, but 
as "a second level of constitutional guarantee, supporting, rather than 
departing from the values contained in the crystallized rights and 
freedoms. "186 This possibility suggests an im portan t difference between 
182 Ref re: EBCA, 81 D.L.R. at 33. This, of course, contrasts sharply with the American Court's 
persistent inattention to the factual background of the cases. 
185 [d. (quoting Regina v. Oakes [1986] I S.C.R. 103,26 D.L.R. 200, 225 (Dickson, CJ.C.». 
184 Charter, supra note 27, § I. 
185 See, e.g., PEl [996, 142 D.L.R. at 350 ("The onus of establishing that there is a breach of 
[Section] 3 of the Charter is upon the person alleging the breach. If a breach is established, the 
onus is then upon the government to show that the legislation is justified under [Section] 1 of 
the Charter and if no justification is shown the legislation is held to be invalid. "); see also Dixon 
1989, 142 D.L.R. at 270. See generally Michael P. Ritter, The Charter of Rights and Freedoms, in 4 
CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, supra note 26, at 27 (Section 1 "implicitly 
sets out a code of evidence indicating the respective burdens to be borne by the parties in 
litigation and further provides that any 'fundamental freedom' can be overridden where the 
circumstances dictate. "). 
186 Lorraine Weinrib, Canada's Charter: Rights Protection in the Cultural Mosaic, 4 CARDOZO J. 
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the American and Canadian attitudes toward governmental power. The 
burden-shifting structure of our Court's constitutional jurispru-
dence-infringement of a presumptive right is permissible if it is nar-
rowly tailored to a compelling purpose-suggests an adversarial rela-
tionship between the government and the individual. If the 
government wins, the individual loses.187 The Canadian Supreme 
Court, however, has read the burden-shifting provision of its Charter, 
Section 1, as a careful balancing of co-existing values; "[u]nder this 
interpretation, democracy, individual dignity, and equality might flour-
ish in the enjoyment of the stipulated guarantees, or in rare cases 
where justified, in their limitation. "188 Opening the Charter itself with 
this provision indicates that the Charter envisions a constellation of 
values that mutually reinforce, rather than exclude, each other. Many 
of the Canadian Supreme Court's first cases under the Charter-the 
Marburys and the McCullochs of Canadian constitutional law-attempt 
to further that vision.189 The EBCA Court takes this philosophy seriously 
and returns to it throughout the various individual opinions. 
b. The Meaning of the Right to Vote 
Having established the principles that govern constitutional inter-
pretation generally, the Court narrowed its gaze by focusing on Section 
3 itself. Section 3 says: 
INT'L & COMPo L. 395, 409 (1996) [hereinafter Weinrib, Canada's Charter]. This characterizes 
Section 1 as an appropriate burden-shifting provision that recognizes law's multiple constituen-
cies. 
187This is true even when there is no presumptively protected constitutional right and any 
rational reason justifies infringement. 
188Weinrib, Canada's Charter, supra note 186, at 409. 
189 See, e.g., Regina V. Keegstra [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 (upholding a hate speech prohibition); Ford 
V. Quebec (A.G.) [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712,54 D.L.R. 577 (invalidating Quebec's French-only sign law), 
both discussed in Weinrib, Canada's Charter, supra note 186, at 395. Critics of Section 1 argue 
that it precludes the very possibility of law under a system of separation of powers by requiring 
virtually unconstrained judicial balancing. See Karen Selick, Rights and Wrongs in the Canadian 
Charter, in RETHINKING THE CONSTITUTION: PERSPECTIVES ON CANADIAN CONSTITUTIONAL RE-
FORM, INTERPRETATION, AND THEORY 115 (Anthony A. Peacock ed., 1996) ("Section 1 gives judges 
not only the power but the positive obligation to determine, in the context of particular cases, 
the general rules that are to govern a free and democratic society. They are authorized not only 
to judge, but to make law."). Although this may be a fair criticism in principle, or even as applied 
in many cases, it does not seem to apply to the EBCA decision or to the other districting cases 
decided under the Charter which exhibit deference to legislatures. 
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Every citizen of Canada has the right to vote in an election 
of members of the House of Commons or of a legislative 
assembly and to be qualified for membership therein. 190 
303 
The question the Court needed to answer was whether "the right to 
vote" guarantees either absolute equality (meaning that a person's vote 
is "as nearly as practicable" worth as much as another's) 191 or relative 
equality. If it guarantees absolute equality, then the statute's permissi-
ble deviations of up to 25% would clearly violate the constitutional 
right. If it guarantees only relative equality, then the Court would need 
to determine whether permitting deviations of 25% still provided rela-
tive equality. If it guarantees neither, then it cannot constrain the 
Electoral Act.192 The Court viewed the issue as a choice between two 
competing conceptions of the underlying purpose of Section 3: 
[t]hose who start from the premise that the purpose of the 
section is to guarantee equality of voting power support the 
view that only minimal deviation from that ideal is possible. 
Those who start from the premise that the purpose of § 3 is 
to guarantee effective representation see the right to vote as 
comprising many factors, of which equality is but one. 19S 
This brief passage says a lot about how the Court approached its task. 
It may be worth noting initially that the Court graciously views both 
options as reasonable,r94 but one (the latter) will ultimately turn out to 
be more consistent with all the justices' understanding of Charter 
rights. 195 
On a substantive level, this passage reinforces the view that interpre-
tation is fundamentally a purposive exercise. The Court does not spend 
time analyzing the text because the specific words of Section 3 shed 
no more light on complex questions than the words of many American 
constitutional provisions. One still is left with the task of assessing what 
190Charter, supra note 27, § 3; see Ref re: EBCA, 81 D.L.R. at 32. 
191 Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 7-8. 
192 As then British Columbia Supreme Court Chief Justice McLachlin said in the Dixon case, 
"[i]n particular, does [the right to vote in Section 3] comprehend equality of voting power, and 
if so, is the equality of voting power absolute or relative? lfit is not absolute, what limits are there 
on deviation from parity of voting?" Dixon 1989, 142 D.L.R. at 255. 
193 Ref re: EBCA, 81 D.L.R. at 34. 
194 Cf Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in aJudicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1185, 1191, 1193-98 
(criticizing the "immoderate tone of statements" of American federal court opinions). 
195 The dissent does not dispute this characterization of the issue. See Ref re: EBCA, 81 D.L.R. 
at 34. 
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"the right to vote" means with respect to a particular law. In addition, 
both options recognized by the Court incorporate the notion of equal-
ity as an essential ingredient of an effective right to vote. 196 Indeed the 
Saskatchewan statute, like the others, instructed the independent com-
mission to use as its baseline the provincial quotient (the number of 
people to be represented by one member of the Legislative Assembly) 
thereby recognizing equipopulosity as the starting point. 197 
What distinguishes the options is whether equality is the sine qua non 
of an effective voting right or whether it is one of several factors to be 
considered in determining whether the right to vote has been violated. 
Curiously, the Court puts the choice in distinctly American terms: if 
the critical right is to equality of voting power (as an abstract value), 
then only absolute equality will do. This means voter parity or one 
person, one vote is required. If, however, the critical right is to effective 
representation, then the right to vote is preserved if several elements 
are present, of which equality is but one. In this case, the right to vote 
may be secured even if the legislature has deviated from what the Court 
refers to as the "ideal" of absolute equality, if the deviation has pre-
served other essential values. 19B It may be worth considering the two 
alternatives not as opposites but as two ends of an equality con tin-
uum.199 The Canadian courts have recognized that absolute voter parity 
may not be possible and that some deviation from the ideal is inevitable 
and must be countenanced even under the most rigid interpreta-
tions. 200 In the end, though, the terminology is similar, whatever the 
196 Even the challengers did not "deny the importance of equality in a meaningful right to vote" 
but "urged that equality was but one of many [relevant) factors." [d. at 34-35. 
197 See Electoral Act, § 42. 
198 In terms of the interplay between Sections 1 and 3 of the Charter, under the former 
approach (that taken by the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal), any deviation from voter parity 
constitutes a violation of Section 3 which must be justified under Section 1. Under the latter 
approach, Section 3 is violated if the deviations are so gross as to deny relative equality or if the 
deviations from absolute equality do not further the goal of effective representation. Only in these 
circumstances will the government be compelled to justify the deviation under Section 1. See Ref. 
re: EBCA, 81 D.L.R. at 34. In this case, the provincial appellate court found that the purpose of 
Section 3 was equality, that the deviations exceeded permissible limitations, and that considera-
tions of geography, historical boundaries, and community interests did not meet Section l's 
requirements for justification. See id. 
199Viewing the alternatives as points on a continuum that are perhaps not so far apart (rather 
than as opposites) may permit a sensible reconciliation of the Reynolds Court's insistence on both 
absolute equality and fair and effective representation. 
200 As noted above, some American states have managed to create equipopulous districts. These 
statistics, however, may say more about computer-age precision than real-world accuracy. Between 
the time the plan is enacted and the time of the election, people have turned 18, died, and moved 
in and out of the district, so at best, the plan is equipopulous at the irrelevant moment that it 
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aspirations or the reality: the Canadian version of "as nearly as is 
practicable"201 is with "minimal deviation"202 which is similar to "within 
practicable and rational limits. "203 
Justice McLachlin and the justices who agreed with her rejected the 
argument that the purpose of enshrining the right to vote in the 
Charter was to ensure absolute equality and instead adopted the view 
that its purpose was to ensure "effective representation":204 
[o]urs is a representative democracy. Each citizen is enti-
tled to be represented in government. Representation compre-
hends the idea of having a voice in the deliberations of 
government as well as the idea of the right to bring one's 
grievances and concerns to the attention of one's government 
rep res en ta tive. 205 
The Court then focused on the relationship, in actual practice, 
between absolute parity and effective representation. Far from realiz-
ing the goals of Section 3, the Court said, undue attention to parity 
would actually detract from it. In the Court's view, it would often be 
necessary to consider such factors as "geography, community history, 
community interests and minority representation ... to ensure that 
our legislative assemblies effectively represent the diversity of our social 
mosaic."206 To insist on voter parity, the Court explained, "might de-
was last modified before enactment. Accuracy is especially doublful to the extent that American 
jurisdictions rely on figures of total population, rather than registered voters. See also Boundary 
Comm. for England ex parte Foot and Others [1983] 1 Q.B. 600, 2 w.L.R. 458, 471, 1 All E.R. 1099 
("Practicability is not the same as possibility .... Practicability not merely connotes a degree of 
flexibility: it contemplates that various matters should be taken into account when considering 
whether any particular purpose is practicable, i.e., capable in practical terms of achievement") 
(discussing the requirement that districts be, as nearly as practicable, equipopulous). Here again, 
the American attraction to idealism leads us to believe that absolute equipopulousity is possible, 
and permits us to ignore the murkier reality of life. But see Abrams, 117 S. Ct. at 1940 (refusing 
to order a new plan because no new plan could "reflect Georgia's true population distribution" 
given the population shifts that would have occurred in the six years since the census). 
201 Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 7-8. 
202 Ref re: EBCA, 81 D.L.R. at 34. 
203 McGinty, 134 A.L.R. at 312 (Toohey,].). 
204 Ref re: EBCA, 81 D.L.R. at 35. 
205Id. (emphasis in original). 
206Id. at 36, 35 (quoting the nation's first Prime Minister, Sir John MacDonald, speaking in 
Parliament in 1872, to introduce an "Act to re-adjust the Representation in the House of 
Commons": " ... it will be found that ... while the principle of population was considered to a 
very great extent, other considerations were also held to have weight; so that different interests, 
classes and localities should be fairly represented, that the principle of number should not be 
the only one."). 
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prive citizens with distinct interests of an effective voice in the legisla-
tive process" as well as of effective assistance from their repre-
sentatives in their "ombudsman" role.207 Referring to the concerns 
listed by former Chief Justice Dickson, the Court said, "[r]espect for 
individual dignity and social equality mandate that citizens' votes not 
be unduly debased or diluted. But the need to recognize cultural and 
group identity and to enhance the participation of individuals in the 
electoral process and society requires that other concerns also be 
accommodated. "208 
The conclusion that absolute equality is not to be gained at the 
expense of other important factors, however, is not without its limita-
tions. Even those courts upholding plans that deviated from absolute 
equality recognized that "at some point" the deviations might be so 
great that they would violate even the more lax "relative equality" 
standard endorsed by the Canadian Supreme Court. 209 Another limita-
tion is that deviations are permitted only if they can be shown to "con-
tribute to better government of the populace as a whole, giving due 
2071d. at 38. 
2081d. at 39. 
209 As one court said, deviations from the quotient "cannot be permitted to continue if Alberta 
wishes to call itself a democracy." Alberta 1994, 119 D.L.R. at 17. This point is made with 
noticeable regularity in the Australian jurisprudence. See, e.g., Ex ReL McKinlay v. The Common-
wealth (1975) 135 C.L.R. 1, 36 {"At some point choice by electors could cease to be able to be 
described as a choice by the people of the Commonwealth. It is a question of degree. It can not 
be determined in the abstract." (McTiernan and Jacobs, lJ.); see also McGinty 134 A.L.R. at 311 
(Dawson, J.). Justice Toohey, in the McGinty case, indicated that the difference between the 
American willingness to establish precise outer limits and the Australian and Canadian reluctance 
to was a matter of comity: 
Unlike the United States, the Canadian courts appear to have baulked at identifying a 
ratio beyond which there is such an imbalance as to invalidate the electoral system .... 
The courts must exercise restraint in this area, in particular not seeking in effect to say 
how boundaries should be drawn or prescribing specific ratios that are acceptable .... 
[A]n approach in broad terms gives proper recognition to the respective roles of the 
legislature and the court. The task of the court is to identify and give effect to the 
constitutional principle at issue. 
McGinty, 134 A.L.R. at 330, 388 (Gummow,j.). As the British Appeals Court has said in a similar 
situation, "[ w] e are prepared to accept the theoretical possibility that in a given instance the 
disparity between the electorate of a proposed constituency and the electoral quota might be so 
grotesquely large as to make it obvious on the figures that no reasonable commission which had 
paid any attention at all to [the equipopulosity requirement] could possibly have made such a 
proposal." Boundary Comm. for England, ex parte Foot and Others [1983] 1 Q.B. 600, 2 w.L.R. at 
477, 1 All E.R. 1099. The American response might be that a bright line is more deferential to 
states because it is more clear and thus leaves less room for judicial discretion; the American 
cases, however, have not been particularly deferential to the states. 
1998] JUDGING ELECTORAL DISTRICTS 307 
weight to regional issues within the populace and geographic factors 
within the territory governed~"210 Although the "list is not closed,"211 
some justifications clearly would not pass this test. For instance, it is 
unlikely that the Court would permit deviations for the purpose of 
enhancing one party's advantage, for incumbency protection, or for 
fear of offending a powerful element of the constituency.212 It also is 
clear that most courts will require proof of clearly articulated justifica-
tions for deviating from absolute voter parity.213 
These principles mean that electoral plans under Section 3 must do 
more than allocate the same number of voters to each district. "The 
concept of absolute voter parity does not accord with the development 
of the right to vote in the Canadian context and does not permit of 
sufficient flexibility to meet the practical difficulties inherent in repre-
sentative government in a country such as Canada. In the end, it is the 
broader concept of effective representation which best serves the in-
terests of a free and democratic society. "214 The goal of effective repre-
sentation must always be borne in mind; this goal permits deviations 
from absolute equality if the result is better government. 
210 &f. re: EBCA, 81 D.L.R. at 22 (Cory,]., dissenting) quoting Dixon 1989, 142 D.L.R. at 267; 
see also Electoral Boundaries Commission 1988 Final Report at 4 quoted in &f. re: EBCA, 81 D.L.R. 
at 30 ("Clearly the Act by necessary inference implies that such voter population quotient must 
be the benchmark for all constituencies. The right of the Commission to depart from that 
quotient is not an absolute one. It is entitled to depart therefrom only for the reasons set forth 
in the Act and only to the extent that the special circumstances properly permit, and the 
legislation requires."). See also Alberta 1994, 119 D.L.R. at 12 ("there is no permissible variation 
if there is no justification."); see also, e.g., Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407 (1977) (discussing 
justifications for deviation). 
211 &f re: EBCA, 81 D.L.R. at 36. 
212 See, e.g., PEl 19%, 142 D.L.R. at 348 ("Despite the fact that there may be instances that 
justify deviations, the fact remains that the less deviations there are the less opportunities there 
will be for political opportunism."); see Alberta 1994, 119 D.L.R. at 3 ("There can be many valid 
reasons for disparity, but they do not include a fear of the future by electors whose electoral 
divisions might be subject to surgery to assure other electors their constitutional rights"). The 
court also noted that "[c]ritical reference was made to the two smallest electoral divisions, which 
happened to be the seats of the chairman and the vice-<:hairman of the committee." Alberta 1994, 
119 D.L.R. at 12. Unlike in America, incumbency protection and party politics are not traditional 
districting principles. 
213 ''The courts, and the people, have rejected the notion of mechanical one-person, one-vote 
equality. That does not mean we can or should accept significant disparities without reasoned 
justification .... " Alberta 1994,119 D.L.R. at 17. 
214 &f. re: EBCA, 81 D.L.R. at 39. 
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c. Applying the Standard 
An overriding concern of every Canadian court which has assessed 
the constitutionality of an electoral plan is the problem of judicial 
interference in an essentially legislative function. 
It is important at the outset to remind ourselves of the proper 
role of courts in determining whether a legislative solution to 
a complex problem runs afoul of the Charter. This court 
has repeatedly affirmed that the courts must be cautious in 
interfering unduly in decisions that involve the balancing of 
conflicting policy considerations.215 
The commitment to judicial restraint derives both from the separation 
of powers principle that a court should not do the legislature's work 
and from the practical effects of invalidating an electoral plan on 
which upcoming elections were to be based.216 In Alberta, the Court of 
Appeal was clearly irritated with the political excuses proffered by the 
government to justify the deviations from voter parity. Nonetheless, the 
Court on several occasions invoked the principle of judicial restraint 
because it did "not see the democratic value in creating a political 
crisis. "217 Thus, in the name of judicial restraint, deviations from voter 
parity may be permitted even when the court is skeptical of their 
legitimacy. 
In the Saskatchewan case, the Supreme Court evaluated both the 
process (that is, the legislation, the Commission's adherence to the 
restrictions in the legislation, and the legislature's subsequent adjust-
2151d. (citations omitted); see also Dixon 1986, 31 D.L.R. at 548 (holding that the constitution-
ality under the Charter ofa legislative districting plan isjusticiable); PEl 1996, 142 D.L.R. at 361 
("More effective representation is possible, however, at this time there should be judicial re-
straint."). 
216 See Baker, 369 U.S. at 302-D7 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
217 Alberta 1994, 119 D.L.R. at 18. The Court said, "[w)e again invoke the need for judicial 
restraint about interference in the electoral process. We do not think the existing inadequacy is 
large or glaring enough to invalidate the existing legislation. To do so would be a major disruption 
in the electoral process. In 1993, Alberta had a general election based on these boundaries." ld. 
This contrasts sharply with the American courts' willingness to assert their constitutional authority 
over the states. The most recent development in the continuing saga in North Carolina, for 
instance, is the Supreme Court's refusal to permit the state to conduct elections (scheduled for 
three weeks hence) based on the gerrymandered districts. According to the New York Times, 
"The refusal to postpone the order jeopardizes a Congressional primary election scheduled for 
May 5. 'Federal courts have now thrown North Carolina's elections into chaos and the real loser 
in all this are the voters,' Attorney General Mike Easley of North Carolina said." High Court Backs 
Ruling on North Carolina Race, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 1998, at A16. 
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ment of the Commission's proposal) and the result (that is, the 
plan).218 It found that "[t]he process, viewed as a whole, was fair" 
because the legislation did not impair the independence of the Com-
mission. 219 
With respect to the resulting map, the Supreme Court found that 
the deviations from absolute equality were not excessive. Although 
overall, "[u]rban ridings generally have somewhat more voters than 
the quotient and rural ridings generally have somewhat fewer," the 
discrepancies were "not great and there are a number of exceptions" 
where the rural ridings were overpopulated.220 Furthermore, the num-
ber of seats in the legislature representing the rural population was 
roughly in proportion to the population. 221 Finally, the Court consid-
ered the reasons for the deviations: 
[I] t may be useful to mention some of the factors other than 
equality of voting power which figure in the analysis .... The 
material before us suggests that not only are rural ridings 
harder to serve because of difficulty in transport and commu-
nications, but that rural voters make greater demands on 
their elected representatives, whether because of the absence 
of alternative resources to be found in urban centres or for 
other reasons. 222 Thus, the goal of effective representation 
may justify somewhat lower voter populations in rural areas. 
Another factor which figured prominently in the argument 
before us is geographic boundaries; rivers and municipal 
boundaries form natural community dividing lines and hence 
218 There was some difference of opinion among the justices as to whether the process needed 
to be independently scrutinized. Justice Sopinka noted in his concurrence that since no inde-
pendent commission is constitutionally required, there is no guarantee for any particular process; 
thus, only the result is justiciable. See Ref re: ERCA, 81 D.L.R. at 21 (Sopinka, j., concurring). 
Justice Cory's dissenting opinion focused on the legislation, and argued that it violated the 
absolute equality standard inherent in the Constitution, even though the resulting "distribution 
map may appear to have achieved a result that is not too unreasonable." ld. at 27. For the 
pragmatist understanding of ends versus means, see generally Daniel A. Farber, Legal Pragmatism 
and the Constitution, 72 MINN. L. REv. 1331 (1988). 
219 Ref re: ERCA, 81 D.L.R. at 43. 
220 See id. at 42. 
221/d. at 42-44. 
222 The Prince Edward Island court was much more skeptical of this justification. It suggested 
that perhaps rural residents were more demanding of their representatives because the smaller 
number of constituents in rural districts permitted them that luxury; but this traditional advan-
tage to rural residents at the disadvantage of urbanites did not justify its perpetuation. PEl 1996, 
142 D.L.R. at 348. 
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natural electoral boundaries. Yet another factor is growth 
projections. Given that the boundaries will govern for a num-
ber of years-the boundaries set in 1989, for example, may 
be in place until 1996-projected population changes within 
that period may justify a deviation from strict equality at the 
time the boundaries are drawn. 223 
The Court then looked at three ridings with the greatest deviations. 
In one, the differential was justified on the ground of adhering to 
natural boundaries, in another on the ground of expected population 
loss, and in the third on the basis of c.ommunities of interest. 224 The 
Court discussed this last justification at greater length, noting that" [i] n 
so far as the election map may separate certain dormitory communities 
from adjacent rural ridings, it is not self-evident that such communities 
should be joined with the communities where the residents worked. 
Their interests may differ from those of the community in the urban 
riding, and their inclusion might sweep in truly rural residents."225 
Thus, communities of interest or social affiliations among voters are 
acceptable justifications for deviating from the ideal of absolute voter 
parity.226 The Court concluded that since the deviations were not great 
and were justified by legitimate interests tending to work to the benefit 
of good government, there was no violation of Section 3. Therefore, it 
was unnecessary to consider Section 1.227 
D. The Australian Odyssey: Guaranteeing and Defining Representative 
Democracy 
Unlike the American story which developed over thirty-five years in 
a roughly linear fashion, or the Canadian story which sprang up re-
cently and seems to have been expeditiously resolved, the Australian 
story runs in fits and false starts. The most important opinion was the 
High Court's 1996 decision in McGinty v. Western Australia.228 Under-
standing McGinty requires a little familiarity with previous constitu-
tional decisions regarding Australian electoral processes. 
223 Ref re: EBCA, 81 D.L.R. at 44. 
224Id. at 44-45. 
225Id. at 45. 
226 See id. 
227Id. 
228 McGinty, 134 A.L.R. at 289. 
1998] JUDGING ELECTORAL DISTRICTS 311 
1. The Background 
a. The First Malapportionment Challenge: McKinlay 
The first malapportionment challenge to a districting scheme re-
sulted in the 1975 decision in McKinlay v. Commonwealth in which the 
High Court rejected the plaintiffs' claim that population deviations in 
either direction of up to 10% from the average violated the Australian 
Constitution.229 In McKinlay, voters from three states argued that they 
were constitutionally entitled to federal electoral districts "as nearly as 
practicable of numerically equal size. "230 They based their claim on 
Section 24 of the Commonwealth Constitution which creates a federal 
House of Representatives whose members must be "directly chosen by 
the people of the Commonwealth. "231 
Six of the seven justices on the Court rejected the argument, largely 
on the ground that nothing in the text of the Constitution required, 
or even permitted, that interpretation. Chief Justice Barwick232 could 
not accept either of the plaintiffs' alternative arguments. Section 24 
did not explicitly require that representatives be "chosen by all of the 
people. "233 Neither did it imply a requirement of equipopulosity.234 Sec-
tion 29, he explained, authorized the states to establish "the bounda-
ries of the electoral divisions within the States and the number of 
members to be chosen by any division" and nothing in the Constitution 
limited that discretion "until the Parliament should otherwise pro-
vide."235 
229 McKinlay, 135 C.L.R. at 57. 
2~O [d. at 14. 
m AUSTL. CONST. § 24. 
2~2The Chief Justice wrote only for himself, although five justices agreed with his conclusions, 
four of whom wrote separate opinions. 
2~~McKinlay, 135 C.L.R. at 17-21 (Barwick, CJ.). 
234 [d. at 17. Rejecting the argument that the Constitution implied a right to equipopulosity, 
the Chief Justice relied on traditional and extant restrictions on the franchise which the states 
established, and which the Constitution did not disturb, including the historical disenfranchise-
ment of women and people of color, and the current disenfranchisement of minors. [d. at 18-19. 
He further referred to the composition of the Australian Senate which, like the American one, 
comprises an equal number of Senators from each state regardless of wide population disparities. 
Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1 with AUSTL. CONST. art. V. McKinlay, 135 C.L.R. at 18. 
235 AUSTL. CONST. § 29. Barwick noted that Section 29 of the Constitution "left it in the first 
place to each State to determine the boundaries of the electoral divisions within the States and 
the number of members to be chosen by any division." McKinlay, 135 C.L.R. at 19. Compare 
AUSTL. CONST. § 29 ("Until the Parliament ofthe Commonwealth otherwise provides, the Parlia-
ment of any State may make laws for determining the divisions in each State for which members 
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Several of the justices did read Section 24 more broadly, finding that 
it "calls for a system of representative democracy. "236 Representative 
democracy in this context entails "the enfranchisement of electors, the 
existence of an electoral system capable of giving effect to their selec-
tion of representatives and the bestowal of legislative functions upon 
the representatives thus selected. "237 But many different kinds of elec-
toral systems are capable of giving effect to electors' choices. It is not 
obvious that any particular element is indispensable or, even if one 
were, that absolute voter parity would be it. In Justice Stephen's view, 
the denial of absolutely equal electoral divisions, therefore, could not 
constitute a per se violation of the guarantee of representative democ-
racy.23B So long as what the state and federal Parliaments decide com-
ports with some conception of representative democracy, it is the 
province of the elected branches to select the means.239 This refusal to 
"perfect embodiment of some particular model of democratic princi-
ples" is completely consistent with the constitutional tradition which 
was, after all "an essentially practical and political affair, achieved after 
much negotiation and the outcome of extensive compromise. "240 
The plaintiffs further argued that, even if the Court did not read the 
constitutional text to require voter parity, it should nonetheless adopt 
the Wesberry rule which was by then firmly entrenched in the American 
landscape.241 The plaintiffs placed "considerable reliance"242 on the 
American cases which, they said, applied because Section 24 of the 
Australian Constitution had adopted the precise language of Article I 
of the American Constitution.243 
of the House of Representatives may be chosen, and the number of members to be chosen for 
each division .... ") with u.s. CONST. art. I, § 4 (''The Times, Places, and Manner of holding 
Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature 
thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to 
the Places of chusing Senators"). 
236 See McKinlay, 135 C.L.R. at 62 (Mason, J.) ("the system of democratic representative gov-
ernment provided for by our Constitution"). 
237 [d. at 56 (Stephen, J.). 
238 See ill. at 56-57. 
239 See id. at 59. 
240 [d. at 58. 
241 See McKinlay, 135 C.L.R. at 22-25 (Barwick, CJ.). 
242 [d. at 22. 
243 Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 ("The House of Representatives shall be composed of 
Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States .... ") with AUSTL. CONST. 
§ 24 (''The House of Representatives shall be composed of members directly chosen by the people 
of the Commonwealth .... "). The U.S. Constitution makes no mention of districting and it was 
not statutorily required until 1842. 
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Although the argument was taken seriously, several of the Justices 
went to pains to distinguish the American cases: the Court acknow-
ledged the similar language, but rejected the meaning the U.S. Su-
- preme Court had superimposed on that language. Even those justices 
who agreed that equality is a proper goal believed that Wesberry's "as 
nearly as practicable" standard "goes beyond what we would accept as 
applicable to our Constitution."244 Wesberry's interpretation of Article 
I, Section 2, the Australian Court said: 
depended heavily, ifnot almost entirely, upon the view taken 
by the majority of American history and of statements made 
in the constitutional conventions preceding the adoption of 
that Constitution. It is evident on reading the views of the 
minority in that case that there is, to say the least, great doubt 
as to the validity of the view of that history and of those 
statements taken by the majority.245 
Thus, the Court was clearly skeptical of the historical basis of the 
Wesberry Court's reasoning and refused to adopt it. 246 Furthermore, like 
the Canadian Court, the Australian Court considered significant reli-
ance on the statements of constitutional framers to be a distinctively 
American phenomenon.247 
244 McKinlay, 135 C.L.R. at 39-40 (McTiernan andJacobs,lJ.) (suggesting that the strictness of 
the American standard "developed from the presence of the Fourteenth Amendment," the Equal 
Protection Clause of which there is no counterpart in the Australian Constitution). All thejustices 
explicitly rejected the American precedents, except Justice Murphy, the lone dissenter who argued 
that the American precedents should be followed. [d. at 65. See infra note 254. 
245 [d. at 23. 
246 "[I] t is simply not correct to say that provisions in our Constitution should receive the same 
construction as that given to similarly worded provisions in the United States Constitution which 
have a different context and a different history, more particularly when the suggested construc-
tion is of recent origin, reversing an interpretation previously accepted." [d. at 63 (Mason, j.). 
Indeed, the Australian justices rely more extensively on the "powerful dissenting judgment" of 
Justice Frankfurter in Baker, 369 U.S. at 302-07 than on any majority opinion in this line of cases. 
See, e.g., McKinlay, 135 C.L.R. at 45 (Gibbs,j.); see also McGinty, 134 A.L.R. at 375 (Gummow,j.) 
(relying on the "celebrated" dissenting judgments of Justices Frankfurter and Harlan in the early 
apportionment cases). 
247 McKinlay, 135 C.L.R. at 23. The distinction is explicable in terms of jurisprudence as well. 
Since the Canadian and Australian Constitutions were acts of Parliament, they are considered as 
statutes for purposes of interpretation and little if any attention is paid to legislative intent. Since 
Americans consider their Constitution to have a non-statutory character, they do rely on framers' 
intent to a far greater extent. See infra notes 386-89 and accompanying text (discussion of canons 
of constitutional interpretation). It will be interesting to see if the Court's approach to constitu-
tional interpretation changes if the transformation to a republic results in new constitutional 
language such as "We the People ... " in the preamble. 
314 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAw REVIEW [Vol. XXI, No.2 
The Australian Court not only rejected any claim of a constitutional 
requirement of absolute voter parity, it affirmatively found that un-
equal district sizes may yield even more equitable results. In an argu-
ment reminiscent of the Canadian Supreme Court's argument in the 
ERCA case, the Australian High Court explained that the challenged 
electoral plan "made a real endeavour to secure equality of voting 
value" because it permitted deviation from absolute equipopulosity 
within a range and for particular enumerated reasons.248 
I am unable to accept the view that mere equality of numbers 
of people in a division provides equality of voting value .... 
[T] 0 ignore community of interest in the creation of electoral 
divisions and to insist on mere equality of numbers will be 
likely, in my opinion, to produce inequality rather than equal-
ity of voting value.249 
Like their colleagues, Justices McTiernan and Jacobs also accepted 
that equality is the "objective to be sought,"250 but their understanding 
of equality diverged from the American definition. They argued that 
such factors as community of interests and geographic boundaries 
may constrain legislative self-dealing and arbitrariness more effectively 
than the equipopulosity requirement.251 Considering such factors may 
result in unequal district sizes, but it avoids "any unnatural divisions of 
the kind which are found in gerrymandering. "252 Indeed, the im-
pugned legislation permitted deviation of up to 10% but only for five 
enumerated reasons, beginning with the grouping together of electors 
with common interests.253 Ultimately, adherence to what the Canadian 
248 McKinlay, 135 C.L.R. at 25 (emphasis added). 
249Id. This passage was cited by the British Columbia Supreme Court in Dixon 1989, 59 D.L.R. 
at 264 (Opinion of McLachlin, J.) 
250 McKinlay, 135 C.L.R. at 37. 
251 See id. This opinion mirrored the Canadian view that absolute equality is desirable but not 
at the expense of other values, resulting in a rule that deviation within a reasonable margin is 
acceptable but only for the purpose of enhancing representation. Id. 
252Id. 
253 According to the Electoral Act: 
In making any proposed distribution of a State into Divisions, the Distribution Commis-
sioners shall give due consideration, in relation to each proposed Division, to-
(a) community of interests within the Division, including economic, social and re-
gional interests; 
(b) means of communication and travel within the Division; 
(c) the trend of population changes within the State; 
(d) the physical features of the Division; and 
(e) existing boundaries of Divisions and Subdivisions, and subject thereto the quota 
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Court called the single "philosophic ideal" of equipopulosity was nei-
ther warranted by the words or implications of the constitutional text 
nor was it even desirable.254 
b. The Free Speech Cases: An Interpretive BliP? 
For a time, the McKinlay case had settled the question of whether 
the Constitution guaranteed representative democracy. Although some 
justices flirted with the idea, the majority suggested either that it did 
not or that if it did, the guarantee did not have significant substantive 
content, except perhaps at the margins. 255 Eleven years later, however, 
of electors shall be the basis for the distribution, and the Distribution Commissioners 
may adopt a margin of allowance, to be used whenever necessary, but in no case shall 
the quota be departed from to a greater extent than one-tenth more or one-tenth less. 
Electoral Act, § 19, reprinted in McKinlay, 135 C.L.R. at 76-77 (Murphy,]., dissenting). 
254Justice Murphy wrote a long and thoughtful dissent in which his admiration for the Ameri-
can system (and for the judicial philosophy of Justice Douglas in particular) was evident. He 
eschewed the literalist approach of the majority, noting that "Great rights are often expressed in 
simple phrases," McKinlay, 135 C.L.R. at 65, and argued for Marshall-like expansiveness. " ... it 
must always be remembered that we are interpreting a Constitution broad and general in its 
terms, intended to apply to the varying conditions which the development of our community 
must involve." [d. at 68 (quotingJumbunna Coal Mine N.L. v. Victorian Coal Miners' Ass'n (1908) 
6 C.L.R. 309, 367-68). 
He quoted at length from Justice Black's opinion in ffi1sberry, as well as from White v. Regester, 
Gray, and Reynolds. See McKinlay, 135 C.L.R. at 66-68. He argued that the principles described 
therein applied in Australia for a number of reasons. First, the logic of equipopulosity is sound 
on its own terms. See id. Second, both Australian and American constitutionalism are charac-
terized by the "democratic theme of equal sharing of political power." [d. at 71. Third, any 
standard of equality that is not absolute is arbitrary and unmanageable. [d. at 70-71. Fourth, the 
absence of any political solution to malapportionment, by definition, renders any equality stand-
ard unenforceable outside the courts. [d. at 71-72. 
255 The controversy discussed in this section is not whether or not the Australians have a system 
of representative democracy--dearly they do-but whether and in what ways the Constitution 
imposes the conditions for such a system. If the Constitution does not require representative 
democracy, the question of whether and how to have it is left entirely to the political process. A 
justice adopting this position would say that the text of the Constitution means exactly what it 
says, nothing more. A justice finding a constitutional guarantee of representative democracy 
would read between the lines of the explicit constitutional commands and find that the under-
lying significance of those commands is to entrench a system of representative democracy. This 
justice would say that the necessary elements of a representative democracy that are denoted in 
the Constitution carry with them other elements that must be inferred, all of which are judicially 
enforceable. 
Perhaps the best analogy in American constitutional jurisprudence is the controversy over 
whether federalism-based limits on Congressional power are textually based or judicially enforce-
able. See, e.g., Printz., 117 S. Ct. at 2376-78 (enforcing the Tenth Amendment). The crucible of 
the controversy is the Court's interpretive stance; the ultimate failure of the constitutional 
guarantee of representative democracy in Australia is a testament to that Court's literalism. 
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the British Parliament enacted the Australia Act, 1986, which ended 
British parliamentary sovereignty over Australia. This, it was argued, 
effectively shifted the sovereign authority of the Australian Constitu-
tion from the British monarchy to the Australian people. In a series of 
cases in 1992256 and 1994,257 plaintiffs relied on the Australia Act to 
make a congerie of arguments for the purpose of establishing an 
implied constitutional right to free expression. Plaintiffs argued that 
popular sovereignty means that the people control their governors. 
In Australia, they argued, this is done through the mechanism of 
representative government. Representative government implies popu-
lar elections (which the Constitution explicitly guarantees) which re-
quire an informed populace which, in turn, requires free speech. 
Perhaps surprisingly, the Australian High Court agreed. In Nation-
wide News v. Wills, the Court struck down a federal law criminalizing 
the use of words "calculated to bring a member of the [Industrial 
Relations] Commission into disrepute as a member of the Commis-
sion."258 While this would dearly contravene the First Amendment's 
prohibition against viewpoint discrimination and protection of govern-
ment criticism,259 the Australian Constitution has no express counter-
part to the First Amendment. Thus, in order to find the law invalid, 
the Court had to infer broader rights than appear on the face of the 
Constitution. To this end, a majority of the Court adopted the reason-
ing of Justice Stephen in McKinlay, finding that the Constitution man-
dates representative democracy and guarantees rights necessary for the 
effectuation of such a system.260 The flaw in the doctrine of repre-
sentative democracy that Justice Stephen had identified-the difficulty 
of giving content to the right-was not extensively addressed in the 
free speech cases of this period. The Court suggested that, wherever 
its borders lie, its core certainly encompasses the right to free political 
expression. As Chief Justice Mason said: 
256 See Nationwide News Pty. Ltd. v. Wills (1992) 177 C.L.R. I; Australian Capital Television, 177 
C.L.R. 106. 
257 See Theophanous v. Herald & Weekly Times Ltd. (1994) 182 C.L.R. 104; Stephens v. West 
Australian Newspapers Ltd. (1994) 182 C.L.R. 211; Cunliffe v. Commonwealth (1994) 182 C.L.R. 
272. 
258 Nationwide News, 177 C.L.R. at 24 (Mason, CJ.). See Industrial Relations Act, § 299 (I) 
(1988) (Commonwealth). 
259 See, e.g., Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58 (1970) (invalidating a law preventing the 
wearing of military attire if it would bring the military into disrepute); New York Times v. Sullivan, 
376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
260 Nationwide News, 177 C.L.R. at 50. 
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the representative democracy ordained by our Constitution 
carries with it a comparable freedom for the Australian peo-
ple and that freedom circumscribes the legislative powers 
conferred on the Parliament by the Constitution. No law of 
the Commonwealth can restrict the freedom of the Australian 
people to discuss governments and political matters unless 
the law is enacted to fulfil a legitimate purpose and the 
restriction is appropriate and adapted to the fulfilment of that 
purpose.261 
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Justices Deane and Toohey reinforced the principle that represent-
ative democracy was as much a part of the Constitution as were the 
unstated, but undeniably enforceable, principles of federalism and 
separation of powers.262 According to these justices, representative gov-
ernment was manifested in the Constitution in two ways: 
In implementing the doctrine of representative government, 
the Constitution reserves to the people ofthe Commonwealth 
the ultimate power of governmental control. It provides for 
the exercise of that ultimate power by two electoral processes. 
The first is the election of the members of the Parliament in 
which is vested the legislative power of the Commonwealth 
and which, under the Cabinet system of government which 
the Constitution assumes, sustains and directly or indirectly 
controls the exercise of the executive power which the Con-
stitution formally vests in the Crown. The second is ... the 
amendment of the Constitution itself. 263 
Justices Deane and Toohey further noted that the people can exercise 
these rights "by direct vote."264 
While one can point to qualifications and exceptions, such as 
those concerned with the protection of the position of the 
less populous States, the general effect of the Constitution is, 
261 [d. 
262 [d. at 69-70 (Deane and Toohey,lJ.) (explaining that these three "main general doctrines 
of government ... underlie the Constitution"). Some protection for political expression is a 
necessary incident of a representative government based in popular sovereignty because "[t)he 
people of the Commonwealth would be unable responsibly to discharge and exercise the powers 
of governmental control which the Constitution reserves to them if each person was an island, 
unable to communicate with any other person." [d. at 72. 
263 [d. at 71. 
264 [d. 
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at least since the adoption of full adult suffrage by all the 
States, that all citizens of the Commonwealth who are not 
under some special disability are entitled to share equally in 
the exercise of those ultimate powers of governmental con-
trol. 265 
In Nationwide News, four of seven justices found a constitutional 
mandate for representative government which entails the freedom 
(within limits) of communication; in Australian Capital Television v. 
Commonwealth, an additional justice agreed that the law there at issue 
(regulation of political broadcasts) violated the principle of repre-
sentative government. 266 
In the defamation cases of 1994, plaintiffs argued that the newly 
identified right to free speech required that the stringent standards of 
the American case of New York Times v. Sullivan,267 govern defamation 
actions involving public figures or public officials, lest the right be 
diluted by frequent or frivolous libel suits against critics of the govern-
ment. Again, the plaintiffs did remarkably well, although the Courts in 
all three cases were badly split. The Court explicitly modeled its new 
rule on the Sullivan case, adopting some but not all of the components 
of the Sullivan standard.268 
The free speech cases did not directly overrule McKinlay, nor did 
they, in the main, even disturb that decision's holding that the Consti-
tution did not require that each vote have the same value. But in three 
important ways, they suggested the possibility that the Court might 
reconsider McKinlay: a majority of justices in these cases relied on the 
Australia Act to give popular authority to the Australian Constitution, 
they found in the Constitution an enforceable right to representative 
democracy, and they indicated an openness to relying on American 
precedents. Armed with these decisions and the new Act, plaintiffs in 
265 Nationwide News, 177 C.L.R. at 72. 
266]ustice McHugh believed that the constitutional principle of representative government 
derived from Section 7 (relating to election of senators) and Section 24 (relating to election of 
representatives), but not from any more amorphous emanations of the Constitution. Thus, the 
right of free expression was limited to processes relating to elections, including nominating, 
campaigning, and voting. Australian Capital Television, 177 C.L.R. at 232 (McHugh,].). The 
"Constitution embodies a system of representative government which involves the conceptions of 
freedom of participation, association and communication in respect of the election of the 
representatives of the people. Under the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia, those 
freedoms have been elevated to the status of constitutional rights." Id. at 233. 
267 Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254. 
268 See Theophanous, 192 C.L.R. 104. 
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McGinty v. Western Australia tried, but failed, to have McKinlay re-
versed.269 
2. McKinlay redux: McGinty v. Western Australia 
The McGinty case challenged apportionment for state legislatures. 
Thus, it was similar to the Canadian cases and its counterpart in 
American law would be Reynolds v. Sims, not Wesberry v. Sanders. The 
plaintiffs-all members of one or the other branch of the state legis-
lature27°-thus had multiple hurdles to overcome. For purposes of 
federal constitutional law, they had to prove, first, that the federal 
Constitution guaranteed representative democracy, either by its terms 
or by virtue of its underlying principles. Then they had to prove that 
such representative democracy included the guarantee of equally 
weighted votes. Finally, they had to prove that the federal constitutional 
provisions applied to the states (through something like the American 
concept of incorporation, albeit without the vehicle of a due process 
clause). Because a majority of the Court rejected the first and second 
propositions, most justices did not answer the third. 271 
Western Australia probably has one of the most unequal population 
distributions in the world. Approximately 900,000 people inhabit 
975,920 square miles, 74% of whom live in the metropolitan area of 
Perth. 272 Two acts were challenged: (1) a 1947 law requiring the Elec-
toral Distribution Commissioners to establish a population quotient for 
each of the state's districts and permitting deviations from that quo-
tient of plus or minus 15% and (2) the 1987 amendments to that Act 
which allocated 34 seats (or roughly 60%) in the Legislative Assembly 
to the Metropolitan area and 23 seats to the other areas of the state.273 
As amended in 1987, the law gave the non-Metropolitan areas a dis-
proportionate share of the power: 26% of the people would control 
40% of the Assembly seats.274 The large and rapidly increasing metro-
politan population in combination with the 15% permissible deviation 
269 McGinty, 134 A.L.R. at 304 (Dawson,].). 
270 ld. at 363 (Gummow, J.) . 
271 Plaintiffs also argued that the Western Australia state Constitution guaranteed equipopulos-
ity. 
272 This is as if the population of greater San Francisco lived in an area three times the size of 
Texas, concentrated in one spot on the coast. 
273 See McGinty, 134 A.L.R at 292. 
274ld. at 330-32 (Toohey,].). 
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reinforced the disparities to the point where one district had 291 % of 
the number of voters in another.275 
It is important to recognize, however, that although these disparities 
are significant, they are also anomalous. Unlike the United States in 
the 1960s, malapportionment in Australia is not rampant; in fact, at 
present, only Western Australia's legislature is significantly malappor-
tioned. 
Although the gap between the largest and smallest electoral 
divisions in all Australian States has narrowed considerably 
over the last century, the governments of Australia have con-
sistently legislated for inequalities in representation, inequali-
ties which have generally favoured the non-metropolitan ar-
eas. Nevertheless, by 1984, only the electoral divisions of 
Queensland and Western Australia could be said to be sig-
nificantly malapportioned. Subsequently, the malapportion-
ment of the Queensland electoral divisions, except for five 
special districts, has been brought into line with electoral dis-
tributions in other States. Even in Western Australia, the gap 
between the largest and smallest electorates, in terms of the 
number of electors, has been continually narrowing through-
out this century.276 
Nor are federal districts significantly malapportioned. Although Mc-
Kinlay relieved the Commonwealth government of the constitutional 
obligation to apportion equally, federal law requires relative equipopu-
losity.277 As the Commonwealth indicated as an intervener in McGinty, 
"this is not merely the work of a benign legislature, but observance of 
a constitutional imperative. "278 Thus, although McKinlay says the Con-
stitution does not fetter the government, the Commonwealth Attorney 
275 See id. at 292. The disparity between the most and least populous districts for purposes of 
electing representatives to the Legislative Council, the state's upper house, was 376%. See id. at 
293. Although Justice Dawson accepted the view that a districting scheme might be so grossly 
disproportionate that elections held thereunder would not represent the people's preferences, 
he noted that it would have to be an "extreme situation markedly different from that which exists" 
in this case. See id. at 311. While the percentages are substantial, the disparity in numbers is not 
great: the most populous electorate had 26,580 enrolled voters and the least populous had 9,135 
enrolled voters. 
2761d. at 357 (McHugh, J.) (noting the pattern of evolutionary democracy that is similar to 
Canada's and different from America's). 
277 Commonwealth Electoral Act, §§ 59, 73 (1918) (Commonwealth). 
278 McGinty, 134 A.L.R. at 365 (Gummow,j.). 
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General believed it does, and therefore asked the Court to overrule 
McKinlay. 279 
The electoral landscape with which the Court was confronted, then, 
did not reveal a crisis demanding judicial interference for failure of 
political solutions. Indeed, twice in the time since Reynolds was de-
cided, Australian voters had been asked, and had declined, to amend 
their Constitution to require explicitly equipopulous districts (within 
plus or minus ten percent). The rejection was based either in satisfac-
tion with the present malapportionment, or the rate at which legisla-
tures are remedying malapportionment, or with skepticism that the 
federal government could do a better job.280 
a. The Constitutional Text Does Not Demand Voter Parity 
Like the justices of the McKinlay Court, the majority of McGinty 
justices noticed that, far from requiring voter parity, the Common-
wealth Constitution seems to demand inequality in various ways.281 For 
instance, the amendment process requires that, for most amendments, 
a majority of voters in a majority of states ratifY a proposed amend-
ment;282 for amendments that disproportionately affect one state, that 
state's residents have veto power.283 If sovereignty means the ability to 
control the government and if, in a constitutional setting, sovereignty 
is exercised through the power of amending the Constitution, "the 
Australian people do not have equal shares in that sovereignty," the 
Court said.284 That inequality inheres in other provisions does not 
279 See id. 
280 See Australian Electoral Commission 1988 Cat. No. 88 0683 6 (on file with author). In the 
1988 referendum, the proposed language would have repealed Section 29, which gives state and 
federal parliaments unfettered discretion over electoral boundaries. The arguments against the 
amendment were based largely on federalism. See id. at 15 (urging voters to vote "no" because it 
''would give the High Court unprecedented new powers to intervene directly in State polls" and 
characterizing the initiative as a federal "power grab" to restrict local control over local elections). 
In 1974, the proposal was rejected by a majority of voters in all states except New South Wales, 
the most populous state. McGinty, 134 A.L.R. at 356 (McHugh,].). In 1988, the total "no" vote 
was 62% with a majority in all states voting against it, and only the Australian Capital Territory 
favoring it. Id. at 357. 
281 See, e.g., McGinty, 134 A.L.R. at 349 (McHugh,].) (calling inequality one of the Constitu-
tion's "striking features"). 
282AuSTL. CONST. § 128. 
283 See McGinty, 134 A.L.R. at 349 (noting that the fewer votes of residents of less populated 
states would equal the greater number of voters of more populated states). Cf Moore v. Ogilvie, 
394 U.S. 814 (1969) (invalidating Illinois law requiring that nominating petitions of new political 
parties be signed by a minimum number of voters in nearly half the counties of the state). 
284 McGinty, 134 A.L.R. at 349 (McHugh,J.), 379 (Gummow,].). Other examples of inequality 
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prove that the framers intended malapportionment but it does suggest 
that, at a minimum, they would have expressly rebuked it in Section 
24 if they had meant for it not to apply. 
But Section 24 is silent on the question of districting. Beyond estab-
lishing that representatives must be chosen directly by the people, it 
says nothing about how this choice should be made. As Chief Justice 
Barwick had said in McKinlay, "in my opinion, the expression 'directly 
chosen by the people' is merely emphatic of two factors: first, that the 
election of members should be direct and not indirect as, for example, 
through an electoral college and, secondly, that it shall be a popular 
election. It is not an indirect reference to any particular theory of 
government. "285 The basic requirement that the people directly choose 
is consistent with a range of electoral systems: "first past the post 
voting," preferential voting, voting in districts or as one electorate, 
selection by occupation or by locality are all possibilities, none of which 
can be said to be compelled by Section 24 at the exclusion of the 
others.286 Furthermore, as was discussed in McKinlay, Section 29 ex-
pressly gives the federal or state parliaments discretion as to how to 
conduct elections for the House of Representatives. 
As an alternative to the textual arguments, plaintiffs urged the Court 
to follow the American cases. The identical language of the American 
and Australian Constitutions, plaintiffs argued, compelled identical 
interpretations.287 The American position turned out to be difficult for 
the Australian Court to avoid: it confronted the justices not only as a 
historical model but, because it has been so influential to political 
scientists in the last thirty years, it appears to be the modern norm as 
well.288 Nonetheless, the McGinty Court, like the McKinlay Court, and 
like the Canadians, ultimately rejected the argument.289 Although these 
Courts did not follow the American example, they apparently felt 
include the "senate floor" rule which establishes that, regardless of population, no state shall have 
fewer than six senators, AUSTL. CONST. § 7, and the "ineqUality in franchise rights of the various 
states at the time of federation, which the Constitution expressly sanctioned as applicable to 
federal elections, rather than requiring universal suffrage. [d. at § 30; see McGinty, 134 A.L.R. at 
353-54 (McHugh,].) (discussing various colonies' franchise requirements). 
285 See McGinty, 134 A.L.R. at 299, quoting McKinlay, 135 C.L.R. at 21. See also McGinty, 134 
A.L.R. at 382 (Gummow,].) (relying on historical background of Section 24). 
286 See McGinty, 134 A.L.R. at 351 (McHugh,].). 
287 Compare AUSTL. CONST. § 24 with U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, cl. 2. See supra note 243. 
288 See McGinty, 134 A.L.R. at 356 (McHugh,].). 
289This contrasts with the defamation cases where the Court adopted much of the American 
Court's reasoning, without even the benefit of comparable textual guarantee. See, e.g., Theo-
phanous, 182 C.L.R. 104. 
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obligated to consider the argument seriously. The Australian Court 
reiterated the reasons for rejecting the American model stated in 
McKinlay, largely on historical grounds, and found the Canadian solu-
tion much more persuasive. 290 
b. The Constitution Does Not Imply a Right to Representative 
Democracy 
The plaintiffs then argued that a constitutional right of represent-
ative democracy that guarantees free political expression must also 
secure absolute voter parity because both rights are necessary for a 
polity to exercise its sovereign ty. 291 Chief Justice Brennan summarily 
distinguished the two rights without explanation.292 But this cursory 
treatment of the free speech cases fails to account either for the 
broad promises those cases contained or for their appealing underly-
ing logic-appealing especially to American sensibilities. Ultimately, 
the shift back towards textualism can be explained only as a change of 
heart on the part of a majority of the Court, informed by certain 
jurisprudential concerns. 
Part of the Court's reluctance to endorse a guarantee of repre-
sentative democracy or representative government undoubtedly stems 
from the ill-defined contours of that term, as Justice Stephen had first 
suggested in McKinlay. Throughout the cases, the various justices have 
conceived of "representative" in significantly different terms, although 
in the free speech cases there was sufficient overlap (though not 
identity) to forge a majority. In Justice Dawson's view, it embodies the 
requirement that regular elections provide voters with a true (in-
formed) choice. Justice McHugh recognized representative democracy 
as it existed in 1900, at the time of federation when the Australian 
nation was created by the adoption of the Constitution. Then-Chief 
Justice Mason, in the Australian Capital Television case, believed it 
signified a concept as wide as "government by the people through their 
representatives" which embodies the principle of popular sovereignty. 
290 McGinty, 134 A.L.R. at 308-09 (quoting McKinlay, 135 c.L.R. at 25 (Barwick, CJ.) and 
discussing Ref re: EBCA, 81 D.L.R. 16); Wesberry, 376 u.s. 1. The Court also cited American cases 
from Baker to Shaw I. 
291 See 134 A.L.R. at 310-11 (Dawson,].), 345-47 (McHugh,].), 365 (Gummow,].). 
292The Chief Justice simply said that all of the free speech cases "were concerned with the 
freedom of communication required to allow 'the people' to perform their constitutional func-
tion of choosing their Parliamentary representatives. None of these cases was concerned with 
equality of voting power." McCzinty, 134 A.L.R. at 296-97. 
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Justice Toohey, along with others, conceived it to require that "all 
citizens of the Commonwealth who are not under some special disabil-
ity are entitled to share equally in the exercise of those ultimate powers 
of governmental control."293 
These differences are so fundamental that they defY the very possi-
bility ofidentirying a unified conception of representative government. 
As Justice Toohey said, "[i] t is one thing to say that the Australian 
Constitution contains an implication of representative democracy. It is 
another to give content to that implication. "294 A jurist who is appre-
hensive about giving content to a constitutional principle may be 
reluctant to recognize the principle at all either because it is so open 
as to be impossible to define or because the difficulty suggests that the 
effort is more political than judicial,295 Justice McHugh explained his 
reluctance this way: 
To decide cases by reference to what the principles of repre-
sentative democracy currently require is to give this Court a 
jurisdiction which the Constitution does not contemplate and 
which the Australian people have never authorised. Interpret-
ing the Constitution is a difficult task at any time. It is not 
made easier by asking the justices of this Court to determine 
what representative democracy requires. That is a political 
question and, unless the Constitution turns it into a constitu-
293 McKinlay, 135 C.L.R. at 36; see McGinty, 134 A.L.R. at 318-19 (Toohey,].) (providing a 
summary of various justices' positions). 
294 McGinty, 134 A.L.R. at 319. 
295 See also id. at 347: 
The result seems to be that the Constitution contains by implication a principle of 
representative democracy that is not confined to restricting the powers of the federal 
or state legislatures, nor does it necessarily confer any rights on individuals. It appears 
to be a free-standing principle .... [~) This [position) may be the logical consequence 
of the way the majority of the justices of this Court have now formulated the principle, 
but, to my mind, it only demonstrates that no such principle can be deduced from the 
Constitution by applying the standard techniques of statutory interpretation to a con-
stitutional instrument. 
[d. In American jurisprudence, substantive due process may provide the best example of this 
problem. As the U.S. Supreme Court has recently reiterated, "we have always been reluctant to 
expand the concept of substantive due process because guideposts for responsible decisionmak-
ing in this unchartered area are scarce and open-ended." Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2267 (quotations 
omitted) (refusing to find physician-assisted suicide to be a fundamental right); see also Griswold 
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 511 (1965) (Black,]., dissenting); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 
S. Ct. 2791, 2874-75 (1992) (Scalia,]., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in 
part). 
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tional question for the judiciary, it should be left to be an-
swered by the people and their elected representatives acting 
within the limits of their powers as prescribed by the Consti-
tution.296 
325 
The majority of justices seems to have found the concept of repre-
sentative democracy simply too unwieldy to permit what our jurispru-
dence might refer to as 'Judicially discoverable and manageable stand-
ards."297 Furthermore, Chief Justice Brennan refused to invalidate a law 
simply because it might be said to contravene a principle extraneous 
to the Constitution itself. 298 
c. A Guarantee of Representative Democracy Would Not Include Voter 
Parity 
The McGinty Court further explained that even if representative 
democracy did exist in the Constitution, it did not require that indi-
vidual votes be of absolutely equal value. In an extensive and scholarly 
discussion, Justice McHugh approached the question from a historical 
perspective. He explained that, far from mandating voter parity, rep-
resentative government in both England and Australia at the time of 
federation (1900) was seen as enabling representation of "communities 
and economic interests rather than individual electors,"299 although he 
noted that this gave way to the view, accepted in Reynolds that, "[l]eg-
islatures represent people, not trees or acres. Legislatures are elected 
by voters, not farms or cities or economic interests. "300 McHugh showed 
that Reynolds reflected the outmoded view of British radicals of the 
1830s which had largely fallen out of favor since then. 30l Given the 
significant disparity in voting power throughout Australian colonial 
296 McGinty, 134 A.L.R. at 348 (McHugh,].). Justice McHugh's decision to renounce the free 
speech cases seemed to rest on the view that while the concept of representative democracy could 
be cabined as applied to federal law as in Nationwide News and Australian Capital Television, when 
applied to the common law of defamation, its boundaries seemed to disappear. See id. at 346-47. 
297 See Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. The political question doctrine is not recognized as such in 
Australian constitutional law. 
298 "It is logically impermissible to treat 'representative democracy' as though it were contained 
in the Constitution, to attribute to the term a meaning or content derived from sources extrinsic 
to the Constitution and then to invalidate a law for inconsistency with the meaning or content 
so attributed." McGinty, 134 A.L.R. at 295-96. 
299 McGinty, 134 A.L.R. at 352 (McHugh, ].). See also Guinier, supra note 86, at 1604-05 
(recounting history of concept of representation as community-based). 
300 McGinty, 134 A.L.R. 289 at 352 (McHugh,].) quoting Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 562. 
301 McGinty, 134 A.L.R. at 352 (McHugh,].). 
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history and at the time of federation, it would be anomalous to assume 
the framers meant to change the status quo but did not say SO.302 
Justice Dawson noted that there "are hundreds of electoral systems 
in existence today by which a form of representative government might 
be achieved. "303 Different systems will balance variously the competing 
values of representative government-such as stable and effective gov-
ernment, fair representation, wide choice of representatives, and con-
tact between the electorate and the representatives-such that each 
system may organize slightly differently in order to achieve its own 
goals within the general rubric of representative government.304 Be-
yond what its terms mandate, however, the Constitution does not 
ordain a particular organizational structure.305 Given that represent-
ative democracy comprises competing values, the legislature must have 
discretion to balance those values against the interest in absolute equal-
ity.306 "If it is rationally open to the federal or State Parliaments to 
conclude that, consistently with representative democracy, other fac-
tors concerning parliamentary representation must be weighed against 
the theory of equal representation for equal numbers, the plaintiffs' 
case based on representative democracy must fail. "307 This openness to 
various conceptions of representative democracy is acknowledged in 
the phrase "until Parliament otherwise provides," which is said to 
"accommodate the notion that representative government is a dynamic 
rather than a static institution and one that has developed in the course 
of this cen tury. "308 
302 See also id. at 367-68 (Gummow,].) (documenting electoral history of Western Australia). 
3031d. at 307 (Dawson, ].). See also Lucas, 377 U.S. at 748 (Stewart,]., dissenting) ("My own 
understanding of the various theories of representative government is that no one theory has 
ever commanded unanimous assent among political scientists, historians, or others who have 
considered the problem"). 
304 McGinty, 134 A.L.R. at 307 (Dawson,].) (quoting VERNON BOGDANOR, THE PEOPLE AND THE 
PARTY SYSTEM 209 (1981». See also McKinlay, 135 C.L.R. at 56 (Stephen,].) ("The electoral 
system, with its innumerable details including numbers and qualifications of representatives, 
single or multi-member electorates, voting methods and the various methods, including varieties 
. of proportional representation, whereby the significance and outcome of the votes cast may be 
determined; in each there is scope for variety and no one formula can preempt the field as alone 
consistent with representative democracy."). 
305 McGinty, 134 A.L.R. at 310 (Dawson,].) ("the system of representative government which, 
without mentioning it by name, the Constitution prescribes is that for which it provides."). 
306 See also id. at 376--78 (Gummow,].) (discussing and quoting at length JOHN STUART MILL, 
CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1861». 
307 McGinty, 134 A.L.R. at 356 (McHugh,].). 
3081d. at 383 (Gummow, ].). 
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Furthermore, even if a legislature decided that the primary value is 
electoral equality, it must be permitted to consider factors other than 
the number of voters in each district. Echoing the insight of Justice 
Stevens in Karcher v. Daggett, Justice Dawson explained: 
There are other ways, perhaps more significant, in which the 
value of a vote may be affected as, for example, where elec-
toral divisions are defined in such a way as to allow one party 
in a two party system to return a majority of representatives 
with less than a majority of the total votes, which may occur 
whether or not malapportionment also exists. Disproportion 
of this kind may be intentionally caused by a gerrymander.309 
Thus, even if the Constitution guaranteed equipopulosity, the plaintiffs 
might still be denied representative democracy if the districts were 
gerrymandered or otherwise manipulated.310 These problems could be 
avoided by eliminating the practice of districting which would ensure 
equal voting power at least within each state. But as Justice Dawson 
realized, districting permits recognition of communities of interests 
which can enhance equality of voting value. 311 Eliminating districting 
would defeat the purpose of representative democracy. On the other 
hand, the goal of "effective representation of all citizens"312 could be 
achieved by permitting deviations from voter parity "as an appropriate 
and adapted means of taking account of geographic boundaries, com-
munity or minority interests or some other matter which bears on 
effective parliamentary representation, such as the dispersed nature of 
the population in remote areas. "313 In the end, a majority of the Aus-
tralian Court found that the impugned legislation balanced the com-
peting values sufficiently well to satisfY the only actual constitutional 
requirement, that the representatives be chosen directly by the peo-
ple.314 
309Id. at 307 (Dawson,].) (citing Bandemer and Shaw /),358 (McHugh,].), 366-67 (Gummow, 
].) . 
310 See also id. at 336 (Gaudron,].) (suggesting that conditioning the franchise on membership 
in a particular political party would violate assumptions implicit in the right to have repre-
sentatives "chosen by the People"). 
311 134 A.L.R. at 308-09 (Dawson,].). 
m McGinty, 134 A.L.R. at 322 (Toohey,].). 
313Id. at 337 (Gaudron,].). 
314 Since a majority of the Court found that there was no implied or explicit constitutional 
guarantee of electoral equality, these justices did not need to reach the question of the federal 
constitution's application to the states. Id. at 300 (Barwick, CJ.) ("In my opinion, the Common-
wealth Constitution contains no implication affecting disparities of voting power among the 
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III. JURISPRUDENTIAL ATTITUDES 
The three Courts have reached different conclusions about the 
constitutional authority for a right to equal voting power and the kind 
of equality, if any, such a right entails. This section will explore the 
jurispruden tial differences among the three decisions and suggest why 
each Court adopted the model it did. 
It does not appear that the jurisprudential differences can be ade-
quately explained simply by reference to the differences in each coun-
try's constitutional text. Each Constitution expressly guarantees a dif-
ferent set of rights but there seems to be little connection between a 
particular collection of rights and the Court's holding. The presence 
of a voting right is critical in Canada yet irrelevant in Australia; its 
absence is also irrelevant in the United States. The presence of an 
equality right is critical in the United States and irrelevant in Canada; 
its absence may be important in Australia. The presence of a right to 
choose federal electors is important in the United States but not con-
clusive in Australia; its absence is irrelevant in Canada. And the right 
against discrimination in voting, embodied in the Fifteenth Amend-
ment, seems irrelevant to all countries. Clearly, the presence or ab-
sence of any particular textual guarantee is not determinative of the 
Court's acceptance of an equal voting right. 
Another possibility for the contrasting jurisprudential approaches to 
electoral equality is the distinctive historical traditions of each country. 
This is a slightly more intriguing option, largely because the Canadian 
and Australian courts rely on the historical differences between their 
countries and America to justify departing from the American model. 
The principal historical difference relied upon is the way in which the 
former colonies moved away from Great Britain and toward greater 
holders of the franchise for the election of members of a State Parliament"). 311 (Dawson. J.). 
375 (Gummow.].). The Chief Justice merely pointed out that Section 24 created and established 
the terms for the federal House of Representatives and it was in the section of the Constitution 
dealing with the structure of the federal government. not the part dealing with states and their 
constitutions. Id. at 300 (distinguishing Chapter I (''The Parliament") from Chapter V ("The 
States") of the Commonwealth Constitution). EvenJustice Toohey. who argued for the relevance 
of representative democracy at the federal level. found that it would not apply to state elections. 
See id. at 324-28. 327 ("Any guarantee of voting equality in Commonwealth elections will not be 
affected by State electoral laws permitting inequality in State elections."). Nor did the Court find 
that state constitutional or statutory law. which used the same language as Section 24. guaranteed 
voter parity either explicitly or implicitly. McGinty. 134 A.L.R. at 313-15 (Toohey.].); but see id. 
at 328-29 (Toohey.j.). 
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democracy-in America by revolution and in Australia and Canada by 
evolution.315 
[T] he American colonies had not only made unilateral dec-
larations of independence but had done so in revolt against 
British institutions and methods of government. The con-
cepts of the sovereignty of Parliament and of ministerial re-
sponsibility were rejected in the formation of the American 
Constitution. Thus, not only does the American Constitution 
provide for a presidential system, but it provides for checks 
and balances based on the denial of complete confidence in 
any single arm of government. 
In high contradistinction, the Australian Constitution was 
developed not in antagonism to British methods of govern-
ment but in co-operation with and, to a great extent, with the 
encouragement of the British Government .... [T]here was 
no antipathy amongst the colonists to the notion of the sov-
ereignty of Parliament in the scheme of government. 316 
This passage raises several distinct but related issues that have impli-
cations for constitutional interpretation. The most discreet is simply 
the question of timing. Even before becoming a nation, the first thing 
Americans did was declare their absolute and immediate indepen-
dence from Britain, proclaiming a sovereignty that has remained in-
violable to this day. Australians and Canadians, by contrast, are more 
comfortable with the measured process of evolutionary independence 
which develops over centuries as needs arise. 
Justice McLachlin has suggested that the instantaneity of the birth 
of the American nation has implications for constitutional interpreta-
tion. 
315This is shorthand for the argument that American autonomy derives from a deliberate act 
of rebellion, abruptly breaking the new world from the old, authorizing deviations from past 
practice in preference to more modern, more democratic, more enlightened ways, while the 
Australian and Canadian federations are engaged in an ongoing process of self-actualization, with 
more or less jolting changes taking place every so often. Even now, Australia and Canada are 
linked to Britain in subtle ways that America has not experienced in more than 200 years. The 
likeness of Elizabeth II on Australian and Canadian currency and stamps indicates some differ-
ence in current attitudes towards Britain between these countries and the United States. In a 
country that will not even pay its dues to the United Nations out of concern for the integrity of 
its sovereignty, it is hard to imagine the likeness of a foreign monarch on United States currency. 
The current debate in Australia over the possibility of converting to a republic is one more step 
in this evolutionary process. 
316 McKinlay, 135 C.L.R. at 23-24. 
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[D]emocracy in Canada is rooted in a different history than 
in the United States: Its origins lie not in the debates of the 
founding fathers, but in the less absolute recesses of the 
British tradition. Our forefathers did not rebel against the 
English tradition of democratic government as did the Ameri-
cans; on the contrary, they embraced it and changed it to suit 
their own perceptions and needs.317 
While Americans owe their sovereignty to the impassioned rhetoric of 
the founders, Canadians have forged their national identity from ex-
perience and traditions that have developed over time. It is not sur-
prising then, that Americans rely to a much greater degree than either 
the Canadians or the Australians on the speeches and writings of the 
framers. This, in turn, reinforces our acceptance of absolutism. As 
Justice McLachlin explains, the American fascination with the consti-
tutional debates "meant that at least in theory the ideals of equality 
can be seen as having been embraced from the outset in an absolute 
fashion, something that never occurred either in England or Canada, 
where gradual change and accommodation of other factors has been 
the norm. "318 
The argument is that Canadians and Australians are more likely to 
look to experience and practice for guidance in constitutional inter-
pretation and to accept the subtleties and compromises they are likely 
to find there. Americans, by contrast, are likely to look to impassioned 
rhetoric for guidance and to accept its propensity for absolutism and 
idealism. Whether or not this is true in all areas of law, it does seem 
to reflect the different jurisprudential choices that each Court has 
made in the cases discussed here. The Canadian Court itself has said 
that its watchword is "[p]ragmatism, rather than [American] conform-
ity to a philosophical ideal. "319 
Other historical differences may also suggest different jurispruden-
tial choices. Perhaps the most significant difference among the three 
countries is that the American system of government resulting from 
independence from Great Britain is presidential while in Australia and 
Canada it is parliamentary. These systems differ in numerous ways, but 
for present purposes it suffices to comment on one: the British system 
of parliamentary sovereignty, with its characteristic trust of the govern-
317 Ref re: EBCA, 81 D.L.R. at 37. 
318 Dixon 1989, 59 D.L.R. at 263 (McLaughlin, J.). 
319 [d. at 262; Ref re: EBCA, 81 D.L.R. at 37. 
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ment may be contrasted with American constitutionalism which is 
marked by distrust of the government.320 As the Australian High Court 
has noted, the American Constitution required a complex system of 
checks and balances, and probably would not have been ratified with-
out the promise of a Bill of Rights.321 By contrast, 
[i]t is very noticeable that no Bill of Rights is attached to the 
Constitution of Australia and that there are few guarantees. 
Not only are the powers given to the Parliament plenary but 
there is a large number of provisions in the Constitution 
which leave to the Parliament the power of altering the ac-
tual constitutional provisions. In other words, unlike the case 
of the American Constitution, the Australian Constitution is 
built upon confidence in a system of parliamentary Govern-
ment with ministerial responsibility.322 
While a parliamentary system assumes the validity of the acts of Parlia-
ment, the American theory of popular sovereignty assumes the validity 
of the will of the people. And this, of course, also has implications for 
constitutional interpretation. In America, the Constitution is viewed as 
the embodiment of popular sovereignty, the bulwark against govern-
mental oppression. The distinctively oppositional nature of the Ameri-
can Constitution vis-a-vis the government means that the Court is 
justified in giving the Constitution broad application. If the Court will 
not help, no one will. The Australian and Canadian Constitutions are, 
at least formally, acts of Parliament which are presumed to be consis-
tent with other acts and with popular will; there is no warrant for 
particularly expansive interpretation that would pit the government 
against the people. 
~20The paradigm expression of parliamentary sovereignty or parliamentary supremacy may be 
found in Blackstone: " ... if the parliament will positively enact a thing to be done which is 
unreasonable, I know of no power that can control it: and the examples usually alleged in support 
of this sense of the rule do none of them prove, that where the main object of a statute is 
unreasonable the judges are at liberty to reject it; for that were to set the judicial power above 
that of the legislature, which would be subversive of all government." 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAws OF ENGLAND 91 (1765), cited in ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF 
INTERPRETATION 130 (1997). Cf Marburyv. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,177 (lS03) (assert-
ing the power of the Court to invalidate laws repugnant to the Constitution and adopting the 
views of Edward Coke articulated in Dr. Bonham's Case, S Co. Rep. ll4a, llSa, 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 
652 (K.B. 1610». 
~21 McKinlay, 135 C.L.R. at 24. 
~22ld. Notwithstanding the homage to the legislature, the Court did invalidate certain aspects 
of the laws under review (relating to the census). Id. at 26-35. 
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The contrast in constitutional approach is that, in the case of 
the American Constitution, restriction on legislative power is 
sought and readily implied whereas, where confidence in the 
parliament prevails, express words are regarded as necessary 
to warrant a limitation of otherwise plenary powers. Thus, 
discretions in parliament are more readily accepted in the 
construction of the Australian Constitution.323 
Out of deference to the principle of separation of powers, enhanced 
as it is by parliamentary sovereignty, the Australian High Court in 
McKinlay and McGinty refused to read the Constitution as if it implied 
restrictions on the legislature beyond those that are express. 324 Evolu-
tionary history, and the parliamentary form of government, the major-
ity seems to be saying, demands textual literalism. In so finding, the 
Court firmly rejected any argument that American precedents (par-
ticularly those dealing with the structure of government) are persua-
sive.325 
Again, Justice McLachlin's remark about reliance on evidence of 
framers' intent is relevant. 326 Americans are distinctively willing to con-
sult the writings of the framers to aid in understanding the terms of 
the Constitution. This may reflect a greater level of comfort with 
idealism but it also indicates that we treat our Constitution as some-
thing other than a regular statute, or even a very important statute. It 
is, in the American system, sui generis. By contrast, the Australian 
Constitution and the Canadian Charter are laws that need to be con-
strued as such. Evidence of framers' intent is no more relevant than 
evidence of legislative intent in construing a statute.327 Moreover, such 
writings may by oversimplification mask the multifarious meanings of 
the words which are informed by the political compromises that led to 
3231d. at 24. But see Kartinyeri, HCA 22 at'l! 98 (Kirby,]., dissenting) ("It is nothing to the point 
that the Constitution derives its force from an Imperial enactment. It is nonetheless a constitu-
tion," quoting Polites v. Commonwealth (1945) 70 C.L.R. 60 (Dixon,].) and arguing for greater 
judicial consideration of historical and other extratextual materials in constitutional interpreta-
tion). 
324 "Our duty is to declare the law as enacted in the Constitution and not to add to its provisions 
new doctrines which may happen to conform to our own prepossessions." ld. at 44 (Gibbs,].). 
See also McGinty, 134 A.L.R. at 309 (Dawson, J.) ('The wisdom of those who were responsible for 
framing our Constitution in recognising the political nature of such matters, and in leaving them 
to parliament, ought not to be overborne by drawing an implication which is neither apparent 
nor necessary. "). 
325 McKinlay, 135 C.L.R. at 24. 
326 See supra note 317 and accompanying text. 
327 See supra note 245 and accompanying text. 
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their use and the historical gloss superimposed on them by subsequent 
practice. 
Whether the explanation for the differences lies in the distinctive 
American enchantment with fiery rhetoric, as the Canadian Court 
suggested, or its unique conception of the role of the Constitution as 
protective against oppressive government, one thing is clear: American 
jurisprudence in this area is peculiarly idealistic whereas Australian 
jurisprudence demonstrates an overriding concern for the constitu-
tional text and the approach of the Canadian Court is more pragmatic. 
This section will compare the dominant feature of each Court's current 
jurisprudence in the area of voting equality. While these descriptions 
are, of course, simplifications of the complex processes involved in 
constitutional interpretation, they may be useful in focusing atten-
tion on some fundamental distinctions among the three Courts' ap-
proaches to a similar set of questions. 328 
A. American Idealism 329 
American jurisprudence in the context of reapportionment and 
redistricting cases is marked by a distinctively idealist attitude: the 
Court appears more concerned with how things should be than with 
how things are, and virtually no attention is paid to the process of 
getting from how things are to how they should be, nor to the Court's 
role in implementing (or impeding) that transition.33o Rather than 
analyze the potential benefits of the accepted rule or the detriments 
of the rejected rule, the Court in the Shaw cases merely adopts a maxim 
that has some simple intuitive appeal-"the State may not ... separate 
its citizens into different voting districts on the basis of their race"-
without pausing to consider the application of such a rule in the 
present setting.331 Did the states in fact separate citizens into different 
328These appellations are not intended to characterize the various Courts' jurisprudence 
beyond the reapportionment/redistricting context. Although there is reason to believe that what 
is true of these cases is true of other areas of the law as well, see, e.g., C. Lynn Smith, Adding A 
Third Dimension: The Canadian Approach to Constitutional Equality Guarantees, 55 LAw & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 211 (1992), this article does no more than suggest this as a possibility. 
329This section will focus on the redistricting (as opposed to the reapportionment) cases in 
part because these are of current interest to the Court and in part because they embody the 
themes of the earlier cases. 
330 This refers to idealism in the lay sense of aspirational, not to any philosophic, or Platonic 
sense of metaphysical or non-material (although there is obviously a connection between the 
two). 
m Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2486. 
334 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAw REVIEW [Vol. XXI, No.2 
voting districts on the basis of race? If so, did it cause any harm or did 
it produce benefits? Ifit caused harm, to whom? Was it constitutionally 
cognizable harm? Why? What should the cure be for such harm? The 
Court seems uninterested in answering these and similar factual ques-
tions. 
This jurisprudential idealism has two components: it is both norma-
tive and formalist. In its normative aspect, the Court announces a 
new rule with a certain if-we-say-it-it-will-be-so confidence.332 This con-
fidence mayor may not be warranted in this instance-although on 
at least some significant occasions, the Court's confidence has been 
justified.333 The modern supports for this confidence include the 
Court's success in amassing popular and ultimately federal political 
support for its desegregation program in the 1950s and 1960s and, 
most relevantly, its success in implementing the Reynolds mandate. 
It remains to be seen whether the Court's current campaign in the 
districting cases will be equally successful. In these cases, the new rule 
is that state legislatures must be color blind when they draw electoral 
332 ''Normativist theory ... -whether it be some kind of natural rights theory, feminist or 
critical race theory, Dworkin's integrity theory, public choice theory, or what is called 'pragma-
tism' or 'practical reason'---contemplates that the process of interpretation entails the judge 
giving effect to her own convictions about what is right, true, or good." Thomas W. Merrill, Bark 
v. Burke, 19 HARV.J.L. & PUB. POL'y 509, 513 (1996); see William N. Eskridge,Jr. & Gary Peller, 
The New Public Law Movement: Moderation as a Postmodern Cultural Form, 89 MICH. L. REv. 707, 
722-23 (1991) (referring to the "should" quality of normativity). Eskridge and Peller conceptu-
alize normativity as tending towards political progressivism. See id. However, in that "[t]he 
normativistjudge exercises judgment or imagination in trying to figure out what the law should 
be in order to produce a world that the judge regards as more right, just, or simply better," Merrill, 
supra at 514, normativism is inherently neither progressive nor conservative, but can be anchored 
to any political agenda. In other words, if as Professors Eskridge and Peller argue, one conclusion 
to be drawn from law's normativity is that "law is responsible for doing something about the 
substantive ills of our society," Eskridge & Peller, supra at 748, one's understanding of what the 
law should be will depend on what one views as the substantive ills of our society. In the context 
of voting rights litigation, for instance, it will depend on whether one views race<onscious 
districting or lack of minority representation as the greater ill. 
To the extent that normativism requires a judge to consider society's ills, it shares with 
pragmatism a realistic stance, and to this extent, it is an admirable jurisprudential choice. See 
generally William N. Eskridge,Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 
YALE LJ. 331 (1991) (emphasizing the pragmatist aspects of normativism). In the redistricting 
cases, however, the Court's formalism has replaced realism as the anchor: the judge'S decision of 
what the law should do is tied not to society's actual ills but to some abstract rule that is not 
explained (nor, arguably, is it explainable), in terms of the real world. Again, my approval of 
some jurisprudential choices and criticisms of others is limited to the redistricting cases. 
333 The first and most significant example of this is John Marshall's assertion of judicial review. 
See Marbury, 5 U.S. 137. If we act like we know what we're doing and dazzle them with some 
fancy rhetoric, people will come to accept it, he might have thought. And so they did. 
1998] JUDGING ELECTORAL DISTRICTS 335 
district lines.334 With roots injustice Harlan's venerable dissent in Plessy 
v. Ferguson,335 the principle now stands for the proposition that, "the 
guarantee of equal protection cannot mean one thing when applied 
to one individual and something else when applied to a person of 
another color."336 But "can" as used here must mean "should," since 
the Equal Protection Clause could mean one thing when applied to a 
discrete and insular minority and another when applied to a member 
of the self-dealing majority intent on subordinating that minority.337 
334 See supra notes 127-49. 
335 See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) ("Our Constitution is color blind, and 
neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. ") (Harlan,]., dissenting). 
336Bakke v. Regents of University of California, 438 U.S. 265, 289-90 (1978) (Powell, ].). In 
other words, the Court will use strict scrutiny whether the case involves blacks complaining about 
invidious discrimination or whites complaining about affirmative action. See also Adarand, 515 
U.S. at 224 ("the standard of review under the Equal Protection Clause is not dependent on the 
race of those burdened or benefitted by a particular classification"). Again, "is" describes what 
the Court thinks the standard should be, not what it inevitably must be. See also Miller, 515 U.S. 
at 903-04. 
337For instance, if as Justice Powell has explained, "[t]he term 'gerrymandering' ... is also 
used loosely to describe the common practice of the party in power to choose the redistricting 
plan that gives it an advantage at the polls," Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 164 (Powell,].), and if as Shaw 
reaffirms, gerrymandering is subject to the Equal Protection Clause, one could plausibly argue 
that redistricting to consolidate power is constitutionally suspect in a way that redistricting to 
diffuse power is not. In her separate opinion in Bandemer,Justice O'Connor also recognized that 
whites and blacks are not necessarily similarly situated such that identical treatment (i.e., color 
blindness) is warranted: 
In my view, where a racial minority group is characterized by "the traditional indicia of 
suspectness" and is vulnerable to exclusion from the political process, individual voters 
who belong to that group enjoy some measure of protection against intentional dilution 
of their group voting strength by means of racial gerrymandering .... In these circum-
stances, ... the Equal Protection Clause gives the federal courts [greater warrant] to 
intervene for protection against racial discrimination .... 
Id. at 151. See also Shaw 1,509 U.S. at 677-78 (Stevens,]., dissenting): 
The duty to govern impartially is abused when a group with power over the electoral 
process defines electoral boundaries solely to enhance its own political strength at the 
expense of any weaker group. That duty, however, is not violated when the majority acts 
to facilitate the election of a member of a group that lacks such power because it remains 
underrepresented in the state legislature-whether that group is defined by political 
affiliation, by common economic interests, or by religious, ethnic, or racial charac-
teristics. The difference between constitutional and unconstitutional gerrymanders has 
nothing to do with whether they are based on assumptions about the groups they affect, 
but whether their purpose is to enhance the power of the group in control of the 
districting process at the expense of any minority group, and thereby to strengthen the 
unequal distribution of electoral power. 
Id. None of this is consistent with the color blindness mandate of the Shaw cases, and the Shaw 
Court makes no effort to respond to this argument. 
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Color blindness is a paradigm of normative jurisprudence:338 no one, 
not even those most committed to it such as Justices Thomas and 
Scalia, argues that it describes the current state of affairs. Thus,Justice 
Scalia does not-and could not--offer any support for the grand claim 
that "[i]n the eyes of government, we are just one race here. It is 
American. "339 This unambiguously reveals a preference for the norma-
tive over the descriptive. Justice Thomas, in Adarand Constructors v. 
Peiia, takes the same approach. "As far as the Constitution is con-
cerned, it is irrelevant whether a government's racial classifications are 
drawn by those who wish to oppress a race or by those who have a 
sincere desire to help those thought to be disadvantaged. There can 
be no doubt that the paternalism that appears to lie at the heart of 
this [affirmative action] program is at war with the principle of inher-
ent equality that underlies and infuses our Constitution. "340 But the 
only thing more normative (and less realistically descriptive) than 
Justice Thomas' reading of the Fourteenth Amendment is his authority 
for this statement, the opening of the Declaration of Independence 
which he cites and quotes.341 The problem is not just thatthis norma-
tive approach fails to reflect reality, but that by supplanting reality with 
idealism, it prevents us from seeing the facts as they are. The Court 
produces an idealist bill of goods that is even better than reality. 
There is significant overlap between the normative and the formalist 
aspects of the Court's idealism, although the emphasis of each is 
different. Color blindness's normative aspect is unappealing because 
it does not accurately reflect reality; its formalist aspect is unappealing 
because it oversimplifies reality.342 
As Professor Schauer has explained, "[a]t the heart of the word 
'formalism,' in many of its numerous uses, lies the concept of decision-
making according to rule. Formalism is the way in which rules achieve 
338 SeeA. Leon Higginbotham, et aI., Shawv. Reno: A Mirage of Good Intentions With Devastating 
Racial Consequences, 62 FORDHAM L. REv. 1593, 1601 n.36 (noting that the Shaw Court "describes 
the notion of a color blind constitution as an ideal"); see also The Supreme Court, 1992 Term: 
Leading Cases, 107 HAav. L. REv. 144, 199-204 (1993). 
339 Compare Adarand, 515 U.S. at 239 (Scalia, j., concurring in part and in the judgment) with 
&f re: EBCA, 81 D.L.R. at 36 (noting the "diversity of our social mosaic"). 
340 Adarand, 515 U.S. at 240 (Thomas,j., concurring in part and in the judgment). 
341Id. ("See Declaration ofIndependence ('We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men 
are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that 
among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness') "). 
342 See Lorraine Weinrib, LegalFormalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 YALE LJ. 949 
(1990) [hereinafter Weinrib, Legal Formalism). 
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their 'ruleness' precisely by doing what is supposed to be the failing of 
formalism: screening off from a decisionmaker factors that a sensitive 
decisionmaker would otherwise take into account. "343 The Court has 
perfected this form of formalism in the Shaw cases, both by focusing 
on rules rather than facts and by shielding itself from factors, and facts, 
that would be relevant to a comprehensive understanding of district-
ing. 
The procedural posture of the cases as they arrived at the Court was 
conducive to a formalist approach. In the first Shaw case, the only 
question before the Court was whether the plaintiffs had stated a cause 
of action sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.344 The Court was 
therefore obligated to assume the truth of the allegations in the com-
plaint,345 which liberated it from the constraints that messy facts can 
impose. Here the Court held that a constitutional injury exists where 
"redistricting legislation ... is so extremely irregular on its face that it 
rationally can be viewed only as an effort to segregate the races for 
purposes of voting, without regard for traditional districting principles 
and without sufficiently compelling justification."346 
Many assumptions are implicit in this holding-assumptions that 
were not revisited as the factual predicates of the cases developed. The 
Court assumed that the irregular shape of a district is the result of 
(undue) attention to voters' race. It assumed that, absent attention to 
voters' race, the legislature would use traditional districting principles, 
and that these principles include contiguity and compactness. It as-
sumed that race-conscious districting presumptively violates plaintiffs' 
right to equal protection but that color blind districting does not 
violate blacks' rights to choose representatives (under Wesberry v. Sand-
ers). It assumed that race consciousness inevitably equates to segrega-
tion, discrimination, and even apartheid. It assumed, in brief, that all 
governmental race-consciousness is the same, whether it results in the 
first black person being elected to Congress in nearly 100 years or in 
the disenfranchisement of blacks.347 
343 Frederick Schauer, Furmalism, 97 YALE LJ. 509, 510 (1988). 
344 Shaw l, 509 U.S. at 634. 
345 Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6). 
346 Shaw l, 509 U.S. at 642. 
347 "If there is no dilution of white voting strength and all other things being equal, it robs the 
term 'racial gerrymander' of all meaning to apply it-as the Shaw Court did-equally to redis-
tricting plans that deny minorities majority-minority districts and to redistricting plans that create 
them." Frank P. Parker, The Constitutionality of Racial Redistricting: A Critique of Shaw v. Reno, 3 
D.C. L. REv. 1,40 (1995) [hereinafter Parker, A Critique]. Elsewhere, Parker has identified other 
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The central theme of the Shaw cases is their most formalist and least 
accurate assumption: that the "North Carolina plan resembles the most 
egregious racial gerrymanders of the past. "348 Although the Court is 
willing to make this broad claim, it is not willing to review the particu-
lars of the plan to test it. Closer attention to the facts would reveal that 
the plan was in fact the opposite of Gomillion-style gerrymandering: it 
was not intended to disenfranchise white voters nor did it have that 
effect, nor was it a product of the profoundly oppressive culture of the 
pre-Civil Rights era.349 The analogy holds true only at the most abstract, 
formal level: in both cases the government considered race. But the 
Court provocatively deduced from this generalization that this race 
consciousness equates to "political apartheid"-a term for which it has 
been rightly criticized.350 And it repeatedly asserted that this race con-
sciousness constituted racial "separation" and "segregation. "351 In fact, 
the challenged districts were among the most integrated in the na-
tion. 352 
incorrect assumptions (that Georgia created the third minority opportunity district to meet the 
Department of Justice's preclearance demands, and that the voters in the challenged Eleventh 
district did not share communities of interest) for the purpose of showing "the haste with which 
the Supreme Court is deciding the cases, the lack of any real deliberation, and the lack of any 
real understanding of what the Supreme Court is dealing with." Parker, Factual Errors, supra note 
128, at 529-30. 
348 Shaw /, 509 U.S. at 642. 
349 Cf. Gomillion, 364 U.S. 339. Parker, A Critique, supra note 347, at 1 (Shaw plaintiffs alleged 
neither racially discriminatory purpose nor racially discriminatory effect) . 
350 Shaw /, 509 U.S. at 647. See, e.g., Jaime B. Raskin, Affirmative Action and Racial Reaction, 38 
How. LJ. 521, 528 (1995) ("By likening the Voting Rights Act-induced districts to 'political 
apartheid,' Justice O'Connor revealed the rhetoric-loaded but theory-barren nature of her deci-
sion. This arresting phrase has never been used by the Supreme Court to describe centuries of 
slavery, disenfranchisement, poll taxes, literacy tests, grandfather clauses, Jim Crow laws, or any 
other political exclusions visited on African Americans by white supremacy."); Richard H. Pildes, 
The Politics of Race, 108 HARV. L. REv. 1359, 1360 (1995) (referring to political apartheid as 
"morally laden rhetoric");James B. Zouras, Note, A Color-Blind Court in a Race-Conscious Society, 
44 DEPAUL L. REv. 917, 974 (1995) (claiming that the Court used these terms more for their 
emotional value than for any guidance they might provide and arguing that the Court should 
avoid using legal terms in a sloppy and inaccurate way). 
351 Both terms are used at least nine times each in the course of O'Connor's relatively brief 
opinion in Shaw 1 See 509 U.S. at 633-58. 
352 Thus, while the Court applied strict scrutiny because the district "rationally cannot be 
understood as anything other than an effort to 'segregate ... voters' on the basis of race," Shaw 
/, 509 U.S. at 64~7, (citing Gomillion), it in fact cannot be understood as anything other than 
an effort to integrate voters of different races into one district and to integrate the legislature. See 
Karlan, All Over the Map, supra note 89, at 282 (noting that District 12 was one of the most 
integrated districts in the nation, with 41 % whites and 56% blacks, comparing favorably with 3 
other districts in North Carolina with white populations of 90% where the total white population 
of the state is only 75.56%); see also J. Morgan Kousser, Shaw v. Reno and The Real World of 
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Nor are the other assumptions implicit in Shaw's holding warranted, 
particularly without further proof. For instance, the Court charac-
terizes race conscious districting as an aberrational departure from 
traditional districting principles. But as J. Morgan Kousser has shown, 
an analysis of North Carolina's districting practice reveals that there is 
nothing particularly traditional or principled about the state's practice. 
Kousser reports that "although committees paid lip service to the value 
of compactness, legislators did not hesitate to sacrifice it for what they 
obviously considered the more important ends of protecting racial, 
partisan, and incumbent interests. This represented no change in de 
facto state policy. During the 1950s and 1960s, the state's congressional 
district[s] were derided as 'bacon strips' with 'tortuous' boundaries. 
The Fourth District in 1966 was contiguous only at a pinpoint."353 
Viewed in this light, the district challenged in Shaw was aberrational 
not in shape, but in its intent to enhance minority representation. 
Kousser also shows that districting in North Carolina was never 
race-neutral, regardless of the shape of the districts. "Before 1991, 
white congressmen openly manipulated redistricting to buttress their 
positions against candidates who might appeal to black voters. Second, 
racial, partisan, and incumbent-protecting goals interacted, often pro-
ducing unlikely coalitions."354 Furthermore, with respect to the chal-
lenged district in particular, Kousser shows that race was hardly the 
"but for" cause of the irregular shape. According to the Raleigh, North 
Carolina newspaper, Kousser says, "the purposes of its [the plan's] 
authors were 'to simultaneously equalize district populations, turn 11 
districts into 12, protect incumbent Democrats, inflict maximum car-
nage on most incumbent Republicans, and construct one district with 
a black majority. "'355 This evidence was noted by the district court on 
remand, but ignored by the Supreme Court. Indeed, in both 1996 
redistricting cases, the Court simply disregarded substantial evidence 
that the irregular shapes were due not to racial but to political consid-
Redistricting and Representation, 26 RUTGERS LJ. 625, 634 (1995) ,(making same point with 
roughly the same figures); Parker, A Critique, supra note 347, at 25-26 (same, and noting that "a 
majority of the State's black voting age population-57%-was actually placed in the majority-
white districts, not the two majority-black districts."). 
s5sKousser, supra note 352, at 674 n.197 (noting that North Carolina legislators considered, 
but never even voted on a requirement that districts be "compact in form."); see also SaUying 
Furth, N.Y. TIMES (Magazine),June 29, 1997, at 13 (noting that the equipopulosity requirement 
has caused many sparsely populated congressional districts to be noncompact). 
354Kousser, supra note 352, at 674. 
s55Id. at 694 (citing A Map to Boggle Minds, RALEIGH NEWS, June I, 1991, at AI2). 
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erations. In both cases, legislatures forfeited racially balanced compact 
districts in favor of racially balanced irregular districts that protected 
incumbents.356 
The most significant assumption the Court made in Shaw l, which 
it repeated throughout without even asking for additional evidence, 
was the assumption about harm. Shaw I is peppered with hypothetical 
suggestions about the kind and degree of harm that race consciousness 
may cause, but there is no evidence in that case or in the later cases 
that it actually does cause such harm to the plaintiffs.357 For instance, 
in Shaw l, the Court stated: 
Classifications on the basis of race . . . threaten to stigmatize 
individuals by reason of their membership in a racial group 
and to incite racial hostility. . . . Racial classifications with 
respect to voting carry particular dangers. Racial gerrymander-
ing, even for remedial purposes, may balkanize us into com-
peting racial factions; it threatens to carry us further from the 
goal of a political system in which race no longer matters-a 
goal that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments embody, 
and to which the Nation continues to aspire.358 
What is important to the Court is whether the plans may distance us 
from our ideal, not whether they actually do. The Court cannot be 
faulted for taking judicial notice, or using its intuition, about the 
possibility that governmental activity sometimes does reinforce private 
prejudices. But it can be faulted for basing a cause of action on these 
assumptions without examining whether they are possible in the par-
ticular case or whether there are countervailing benefits, and for ad-
hering to these assumptions after contrary evidence has been adduced. 
In Miller, for instance, the Court transforms the assumption into the 
356 Shaw II, 116 S. Ct. at 1916 (Stevens, j.). In Bush, the tentacles of the challenged district, 
which rendered the shape irregular, were 70% white, so the shape would have been more or less 
regular but for the inclusion of additional white voters who were wanted in the district not because 
of their race but because of their political affiliations. 116 S. Ct. 1941; Conference, supra note 
88, at 55; see also Abrams, 117 S. Ct. at 1943 (Breyer, j., dissenting) (plans with fewer minority-
majority districts no more compact than those with more). 
357 Indeed, the Shaw Court seems to be responding on a visceral level rather than an analytic 
level to what the government has done, calling the actions "unsettling" and "uncomfortable." 
Shaw /, 509 U.S. at 641,647. 
358Id. at 643, 657 (emphases added). But see Parker, Factual Errors, supra note 128, at 533 
(noting that "[t]here is no more proof that racial redistricting causes racially polarized thinking 
and racial stereotypes, racial bloc voting or representational harms than there is proof that racial 
redistricting caused the OJ. Simpson verdict"). 
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reality effortlessly: "Race-based assignments ... cause society serious 
harm. As we concluded in Shaw: 'Racial classifications ... may balkan-
ize us . . . .' "359 The Court then refers to these harms as "the conse-
quences of racial stereotyping. "360 Consequences that were once poten-
tialities have hardened into actualities.361 As the Shaw series progresses, 
the Court is not even addressing the alleged harms anymore, but 
rather considers them to have already been established.362 It has de-
clared its preference for the normative appeal of aspirational jurispru-
dence ("a political system in which race no longer matters") and for 
the formal appeal of the bright line (all race consciousness is bad race 
consciousness) and it has maintained its indifference to the complex 
realities of redistricting and to the real effects of governmental choices 
on people. 
This idealism is consistent with an aspect of the Court's jurispru-
dence that appears to be distinctively American. As Thomas Grey has 
explained, Americans tend to view our Constitution as Scripture: 'Just 
as Christians and Jews take the word of God as sovereign and the Bible 
as the word of God, so Americans take the will of the people as 
sovereign, at least in secular matters, and the Constitution as the most 
359 Miller, 515 u.s. at 912 (quoting full passage in text). 
360 Id. 
361 A parallel transformation can be mapped for the role of race in these cases. We start with 
the desire to diversify Congress, which prompted the Voting Rights Act, which in turn requires 
that covered states get approval from the Department of Justice for new electoral plans. This, in 
turn, may require state legislators to ensure that there are enough minorities in a given district 
to permit the minorities to elect a representative of their choice. Race is, therefore, one of many 
factors of which legislators are aware. But Shaw delegitimizes this by making race the defining 
factor (as in a "racial gerrymander") and then transmuting it into prejudice ("racial stereotype") 
and then, the worst of all epithets, into "political apartheid." See, e.g., Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 648 
("By perpetuating [racial stereotypes], a racial gerrymander may exacerbate the very patterns of 
racial bloc voting that majority-minority districting is sometimes said to counteract"). No expla-
nation is given as to how the intent to diversify Congress turned into political apartheid. 
362 In Hays, the court stated: 
We discussed the harms caused by racial classifications in Shaw. We noted that, in 
general, "[t]hey threaten to stigmatize individuals by reason of their membership in a 
racial group and to incite racial hostility." Shaw I, 509 u.s. at 643. We also noted 
"representational harms" the particular type of racial classification at issue in Shaw may 
cause: "When a district obviously is created solely to effectuate the perceived common 
interests of one racial group, elected officials are more likely to believe that their primary 
obligation is to represent only the members of that group, rather than their constituency 
as a whole." Id. at 648. 
Hays, 515 U.S. at 744. See also Shaw II, 116 S. Ct. 1894 (no discussion of harms of predominant 
legislative attention to race in districting); but see Hays, 515 u.s. at 750 (Stevens, j., concurring) 
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authoritative legal expression of that popular will. "363 While it is true 
that the Constitution entrenches itself as the Supreme Law of the 
Land,364 Grey points out that Americans see their national Constitution 
as much more than simply the top of a hierarchy that ranks federal 
and state laws, treaties, executive orders, e tc. 365 Just as the Bible is more 
than a set of parables and stories about people who lived long ago, the 
Constitution is more than a set of rules and instructions by which the 
Government must abide. "[T]he Constitution is meant to express an 
arrangement vastly more complex than those underlying most legal 
documents: the web of society's basic institutions and ideals, its unwrit-
ten constitution .... It is this grand and cloudy Constitution that 
stands in our minds for the ideal America, earth's last best hope, the 
city on the hill."366 Like the Bible, the Constitution is aspirational, not 
merely prescriptive.367 
(,The majority fails to explain coherently how a State discriminates invidiously by deliberately 
joining members of different races in the same district; why such placement amounts to an injury 
to members of any race; and, assuming it does, to whom"). 
s63Thomas C. Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REv. 1, 3 (1984) [hereinafter 
Grey, Constitution as Scripture]. See also Anthony R. Blackshield, Observance of Basic Law Oceans 
Apart, THE AUSTRALIAN, Mar. 29, 1996, at 8 ("[T]he American reverence for the Constitution 
contrasts oddly with Australian experience, where opinion polls repeatedly show that many 
Australians-especially younger Australians-are unaware a Constitution exists.") [hereinafter 
Blackshield, Oceans Apart]. Whatever else can be said of the American education system, it cannot 
be gainsaid that Americans are aware of their Constitution. See also Morton J. Horwitz, The 
Meaning of the Bork Nomination in American Constitutional History, 50 U. PITT. L. REv. 655, 663 
(1988) ("Constitution worship is America's secular religion"). 
S64U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. 
365 Grey, Constitution as Scripture, supra note 363, at 3 (contrasting American perceptions of 
their national and state constitutions). Grey is certainly not the first to have made this analogy; 
indeed, Grey notes that the Constitution assumed a quasi-religious character upon ratification. 
And as far back as 1803, John Marshall was able to say that "in America, ... written constitutions 
have been viewed with so much reverence." Marbury, 5 U.S. at 178. As Sanford Levinson has 
shown, Abraham Lincoln called attention to the religious aspect of constitutionalism in 1838. See 
Sanford Levinson, The Constitution in American Civil Religion, 1979 SUP. CT. REv. 123, 124. 
366 Grey, Constitution as Scripture, supra note 363, at 16, 19. 
367 Hence the italicization of "constitution" in the phrase "It is a constitution we are expound-
ing." McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,407 (1819). See also Grey, Constitution as 
Scripture, supra note 363, at 16; Suzanna Sherry, The Founders' Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHI. 
L. REv. 1127, 1146 (1987): 
The Constitution [the Framers] were drafting was, at the beginning, neither positive law 
nor popularly grounded. As the summer [of 1787] progressed, the delegates began to 
formulate and understand two concepts crucial to understanding the Constitution as a 
sui generis form of positive law: self-referential enforceability and extra-legislative origin 
. . .. Both of these concepts were in direct conflict with the English version of a 
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Viewed this way, the Constitution demands (and Americans expect) 
that the Constitution's interpreters will heed the idealism it embodies; 
its first stated purpose is, after all, to form "a more perfect Union"-a 
purpose that seems to contemplate always being aspired to but never 
being achieved.368 Thus, the Shaw Court is being true to its role as the 
interpreter of the Constitution when it holds color blindness to be a 
constitutional aspiration without much regard to the practical realities 
of how to achieve color blindness or, in this particular context, to 
whether a little color-consciousness might not be the best means to 
achieve the ultirriate goal. Shaw manifests the Court's view of itself as 
guardian of the Constitution's ideals, where the guardian's role is to 
interpret and preserve, not to implement. 
This approach is certainly valuable because it continually recalls the 
nation's goals. Americans take seriously the ideals of the Constitution 
precisely because it is more than a statute, even a self-entrenching 
statute. They continue to revere it even though or perhaps because 
they cannot realize its promise. It is a valuable approach, too, because 
it authorizes a reading of the Constitution that goes beyond textualism 
but embodies the Constitution's deeper meaning and its aspirations. 
But the idealism of the Constitution can be overstated, as the Shaw 
cases illustrate. When the Constitution's idealism supplants, rather 
than merely supplements, its functionalism, it is only achieving part of 
its potential. One could argue, asJustice Scalia does in his recent book, 
A Matter of Interpretation, that if idealism, and particularly formalism, 
are only part of the Constitution, they are the most important part. 
constitution as inherently fundamental and accretionally derived from natural law and 
unchallenged legislative acts. 
Sherry, supra at 1146. What seems to be important here is not that the origin of the Constitution 
is popular or otherwise legitimate but that it is, in its nature, wholly extraordinary without 
precedent or successor. In this regard, it is interesting to note that the American custom for 
documenting Constitutional amendments it to add on to the text without altering the original. 
By contrast, the Australian custom is to indicate the amending language by striking out the 
original. See, e.g., Kartinyeri, HCA 22 at'll 26 (quoting Section 51, clause xxvi of the Australian 
Constitution: "[tlhe people of any race, for whom it is deemed necessary to make special laws 
.... "). 
368 The Constitution does not, after all, expire when we have attained the more perfect union. 
In this sense, the constitutional enterprise is rather sisyphean: the point is not to achieve a more 
perfect union but to keep trying. Furthermore, the existential constitutionalist, which we all must 
be if we continue to believe in it, would say that success-not to say happiness--comes from the 
ongoing struggle, "for ages to come," notwithstanding the improbability of achieving a perfect 
union. See ALBERT CAMUS, THE MYTH OF SISYPHUS AND OTHER ESSAYS 91 (1955) ("The struggle 
itself toward the heights is enough to fill a man's heart. One must imagine Sisyphus happy"). 
344 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAw REVIEW [Vol. XXI, No.2 
Justice Scalia argues that law is supposed to be formal; it is, after all, a 
system of rules. 369 But while this may be good enough for a Declaration 
of Independence, it shortchanges the Constitution. Law is, of course, 
a set of rules, but it is a set that operates in a particular social and 
political system. Legal rules must be relevant to the system in which 
they apply. The aspirations these rules embody should not be only (or 
even partially) spiritual,37o They must also be social, which means that 
they must work in the social world and be followed on a day-to-day 
basis. It is not enough for the government to agree with the ideal of 
equality; it must conform its behavior to that requirement. Thus, the 
framers designed a Constitution that was not only idealistic, but "work-
able" as well. 371 
The Court in Reynolds and the other early voting rights cases seemed 
to recognize this dual mission.372 It spoke both of the ideal of absolute 
equipopulosity and of the practical need for fair and effective repre-
sentation.373 But the post-Warren Court has deliberately repudiated any 
interest in "effective" governance, or any interpretation of the Consti-
tution mandating effective government.374 Indeed, the current Court 
has adopted what it has called (and what by now has become) "the 
settled rule that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees equal laws, 
not equal results. "375 Results are not interesting to this Court; effective 
is no longer a part of its constitutional lexicon. In its idealist attitude, 
the Court is freed from having to consider whether the rule it endorses 
is more likely than the rule it rejects to achieve fair and effective 
369 "Of all the criticisms leveled against textualism, the most mindless is that it is 'formalistic.' 
The answer to that is, of course it's formalistic! The rule of law is about form .... Long live 
formalism. It is what makes a government a government of laws and not of men." SCALIA, supra 
note 320, at 25 (emphasis in original). 
370 Scalia argues against living constitutionalism. See id. at 37-47. But could he be arguing in 
favor of "dead constitutionalism"? Probably not. What he has in mind is probably something more 
akin to spiritual constitutionalism-ever-lasting but never-changing, more ephemeral than hu-
man, more aspirational than real. 
371 "To burden Congress with all federal rulemaking would divert that branch from more 
pressing issues, and defeat the Framers' design of a workable National Government." Loving v. 
United States, 517 U.S. 748, 116 S. Ct. 1737, 1744 (1996). "While the Constitution diffuses power 
the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers 
into a workable government." United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974) (citing Youngstown 
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson,]., concurring). 
372 See Reynolds, 377 U.S. 533. 
373 See supra notes 32-102 and accompanying text. 
374 See supra notes 103-46 and accompanying text. 
375 Feeney, 442 U.S. at 273; see also Blumstein, supra note 97, at 532 (describing the "nondis-
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representation for the greatest number of people or for those most 
deserving of constitutional protection.376 
Simplicity is idealism's greatest asset and its worst flaw. Simplicity 
means that people can understand the constitutional command, but 
simplicity can be misleading if the facts to which the rule applies are 
not equally simple, as they rarely are, particularly in districting. As 
Daniel Farber has written: 
[f]oundational grand theories aspire to make constitutional 
law easy by providing a single recipe for all decisions-a 
recipe, moreover, that will never require change, no matter 
how much society evolves. Foundationalist analysis supposes 
that the genuine conflicts that underlie many constitutional 
cases will dissolve. Pragmatism, however, acknowledges that 
there are real conflicts that have to be squarely confronted 
rather than finessed. 377 
In the redistricting cases, the recipe the Court has adopted is color 
blindness, but, so far, the Court has indicated no inclination to con-
front the conflicts that this principle implicates; instead, it seems to 
hope that the conflicts will simply dissolve. But the Court's unsup-
ported adoption of color blindness creates, rather than dissolves, im-
portant conflicts, such as between color blindness as a mean and as an 
end, between individual rights and the associational character of vot-
ing, between abstract harm to the powerful majority and concrete 
benefits to a underenfranchised minority. Whereas idealism precludes 
consideration (and therefore resolution) of these conflicts, pragma-
tism (as will be discussed below) confronts them; the textualism of the 
Australian cases, meanwhile, leaves their resolution to the political 
process. The next section evaluates the textualist approach adopted by 
the Australian High Court and explains why that approach would be 
inappropriate if incorporated into American voting rights jurispru-
dence. 
crimination principle as an institutionalist, process-oriented precept. Outcome is not determina-
tive") . 
376 Clearly these are two very different questions; my criticism is not that the Court took the 
wrong side, but that the Court did not take either side. It simply did not consider how its rule 
plays out in people's lives. 
377Farber, supra note 218, at 1342. 
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B. Australian TextualisrJi378 
When John Marshall said "it is a constitution we are expounding," he 
made a connection between two distinct but related issues: the prove-
nance of the Constitution (that is, the source of its authority) and the 
Court's interpretive stance.379 In McCulloch, Marshall resolved both 
questions definitively (it so far seems).380 The source of the Constitu-
tion's authority and legitimacy, he said, is the people of the United 
States, not at any particular moment or on any specific issue but in 
what Alexander Bickel would later call the people in the "mystic" sense 
of the word.381 Constitutional interpretation, then, is a matter of giving 
effect to the will of the -people; the Court should be generous in 
construing legislative necessities as constitutionally justified and should 
feel confident in its authority to do so. Marshall was explicit in linking 
the role of the Court as guardian of the people's will with broad 
constitutional interpretation of federal power. "Since, then, the consti-
tutional government of this republican empire cannot be practically 
enforced, so as to secure the permanent glory, safety and felicity of this 
great country, but by a fair and liberal interpretation of its powers; 
since those powers could not all be expressed in the constitution, but 
many of them must be taken by implication; ... no other alternative 
remains, but for this court to interpose its authority, and save the 
nation from the consequences of this dangerous attempt. "382 
In Australia, both issues have historically been resolved differently. 
As discussed above, the source of authority of the Australian Constitu-
tion is ambiguous. For most of the Constitution's life, the predominant 
view has been that it is properly conceived of and interpreted as an act 
of Parliament. As Sir Owen Dixon, one of the foremost expositors of 
Australian constitutional law, has explained: 
The framers of our own federal Commonwealth Constitution 
... found the American instrument of government an incom-
parable model. They could not escape from its fascination. Its 
378 I make no broad claim about the value of textualism either in general or in Australian law; 
the claim here is limited to showing that the Australian attitude can legitimately be described as 
textualist and that such an approach would not be appropriate if applied to American districting 
cases. 
379 See McCulloch, 17 V.S. at 407. 
380 But see U.S. Term Limits, 514 V.S. 779 (Thomas,j., dissenting). 
381 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 17 (1965). 
382 McCulloch, 17 V.S. at 399--400. 
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contemplation damped the smouldering fires of their origi-
nality. But, although they copied it in many respects with 
great fidelity, in one respect the Constitution of our Common-
wealth was bound to depart altogether from its prototype. It 
is not a supreme law purporting to obtain its force from the 
direct expression of a people's inherent authority to consti-
tute a government. It is a statute of the British Parliament 
enacted in the exercise of its legal sovereignty over the law 
everywhere in the King's Dominions. In the interpretation of 
our Constitution, this distinction has many important conse-
quences. We treat our organs of government simply as insti-
tutions established by law, and we interpret their powers sim-
ply as authorities belonging to them by law.383 
347 
Without popular sovereignty as the defining feature, a court constru-
ing a constitution is merely acting as a common law court construing 
a statute; there is no obvious reason to treat a self-named constitution 
differently.384 The chief authority for this view is the 1920 landmark 
case of Amalgamated Soc'y of Engineers v. Adelaide Steamship Co. Ltd. 
(Engineers' Case). 385 This case unambiguously established that the 
proper mode of constitutional interpretation is more consistent with 
strict construction than with the doctrine of implied powers adopted 
by Marshall. 386 The Court followed the approach not of the Americans 
but of the British Privy Council. In language reminiscent of but decid-
edly different from Marshall's in another context, the Court said: "it is 
383Sir Owen Dixon, The Law and the Constitution, 51 LAw Q. REv. 590 (1935), reprinted in 
A.'1THONY R. BLACKSHIELD ET AL., AUSTRALIru'l CONSTITUTIONAL LAw & THEORY: COMMENTARY 
& MATERIALS 28 (1996) [hereinafter BLACKSHIELD ET AL., AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw]. 
384 There has always been an argument, based on popular participation in the drafting and 
ratification processes, that the Australian Constitution, like the American one, derives from 
popular sovereignty. See Australian Capital Television, 177 C.L.R. at 138 (Mason, CJ.). 'Two 
features of the Constitution would have been important in explaining its character at the time 
of its enactment. First its legal status was derived from the fact that it was contained in an 
enactment of the British Imperial Parliament. Secondly, its political legitimacy or authority was 
based on the words contained in the preamble to that enactment which refer to the people of 
the Australian colonies having agreed to unite in a 'Federal Commonwealth' and having the 
authority to amend the Constitution." GJ. Lindell, lWIy is Australia's Constitution Binding? The 
Reasons in 1900 and Now, and the Effect of Independence, 16 FED. L. REv. 29 (1986), quoted in 
BLACKSHIELD ET AL., AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, supra note 383, at 29. Nonetheless, until 
the Australia Act, 1986, this was not the prevailing view. 
385 Amalgamated Soc'y of Engineers v. Adelaide Steamship Co. Ltd., 28 C.L.R. 129 (1920). 
386 .. [F] ollowing the decision in [the Engineers' Case], the notion seemed to gain currency that 
no implications could be made in interpreting the Constitution." Australian Capital Television, 
177 C.L.R. at 133 (Mason, CJ.). 
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the chief and special duty of this Court faithfully to expound and give 
effect to [the Constitution] according to its own terms, finding the 
intention from the words of the compact, and upholding it throughout 
precisely as framed. "387 Only if the text is ambiguous, the Court ex-
plained, should recourse "be had to the context and scheme of the 
Act" (meaning the Constitution) .388 Thus, while Americans rely heavily 
on the notes of James Madison at the Constitutional Convention and 
on the speeches and writings of those who were involved with the 
development and adoption of the Constitution, "it is settled doctrine 
in Australia that the records of the discussions in the Conventions and 
in the legislatures of the colonies will not be used as an aid to the 
construction of the Constitution. "389 
This textual approach, which "depended on reading the Constitu-
tion as an Act of the Imperial Parliament, invested with the full 'par-
liamentary sovereignty' of that Parliament itself,"390 has dominated 
Australian constitutional jurisprudence since 1920. For instance, in the 
McKinlay case, the Court made clear that it would resolve the plaintiffs' 
challenge in a manner consistent with traditional canons of constitu-
tional interpretation. "The only true guide and the only course which 
can produce stability in constitutional law is to read the language of 
the Constitution itself, no doubt generously and not pedantically, but 
as a whole; and to find its meaning by legal reasoning."391 In the 1996 
McGinty case, Justice McHugh could still apply "the standard tech-
387 Engineers' Case, 28 C.L.R at 142. 
388Id. at 149-50. Ironically, the strict construction of the Engineers' Case and the broad con-
struction of McCulloch led to the same result; in both cases, the federal legislature was permitted 
to exercise broad powers over the states. In the Australian case, the Commonwealth Court of 
Conciliation and Arbitration had issued an award in an employment dispute which covered both 
private and state employers. The state employers argued that the federal power to control labor 
disputes did not extend to state employers notwithstanding the absence of any limiting language 
in the Constitution. Thus, the case can be compared to the American case of Garcia v. San 
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985), where the Court also refused to read into the 
Commerce clause a federalism-based limitation which was not explicit. Despite this similarity to 
Garcia, the Engineers' Case is more appropriately analogized to McCulloch, having had the same 
pivotal nationalizing effect on the young nation as McCulloch. See RT.E. Latham, The Law and 
the Commonwealth, reprinted in BLACKSHIELD ET AL., AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra 
note 383, at 254 (explaining that the unstated "real ground of decision was the view held by the 
majority that the Constitution had been intended to create a nation, and that it had succeeded 
.... "). 
389 McKinlay, 135 C.L.R. at 17. 
390 Anthony R Blackshield, Reinterpreting the Constitution, in DEVELOPMENTS IN AUSTRALIAN 
POLITICS 31 Uudith Brett et al. eds., 1994) [hereinafter Blackshield, Reinterpretingl. 
391 McKinlay, 135 C.L.R at 17. 
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niques of statutory interpretation to a constitutional instrument."392 
Justice McHugh seems to speak for the center of the Court when he 
explains: 
The ordinary principles of statutory interpretation require 
that the text be the starting point of any interpretation of the 
Constitution. Part of the ordinary and natural meaning of the 
text is any implication which is "manifested according to the 
accepted principles of interpretation." Implications derived 
from the structure of the Constitution are also part of the 
Constitution's meaning but such implications may be drawn 
only when they are "logically or practically necessary for the 
preservation of the integrity of that structure. "393 
In part this textualism derives from general considerations of separa-
tion of powers: out of concern for its own legitimacy, every unelected 
Court that functions in an otherwise democratic system takes pains to 
avoid the appearance that it is legislating. Thus, it confines itself to 
interpreting, but not enacting, the law as written. 394 
The Australia Act of 1986 presen ted the Australian Court with the 
opportunity to free itself of this textualist shackle. The Act severed 
almost all ties between Australia and the British Empire which, argu-
ably, had the effect of formalizing popular authority for the Constitu-
tion: by removing the British Parliament as one of the two legs on 
which the legitimacy of the Australian Constitution stands, the argu-
ment goes, the Australia Act established popular sovereignty as the 
sole basis for the Constitution's legitimacy.395 As explained by Justice 
McHugh: 
In the late twentieth century, it may not be palatable to many 
persons to think that the powers, authorities, immunities and 
392 McGinty, 134 A.L.R. at 347 (McHugh,].). 
393 [d. at 344-45. 
394 On occasion, the Australian Court has expressed ambivalence towards its self-imposed strict 
constructionism and has acknowledged that some degree of implication is necessary in constitu-
tional interpretation (if not in all legal interpretation). Thus, the Court has also stated that 
"implications have a place in the interpretation of the Constitution [but] I would prefer not to 
say 'making implications,' because our avowed task is simply the revealing or uncovering of 
implications that are already there." Victoria v. Commonwealth (Payroll Tax Case) (1971) 122 
c.L.R. 353, 401-02 (Windeyer,J.). 
395 h[T]he Australia Act 1986 (U.K.) marked the end of the legal sovereignty of the Imperial 
Parliament and recognized that ultimate sovereignty resided in the Australian people." Australian 
Capital Television, 177 C.L.R at 138 (Mason, Cl). See also Blackshield, Reinterpreting, supra note 
390, at 31. 
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obligations of the federal and State parliaments of Australia 
derive their legal authority from a statute enacted by the 
Imperial Parliament, but the enactment of that statute con-
taining the terms of the Constitution is the instrument by 
which the Australian people have consented to be governed. 
Since the passing of the Australia Act (UK) in 1986, notwith-
standing some considerable theoretical difficulties, the politi-
cal and legal sovereignty of Australia now resides in the peo-
ple of Australia. But the only authority that the people have 
given to the parliaments of the nation is to enact laws in 
accordance with the terms of the Constitution.396 
The Australia Act essentially retroactively shifted the authority for the 
Constitution from the Imperial Parliament to the people of Australia, 
permitting the Court to emphasize the importance of popular-as 
opposed to parliamentary-sovereignty. This in turn authorized the 
Court to interpret the Constitution as a dynamic constitution rather 
than as a static statute. And in the free speech cases of 1992 and 1994, 
the Court took advantage of this authority, reading into the Constitu-
tion a guarantee of representative democracy which in turn guaran-
teed some measure of freedom for political communication, none of 
which was explicit (or even reasonably implicit) in the text. This set 
of cases raised the hope that Australian constitutional interpretation 
would begin to look more American, now that the Constitutions of 
both countries were similarly grounded in popular sovereignty. 
But this hope proved short-lived. The McGinty case rejected the 
approach of the free speech cases notwithstanding the potential trans-
formative power of the Australia Act. Popular sovereignty, wrote Justice 
McHugh, means simply that the people have delegated to the legisla-
ture the authority to act consistent with the Constitution. "But since 
the people have agreed to be governed by a constitution enacted by a 
British statute, it is surely right to conclude that its meaning must be 
determined by the ordinary techniques of statutory interpretation and 
by no other means. "397 At the end of the day, the Australian Court 
simply does not have much stomach for substantial constitutional im-
plication-popular sovereignty or not. Thus, McGinty represents not 
only a return to the textualism of the Engineers' Case but a break from 
the American and Australian tradition of linking constitutional author-
396 McGinty, 134 A.L.R. at 343. 
397 !d. at 344. 
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ity with constitutional interpretation: even if the Australia Act did 
substitute the people for the legislature as the ultimate source of 
authority, McGinty says that this fact does not dictate the jurispruden-
tial attitude of the Court. There are still reasons, based largely in 
principles of separation of powers and judicial legitimacy, to interpret 
any positive law strictly. However, so long as those reasons do not link 
the interpretations of the constitution with its provenance, they would 
not necessarily be appropriate for American constitutional interpreta-
tion. 398 
In A Matter of Interpretation, Justice Scalia argues that the kind of 
textualism that is popular in Australia should obtain in the United 
States as well, although he does not explicitly refer to the Australian 
experience.399 This experience, however, provides a case study of what 
is required for a textualist approach to work. Australian textualism 
seems to lie somewhere between what Justice Black was comfortable 
with and the stricter construction that Scalia now says he endorses. 
Justice Black's reading of the text was expansive enough to infer from 
the constitutional right to choose representatives a right to equal 
voting power.400 The Australian Court has been unwilling to do this 
insofar as it "involves a rejection of the principles of implication laid 
down in the Engineers' Case. "401 Rejecting the Engineers' Case is ulti-
mately no more acceptable to the Australians than rejecting McCulloch 
would be to most Americans. 
398 As previously noted, the recent Constitutional Convention recommended that the republi-
can Constitution include "Introductory language in the form 'We the people of Australia,'" which 
would make explicit the popular grounding of the new Constitution. Interestingly, the Conven-
tion also recommended that "[c]are should be taken to draft the Preamble in such a way that it 
does not have implications for the interpretation of the Constitution." See <http://www. 
dpmc.gov.au/convention.html>. Whether or not the Preamble can be contained in this way is 
of course an open question. In the recent case concerning a Constitutional amendment effected 
by popular referendum, a majority of the Court maintained its commitment to textualism ("it is 
the Constitutional text which must always be controlling," Kartinycri, HCA 22 at ~ 90 (Gummow 
& Hayne, lJ.), while the lone dissenter urged the Court to "take notice of the history of the 
amendment and the circumstances surrounding it in giving meaning to the amended paragraph." 
See id. ~ 157 (Kirby,]., dissenting). Even]ustice Kirby, however, towed the textualist line, "the 
emphasis upon the text of the document is beneficial. It tames the creative imagination of those 
who might be fired by the suggested requirements of changing times or by the perceived needs 
of justice in a particular casco The text is thc law." ld. ~ 132(1). Thus, even in these post-Australia 
Act, pre-republic times, the textualist stance remains secure. 
399 SCALIA, supra note 320, at 23-29. 
400 See Wesberry, 376 u.S. l. 
401 McGinty, 134 A.L.R. at 345 (McHugh,].). 
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On the other hand, the Australian Court's textualism does not seem 
as severe as Justice Scalia's position as described in his book. The 
Australian Court has, at least in dictum, accepted that certain changes 
must be read into the Constitution, even if the text has not itself been 
updated, whereas in Justice Scalia's view the text of the Constitution 
cannot change over time absent Article V amendment. Thus, whereas 
the Australian Court accepts that certain practices that were once 
constitutional could through changes in practice become unconstitu-
tional, Justice Scalia does not. Ironically, both Justice Scalia and the 
Australian Court use the same example to illustrate their opposite 
views. Justice Scalia argues that the Nineteenth Amendment was need-
ed to secure female franchise because no judicial interpretation of the 
unamended Constitution could legitimately secure this right.402 The 
Australians, however, use female franchise to show that some implica-
tion is necessary: although at federation the Constitution permitted 
states to deny women the vote, and although this has never been for-
mallyamended, the Court would find that a state's denying a woman 
the right to vote on account of her gender in 1996 would violate the 
Constitution.403 
Both American and Australian textualists recognize that a constitu-
tional text is not necessarily self-revealing and that some extrinsic 
information is needed in order to understand and apply the words.404 
This extrinsic evidence is meant to be both informative and constrain-
ing, limiting the possible interpretations of the ambiguous text. But 
two important differences in the countries' approach to such evidence 
present themselves. First, American textualism tends to be informed 
by originalism,405 whereas Australian textualism is tinged with pragma-
tism. Thus, the Australian Court can look outside its windows and see 
that there are sound reasons for malapportionment that do not im-
pede, and may enhance, the right of Australians to choose their rep-
402SCALIA, supra note 320, at 47. 
40~ See, e.g., McGinty, 134 A.L.R. at 320 (Toohey,].). This might be an unfair comparison: Justice 
Scalia writes from a comfortably counterfactual position since the Constitution has been amended 
and he will never be asked whether a state may constitutionally prohibit women from voting. One 
can only hope that he would, if forced, concede that such action does violate an unwritten 
postulate of the Constitution (although his dissent in United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 
(1996), does not provide any basis for such a hope). 
404 See Schauer, supra note 343, at 514 ("Some terms, like 'liberty' and 'equality,' are pervasively 
indeterminate. It is not that such terms have no content whatsoever; it is that every application, 
every concretization, every instantiation requires the addition of supplementary premises to apply 
the general term to specific cases."). 
405 See, e.g., BORK, supra note 161; SCALIA, supra note 320. 
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resentatives and that legislators around the country are, for the most 
part, conforming to the values the nation embodies. American textu-
alism may very well come to the same conclusion, but it would do so 
for the wrong reasons: it would accept malapportionment because the 
Framers accepted it, not because it furthers any community values. 
The second reason exacerbates the problems of the first. American 
textualism is more dependent on extrinsic evidence than Australian 
textualism is because of the nature of the constitutional text. In gen-
eral, the words of the American Constitution on which most major 
cases depend are much broader than their Australian counterparts.406 
In foregoing a Bill of Rights, the Australians chose to articulate their 
fundamental law in much narrower language. There is nothing as open 
ended in the Australian Constitution as a mandate that the govern-
ment "shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech" or that 
"[n]o state shall ... deny to any person ... the equal protection of 
the laws. "407 Even the few comparable clauses protecting individual 
rights are more specific in the Australian Constitution.408 In Australian 
jurisprudence, therefore, a court adopting a textualist stance is much 
more constrained by the text itself than an American court doing the 
same: the balance between textual interpretation and reliance on ex-
trinsic evidence favors the text in Australia, but favors the extrinsic 
evidence in the United States. Thus, an American court purporting to 
read the Constitution strictly may not even refer to the Constitutional 
language. The irony of the districting cases is that the more rigid, 
textualist approach of the Australian Court is much more deferential 
to the legislative branches than the idealist approach of the Americans. 
The result of Australian textualism is to permit legislative flexibility, 
and to express judicial trust in the legislative branches that they will 
conform to whatever ideals the Australian people have. As Justice 
McHugh explained in McGinty, "[i]n Australia, the framers ... per-
formed their task in such a way as to allow room for further legislative 
evolution in the system of representative government. Constitutional 
rigidity was, to a significant degree, avoided. But, in a sense, the 
406 See RONALD M. DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAw 7 (1996) ("Many of [the clauses of the American 
Constitution that protect individuals and minorities from government] are drafted in exceedingly 
abstract moral language") [hereinafter DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW]. 
407U.S. CONST. amends. I, XN. 
40B See, e.g., AUSTL. CONST. § 116 (adding to what is protected in the religion clauses of the 
First Amendment the prohibition on the Commonwealth government "imposing any religious 
observance") . 
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plaintiffs seek to assert and to rely upon such rigidity."409 Far from 
stamping the legislative practice with the seal of personal predilections, 
the Australian Court deferred to the popularly, and apparently fairly, 
elected branches. Australia's textualism was restrained when it was 
appropriate: the malapportionment in Western Australia was not egre-
gious or typical and was justified by extraordinary population dispari-
ties. American textualism would rely too much on history to assure a 
result that would match the needs.410 It is not bounded by textual 
specificity, nor by deference to other branches or comity. Furthermore, 
and probably most importantly, so long as Americans believe in their 
Constitution as the embodiment of popular will, there is no warrant 
for textualist interpretation. 
C. Canadian Pragmatism 
Of the three jurisprudential choices adopted by the Courts in these 
cases, the most appealing for voting rights cases is the pragmatic 
Canadian approach. True to its variegated nature, pragmatism does 
not boast of a single definition41l and is often defined more by what it 
is not than by what it is.412 There are, however, at least three major 
themes that can be teased out. The first goes to the meta-question of 
constitutional adjudication: what role the court plays in construing the 
fundamental law of a democracy. In Daniel Farber's terms, the over-
arching goal of the pragmatist court is to "play a useful role in the 
409 McGinty, 134 A.L.R. at 374 (McHugh,J.) (distinguishing the American approach). 
410 See, e.g., Justice Scalia's opinion in Printz., 117 S. Ct. at 2365. 
4ll An inventive articulation of this is embodied in J.M. Balkin, The Top Ten Reasons To Be A 
Legal Pragmatist, 8 CONST. COMMENTARY 351 (1991). I will rely primarily on the descriptions of 
legal pragmatism in Farber, supra note 218, at 1331; Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragma-
tism, 41 STAN. L. REv. 787 (1989) [hereinafter Grey, Holmes]; Robert]. Lipkin, The Anatomy of 
Constitutional Revolutions: The Role of Judicial Review in the American Communitarian Repub-
lic (1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) [hereinafter Lipkin, Constitutional 
Revolutions]. 
412See, e.g., ROBERT L. HAYMAN &: NANCY LEVIT,JURISPRUDENCE: CONTEMPORARY READINGS, 
PROBLEMS, AND NARRATIVES 454 (1996) (describing pragmatism as antifoundationalist and anti-
essentialist). Robert Lipkin distinguishes between two types of pragmatism, doctrinaire and 
reflective. "[D]octrinaire pragmatism is theory-phobic and deathly adverse to abstractions, dual-
isms, and formalistic methods of deciding political legitimacy" while reflective pragmatism en-
dorses these but only if "doing so reaps sufficient pragmatic benefits." Robert Lipkin, Pragma-
tism-The Unfinished Revolution: Doctrinaire and Reflective Pragmatism in Rorty's Social Thought, 
67 TULANE L. REv. 1561, 1622-23 (1993) [hereinafter Lipkin, The Unfinished Revolution]. See also 
Steven D. Smith, The Pursuit of Pragmatism, 100 YALE LJ. 409 (1990) (discussing pragmatism's 
ahistoricity and hostility to abstract theory); Symposium, The Renaissance of Pragmatism in Ameri-
can Legal Thought, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1569 (1990). 
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practical tasks of democratic government": that the court is unelected 
and unaccountable should not deprive it of the opportunity to contrib-
ute meaningfully to the political system.413 
The second and third themes focus on the inputs and outputs of 
constitutional adjudication. According to Thomas Grey, "[ t] 0 apply the 
central pragmatic tenets to law means to treat it as a practical enter-
prise in two senses. First, law is constituted of practices-contextual, 
situated, rooted in custom and shared expectations. Second, it is in-
strumental, a means for achieving socially desired ends, and available 
to be adapted to their service. "4l4 These are, of course, connected: "On 
the one hand, law is situated: It draws on felt necessities; unconscious 
intuitions; prejudices-the tacit patterns of thought inherited from the 
past .... On the other hand law is instrumental: It responds to moral 
and political theories; avowed intuitions of public policy-the products 
of future directed deliberation. "415 In other words, the pragmatic jurist 
will think about where the law has come from (the context out of which 
it emerges) and where it is going (the effect it will have when applied 
in society). 
The principal Canadian decision on districting, Ref re: EBCA, ex-
emplifies this pragmatist attitude.416 Understanding how a pragmatist 
court can decide a districting case reveals that the pragmatist model is 
available to the American Court and suggests that adopting it would 
indeed yield better results than the Court's current idealist approach. 
Reading the opinion in pragmatic terms thus sheds light on what the 
Canadian Court has done as well as on what the American Court could 
potentially do. 
1. The Court's Role 
The question of how a Court thinks about what it is doing usually 
gets addressed, if at all, at the jurisdictional or justiciability stage of a 
case, so that by the time the Court is confronting the merits, it has long 
ceased to be self-conscious-at least explicitly. But how the Court 
413 Farber, supra note 218, at 1341 n.48. 
414Grey, Holmes, supra note 411, at 805. 
415Id. at 806. 
416The terms "living constitutionalism" (the watchword ofthe EBCA case) and pragmatism are 
not exactly synonymous, although the Canadian cases conflate their salient features. Indeed, 
Justice Scalia suggests that the most common argument for "living constitutionalism" is a prag-
matic one. SCALIA, supra note 320, at 44, 41. The reverse is also probably true: the best argument 
for pragmatism is the Canadian Court's success with living constitutionalism. 
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resolves the threshold question has significant implications for how its 
asserts its role on the merits. 
The first Canadian court to address (and affirm) the justiciability of 
the districting claim under the Charter began by placing itself within 
the system of government defined by the Charter. Lamenting the 
inexorable judicialization of society,417 Chief Justice McEachern of the 
Supreme Court of British Columbia explained that the "community 
agreement" that the Constitution (including the Charter) embodies 
"imposes upon the court the responsibility to determine the reach of 
the Constitution in the organization of our political structure. "418 This 
presages the Canadian courts' view that courts are players inside a 
system of democratic governance, not referees standing outside the 
game looking in. Indeed, the first section of the Charter all but com-
pels this approach. Section 1 requires the law to be consistent with the 
needs of a free and democratic system. By its terms, it seems to apply 
to judicial as well as legislative rules. As discussed previously, Canadian 
courts and commentators have interpreted Section 1 to create a mu-
tually reinforcing relationship, not a rivalry, with the other sections.419 
Thus, Section 1 requires the Court to recognize that its own rules are 
as capable of enhancing or detracting from a free and democratic 
society as are legislative rules. It thus places both the constitution and 
the courts in the political structure, requiring the courts to accept the 
responsibility of playing a central (though not the central) role in the 
task of democratic governance.420 
A court participating in the democratic system and constituting the 
law as it goes along will try to interact with the other institutions in the 
system in a constructive manner.421 Pragmatism therefore "reduces the 
417 Dixon 1986, 31 D.L.R. at 548. 
418Id. (emphasis added). 
419 See supra notes 172-89 and accompanying text. 
420 Ref. re: EBCA, 81 D.L.R. at 32-33. In one view, of course, the Court is necessarily inside the 
government in the sense that it is one of the three constitutional branches of government, and 
the actions of the Court are clearly state action. See, e.g., Shelley, 334 U.S. 1; Sullivan, 376 U.S. 
254. In another view, the Court is immune from political recriminations by lifetime appointments 
and salary protections. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. Since the formalist argument could go either 
way, the Court can choose how it wishes to conceptualize itself. A pragmatist court wOlild, and 
the Canadian courts did, choose to be inside the system, with all the responsibilities that that 
entails. 
421 As Ronald Dworkin has explained, judges "must regard themselves as partners with other 
officials, past and future, who together elaborate a coherent constitutional morality, and they 
must take care to see that what they contribute fits with the rest." DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAw, 
supra note 406, at 10. 
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risk of u~ustified radical intrusions into social institutions, and in-
creases the possibility of dialogue between the Court and other seg-
ments of society. "422 In the context of districting, a pragmatic court will 
recognize that the judicial system has a prominent role to play in 
the process of securing meaningful voting rights for all citizens. This 
role is as important as, though distinct from, the role of the political 
branches. 
This option has always been open to the U.S. Supreme Court and 
of course remains open today. In the past, the Court has taken advan-
tage of it; it has been one of several social institutions that have 
contributed, more or less enthusiastically, to the broad-based effort to 
increase the opportunities especially of minorities to "participate in the 
political process and to elect representatives of their choice. "423 In the 
1950s and· 1960s, Congress established national policy in landmark 
voting rights legislation which Congress has continued to strengthen.424 
The Court has, for most of this period, reinforced the national policy 
in both statutory and constitutional rulings. 425 The executive branch 
has strengthened the statutory amendments through its enforcement 
of the Voting Rights Act and, in the 1990s, state legislatures helped 
enhance representation for minorities at the state and federal level. In 
addition, civil rights groups have worked to fulfill the national policy 
of democratizing the political process.426 When faced with the novel 
question of gerrymandering for the purpose of enhancing minority 
participation and representation, the Court might have joined these 
public and private actors in promoting voting rights as well as other 
fundamental interests, namely equality. It might have balanced the 
societal, group, and individual interests and found ways to reconcile 
the various claims. 
The Shaw Court has not taken this route. It has chosen to stand apart 
from the national policy as articulated by federal law, administrative 
422Farber, supra note 218, at 1343. 
423 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1982). 
424 See gmerally Civil Rights Act of 1957; Civil Rights Act of 1964; Voting Rights Act of 1965 (as 
amended 1982). 
425See, e.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 
(1970); City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980). See also City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 
S. Ct. 2157, 2167 (1997) (noting that after Katzenbach v. Margan, "the Court continued to 
acknowledge the necessity of using strong remedial and preventive measures to respond to the 
widespread and persisting deprivation of constitutional rights resulting from this country's history 
of racial discrimination" and citing cases). 
426 See generally LOWENSTEIN, supra note 7, at 30-32. 
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practice, state politics, and civil rights groups. It has even continuously 
refused to find that compliance with the centerpiece of the national 
policy, the Voting Rights Act, is a compelling government interest.427 
Although the Court was perhaps correct in finding the Shaw claim to 
be justiciable, thus reserving the right to speak when necessary, its 
holding that the claim was subject to the strictest of strict scrutiny was 
not a constructive way to participate in democratic governance. The 
Court inserted itself into the melee not as a team player but as a 
referee, who instinctively yells "out of bounds" without regard to the 
consequences to the players or to the outcome of the game.428 Through 
rigid adherence to the principle of color blindness (but without a 
commitment to fair and effective representation), the Court has shown 
that it takes seriously its role as proclaimer of the law, but not its role 
as participant in the democratic process. The Court's attitude toward 
the other participants is not "let's see how we can collectively enhance 
minority voting rights" or even "let's try to enhance everyone's elec-
toral participation" but "go back to the drawing board!"429 But the 
simple elegance of the singular ideal of color blindness has distracted 
the Court. As Farber explains, "a Court obsessed with theoretical con-
sistency might be less able to playa useful role in the practical tasks of 
democratic government."430 Justice Stevens has noted in another sepa-
ration of powers context that there is an alternative: "The three branch-
es must cooperate in order to govern. We should regard favorably, 
rather than with suspicious hostility" legislation designed to promote 
good government.431 
427 Abrams, 117 S. Ct. at 1936. 
428 And to this day, the Court continues to assert its bright line rules without regard to political 
consequences. See High Court Backs Ruling on North Carolina Race, supra note 217. 
429 As the Shaw cases have progressed, the Court's hostility to the Department of Justice in 
particular has become increasingly palpable. In the most recent case in the series, the Court 
repeatedly refers to Justice Department "pressure," "threats," "distort[ion]," and "interference" 
and says it required "concessions" and "nothing less than abject surrender." Abrams, 117 S. Ct. at 
1931, 1933, 1935. The Court discounts the significance of the Department's proposed plan 
because it had submitted the plan after the close of evidence "and in consequence its demogra-
pher could not be crosHOxamined on the question of racial motivation [although] the District 
Court recognized its apparent racial impetus." [d. at 1935. This dramatically constrains the 
Department of Justice which must screen districting plans for infringement of minority voting 
rights, but must somehow do so without "racial impetus." 
430 Farber, supra note 218, at 1341. A proponent of the standard view might reply that the 
principle of color-blindness is so entrenched in the Constitution that the Court is justified in 
appealing to that principle without regard to its consequences in a particular situation. This 
argument, however, is based on the highly debatable premise that color blindness is constitution-
ally compelled where political power is being shared. 
431 Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 266 (1995) (Stevens,]., dissenting) (referring 
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This distinction-between a court as referee and a court as player-
is important in pragmatist thinking and illustrates a critical difference 
between the American and the Canadian attitudes.432 The difference 
is important for a variety of reasons. First, a court that views its primary 
role as expounding a Constitution for its own sake (the Court's or the 
Constitution's) may be more likely to be seduced by elegant theories 
that look good on paper but that do not necessarily work.433 By contrast, 
a court that sees itself as part of the process of democratic governance 
is to that extent more likely to issue a more realistic and, therefore, 
more responsible opinion because of its awareness of the purpose and 
consequences of its decision. The pragmatist court recognizes that its 
judgments are not just reflective of the broader society but constitutive 
of it as well.434 Therefore, if the society values equality of voting power 
(i.e., non-dilution) and minority representation, then a pragmatist 
court would have to consider the likely impact of its proposed rule on 
both of these values. That compromise may be inelegant is no reason 
to abjure it. 
to "legislation that enables the judiciary to overcome impediments to the performance of its 
mission of administering justice impartially"). 
432 One might argue that the requirement that a constitutional court "playa useful role in the 
practical tasks of democratic government" is a kind of foundationalist value which the anti-foun-
dationalist pragmatist should reject. The pragmatist, however, would accept the value not because 
it is foundationalist, but because it is good. 
A distinct argument could be made that the "useful role" that our Court should play is precisely 
that of referee: We did not put these people on the Court for life so that they could side with 
the Government, but so that they could protect us from the Government. If the Incredible Hulk 
is on the other team, you want a neutral referee, not the Hulk's ally. For the player role to seem 
equitable, one must accept the possibility of a less adversarial relationship between the polity and 
the government which of course is one of the hallmarks of the American system of judicial review 
as distinct from the English system of Parliamentary sovereignty. But the argument made in this 
article is confined by the context of the Shaw claims, and in this context, every government 
institution save the Court is trying to empower, not oppress, the discrete and insular minority. 
The Court-as-bulwark is less necessary here than the Court-as-participant. 
433 See Grey, Holmes, supra note 411, at 814-15. (noting the Pragmatist's willingness to abjure 
elegant theories in favor of more "useful" explanations). This is, of course, particularly apt in the 
case of gerrymandering, where the Court has given primacy to aesthetic (i.e., elegant) considera-
tions of compactness and contiguity without explaining what "cash value" these have. See Farber, 
supra note 218, at 1341 for discussion of the term "cash value" in pragmatist thought. 
It is on this ground that, according to Thomas Grey,Justice Holmes "defended the appointment 
of politicians as judges, which had produced Marshall, Story, Taney, and Chase, along with his 
contemporaries Taft and White. He feared that 'men ... of the abstract type only exceptionally 
prove wise in practical affairs,'" Grey, Holmes, supra note 411, at 848. Indeed, our nominations 
process has been criticized for relying too heavily on sitting judges with little extrajudicial 
experience. Sandra Day O'Connor is the only sitting justice who was a state legislator during a 
reapportionment (in 1970). Kousser, supra note 352, at 642. 
434 "Legal pragmatism thus understood is receptive to the classical republican conception both 
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Second, a court's failure to ensure that its opinions are constructive 
may be self-defeating. As Farber has argued, an opinion or judicial 
philosophy anchored to a single overriding value is unlikely to benefit 
from community support because it will only appeal to one group 
rather than to a coalition.435 Ultimately, it is likely to be less stable 
should that single reed weaken than an opinion grounded in a collec-
tion of overlapping values.436 As Justice Souter has explained in discuss-
ing the judicial role in substantive due process analysis, "[i]t is a 
comparison of the relative strengths of opposing claims that informs 
the judicial task, not a deduction from some first premise. "437 
Third, a pragmatic court is likely to issue a more flexible and, 
therefore, more workable rule. This too is built into Section 1 of the 
Canadian Charter which compels a balanced approach, recognizing 
that, for legal rules to work in human society, they must be flexible in 
accommodating the dual claims of order and freedom. This can be 
contrasted with the U.S. Constitution which does not explicitly man-
date flexibility, or any other particular rule of construction; rather, be-
cause some provisions incorporate compromise (reasonable searches 
and seizures, due process) and others seem to require absolutism (no 
law abridging freedom of speech or establishing a religion), it seems 
to give the Court the choice of interpreting a clause as an absolute or 
of law as a constitutive element in political life, and of politics itself as an activity of intrinsic as 
well as instrumental value. Together, these ideas suggest a model of lawyer as republican civil 
servant rather than as social engineer." Grey, Holmes, supra note 411, at 861. Again, the pragmatist 
is inside, not outside, the system. 
435 "[A) judicial decision may be stronger if it does not rely exclusively on [a single source of 
normative support) because other widely shared values may have more decisive bearing in cases 
in which the implications of [that source) are ambiguous." Farber, supra note 218, at 1343. For 
instance, although color blindness may be the most important value in the allocation of drinking 
fountains or public swimming pools, other values may outweigh that interest in other contexts, 
such as the value of educational or economic opportunity in the context of educational and 
contracting allocation, or the value of fair and effective representation in the context of electoral 
districts. 
Pragmatism necessarily entails balancing multiple values, insofar as it eschews foundationalism 
which embraces a single value. Under the Canadian Charter, Section 1 seems to require some 
form of balancing since it entreats the courts to reconcile in some constructive fashion the 
particular substantive rights at issue and the reasonable needs of a "free and democratic society." 
Section I, however, does not direct the court as to which form of balancing is required (straight, 
weighted, and if weighted, how much and of what factors). 
436 Indeed, although it is too early to predict ultimate defeat, it would not be surprising if a 
single change in Court membership upset the entire Shaw structure; all it would take is one 
additional judge who took a pragmatic approach to effective representation rather than embrac-
ing the abstract ideal of color blindness. as a remedy for race-conscious districting. See infra notes 
501-504 and accompanying text. The current majority's theory goes no deeper than that. 
437 Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2275 (Souter,]., concurring in the judgment). 
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as requiring flexible accommodation. Indeed, the Court's adoption of 
a strict scrutiny/rational basis scheme for individual rights seems to 
recognize the need for balancing social values, although the extremism 
of both these points along the continuum suggests the Court's reluc-
tance to actually balance constitutional commands. There is just 
enough leeway in these standards-enough possibility for the unex-
pected result-that the Court can comfortably say it is balancing with-
out doing so to any serious degree. The Court's failure to find that the 
North Carolina and Texas plans survived strict scrutiny indicates that 
the standard is, if not fatal, at least very very serious.438 Thus, in our 
system, the Court can choose whether or not to craft rules that pro-
mote a free and democratic society. 
A final salient difference between a referee and a player is that 
the player'S actions are aimed at affecting the outcome of the game, 
whereas the referee is not supposed to care who wins and who loses as 
long as everyone plays by the rules. The Court as referee may sound 
both desirable and feasible, but it is neither. In the context of a 
national policy such as eradicating the effects of slavery and discrimi-
nation, it is not at all clear that the Court should be agnostic as to 
results. If every social institution we have (including the Constitu-
tion in the Reconstruction Amendments) speaks with a uniform voice 
about the desirability of a particular result, there is no particular reason 
for the Court to exempt itself from this chorus. Furthermore, at this 
point in our postmodern consciousness, it is not even clear that a Court 
could be truly agnostic as to results. The Court is always aware of the 
consequences of its ruling, whether it states so expressly or not; these 
are argued extensively in briefs of both parties and amici, and if a 
majority of justices does not understand them, dissenters, especially in 
the Shaw cases, are always on hand to explain the consequences. It 
strains credulity to assert that the justices who voted in the majority in 
the Shaw cases did not know or care about the political ramifications 
of their decisions (but that the dissenters did). So the difference 
between the American and the Canadian approach is not that the latter 
is aware of the consequences of its ruling, but that it acknowledges its 
awareness and incorporates into its analysis the likely consequences of 
its ruling.439 By being aware and incorporating this awareness into the 
438 Bush, 116 S. Ct. 1941; Shaw II, 116 S. Ct. 1894. 
439 See Schauer, supra note 343, at 511-12 (explaining that the gist of the criticism of Lochner 
v. New York "inheres in its denial of the political, moral, social, and economic choices involved 
in the decision, and indeed in its denial that there was any choice at all .... We condemn Lochner 
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analysis, the Canadian Court situates itself inside the political process. 
The principal manifestations of this awareness are the Court's atten-
tion to the contextuality and the instrumentality of its interpretation. 
2. The Contextuality of Canadian Pragmatism 
In common law terms, contextuality means situating the law in the 
traditions and experiences of the culture. Translated into constitu-
tional terms, it means recognizing that the Constitution or Charter em-
bodies the society's traditions, experiences, and shared expectations-
"the story of a nation's development through many centuries."44o 
Whether the document is old or new, a constitutional court that pays 
attention to the customs and expectations that the document defines 
keeps itself inside the system by furthering the document's broad 
purposes.441 The Canadian Court's first step was to establish that the 
purpose of Section 3 of the Charter was to ensure "'effective repre-
sentation' [in which eJach citizen is entitled to be represented in gov-
ernment. "442 The specific right to vote is an instance of effective repre-
sentation which is valued because of the importance of each citizen 
being represented in government. The Court read the Charter provi-
sion as the concretization of a broader right rooted in a widely shared 
political value and, thus, upheld the Saskatchewan districting plan 
because it did not interfere with that underlying value and in fact 
promoted it. 
The bright line of equipopulosity is also justifiable because it ema-
nates from the broad purposes of the Constitution which themselves 
are grounded in generally accepted political theory. Whether the au-
as formalistic not because it involves a choice, but because it attempts to describe this choice as 
compulsion." While the Lochner case dramatically illustrates this point, it could be made equally 
of more recent Supreme Court jurisprudence. 
440 Grey, Holmes, supra note 411, at 806 (quoting OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 
5 (M. Howe ed., 1963) (originally published 1881». This is particularly true in Canada, where 
the Charter was adopted not in the nation's infancy but after the Nation had developed and 
matured for more than 100 years. Thus, one central'difference between the Canadian Charter 
and the U.S. Constitution is that while the Constitution originally embodied what America hoped 
to become-its national ideals-the Charter embodies what Canada has become. Therefore, one 
challenge that the American Court faces is to understand the Constitution as standing not just 
for what the nation aspired to 200 years ago, but for what it has become since then. 
441 Ref re: EBCA, 81 D.L.R. at 34 ("The question for resolution on this appeal can be summed 
up in one sentence: to what extent, if at all, does the right to vote enshrined in the Charter permit 
deviation from the 'one person-one vote' rule? The answer to this question turns on what one 
sees as the purpose of Section 3. "). 
442Id. at 35. 
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thority is Article I or the Equal Protection Clause, it is clear that a rule 
that promotes fair and effective representation is consistent with the 
most deeply embedded postulates of the governmental system the 
Constitution creates. As discussed above, both Wesberryand Reynolds 
equated equipopulosity with fair and effective representation-a con-
clusion that was consistent with the facts at the time. 
The Shaw cases emerge neither from a purposeful interpretation of 
the Equal Protection Clause, nor from any valued theoretical founda-
tion.443 The Equal Protection Clause (like the Australian conception of 
representative democracy) does not manifest a single incontestible 
purpose on which there is any significant degree of consensus (such 
as the support for the right of each citizen to be represented in 
government). Certainly, the proposition that its purpose is to ensure 
governmental color blindness is possible but debatable: much of the 
evidence, as well as the Court's precedents, suggests otherwise.444 At 
most, color blindness is consistent with some constitutional values, but 
impairs others. Color blindness is an abstract principle not rooted in 
any core value; its abstractness makes it both plausible and insufficient. 
A pragmatist would find that the American Court's attraction to this 
single principle which at best oversimplifies history and at worst dis-
torts it, to be fatal. 
The American Court has been harshly criticized for its commitment 
to a philosophical ideal at the expense of historical reality; one of the 
first and most articulate of such criticisms was an editorial in the New 
York Times published two days after the first Shaw decision was ren-
dered: 
Uustice O'Connor's] opinion wraps the legal assault on the 
Voting Rights Act in noble language, proclaiming "the goal 
of a political system in which race no longer matters." Thus 
she steps over the fact that we have a political history-and a 
443 By holding that the Shaw claim is "analytically distinct" from a voting rights claim, the Court 
divests itself of the need to measure the plaintiffs' claim against the purposes of Article I's 
guarantee of the right to vote for federal representatives. But doing so also precludes considera-
tion of the state's interest in its redistricting plan as a means of vindicating other voters' Article 
I rights. 
444 It is simply too late in the day to argue, for instance, that school segregation was unconsti-
tutional simply because it violated the neutrality principle. For contrasting views of the neutrality 
issue in Brown v. Board of Education, see Blumstein, supra note 97, at 528-30; Herbert Wechsler, 
Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 fuRV. L. REv. 1 (1959); Mark V. Tushnet, 
Following the Rules Laid Down: a Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 fuRV. L. REv. 
781 (1983). 
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body of franchise law-in which race has always mattered. 
Indeed, since the Civil War, the struggle to achieve a healthy 
race consciousness in our politics has been an ennobling part 
of our system. 
Only a willful disregard of that history would allow a major-
ity opinion that says the equal protection clause of the 14th 
Amendment passed to extend political rights to blacks-must 
be read to protect a white majority with no history of discrimi-
nation.445 
This is of course an indictment not just of the Shaw claims, but of the 
Court's entire affirmative action jurisprudence, although it applies 
with particular force to voting rights because of their centrality to the 
political process. Stanley Fish calls this fiction "'moral algebra,' a game 
that is played by fixing on an abstract quality and declaring all practices 
that display or fail to display that quality equivalent."446 The Shaw Court 
plays the game by suggesting that all race consciousness is equally 
evocative of apartheid and therefore equally suspect, whether the pur-
pose or effect is to fence a minority out or to help bring the previously 
excluded minority in. In a country where racism has been practiced 
primarily in one direction with burdens borne primarily by one race, 
sanctioning all race consciousness equally can' only be done without 
any reference whatsoever to the country's history or to the history of 
the Fourteenth Amendment or the more recent history of the federal 
protection for minority voting rights. 
Idealism as practiced in the Shaw cases-without attention to the 
past or to the purpose of a constitutional clause-frees the Court to 
play moral algebra; without historical or precedential constraints any 
interpretation is permissible. You think the ideal of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause is color blindness; I think it is equal results. Who is to say 
who is right? If the purpose of the provision or the document as a 
whole does not identify the goal, what does? The Court's refusal to feel 
bound by traditional constraints is consistent with its commitment to 
the ideology of Constitution-as-scripture. According to Michael Perry, 
"the constitutional text conceived as the symbolization of the aspira-
tions of the tradition is significantly less constraining than the text 
conceived as simply the linguistic embodiment of the various concrete 
445Editorial, A Dinosaur Ruling, N.Y. TIMEs,June 30,1993, at A14, quoted in STANLEY E. FISH, 
THERE'S No SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH AND IT's A GOOD THING Too ix (1993). 
446 [d. 
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political-moral judgments constitutionalized by the ratifiers."447 The 
reason for this is simply that the "grand and cloudy" constitutional 
commands can mean most anything if taken out of context or, rather, 
if never put into context. Without reference to the purpose(s) of the 
clause or to the effect of the challenged action, the Court is free to 
reach almost any result it wants. The Equal Protection Clause can mean 
that affirmative action is constitutionally prohibited or that it is consti-
tutionally compelled. The First Amendment can mean that campaign 
finance reform is constitutionally prohibited or required. We are left 
with mere idealistic slogans: there should be a marketplace of ideas; 
there should be no inequality among similarly situated parties. On the 
other hand, viewing the Constitution as having a pragmatic as well as 
a scriptural component requires some analysis by the Court of how the 
challenged act matches the clause's purpose(s) or what its real world 
effect(s) will be. We may disagree with the Court's analysis, but at least 
we would expect some analysis beyond: this is "unsettling" to a majority 
of us, therefore it is unconstitutional.448 
The Canadian cases demonstrate the truth of this proposition. To 
the Canadian Supreme Court, pragmatism means neither ignoring nor 
being railroaded by the past, but being guided by it. As the Canadian 
Court said, "the past plays a critical but non-exclusive role .... The 
tree is rooted in past and present institutions, but must be capable of 
growth to meet the future."449 The common experience and shared 
purpose of the Charter provides the guidelines for constitutional in-
terpretation and at least limits the possibilities. If this approach were 
applied to the American experience, a reading of the clause that 
ensured fair and effective representation of people of color would 
be consistent with the purposes (broadly conceived) of the clause, 
whereas a reading that reduced representation of people of color 
would not be. Because pragmatism requires attention to contextual 
factors such as the purpose of the clause, the approach to constitu-
tional interpretation most often criticized as being unconstraining 
turns out to be more constraining than the approach the Court has 
447 Michael J. Perry, The Authority of Text, Tradition, and Reason: A Theory of Constitutional 
"Interpretation," 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 551, 566 (1985). Perry is quick to point out that this does not 
mean that this approach is not at all constraining but only that it is less constraining than some 
other alternatives. 
448 Or, as John Hart Ely has put it, 'We like Rawls. You like Nozick. We win, 6-3. Statute 
invalidated." Jom; HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 58 
(1980). 
449 Ref. re: EBCA, 81 D.L.R. at 33. 
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actually chosen to use which permits ahistoricity and acontextualiza-
tion. The Court standing at the crossroads of where the law has been 
and where it is going must be willing to acknowledge the sources of 
the law. 
3. The Instrumentality of Canadian Pragmatism 
In Thomas Grey's topology, applying pragmatist tenets to law means 
thinking about law in its instrumental sense as well. This means select-
ing a rule that is capable of achieving "socially desired ends. "450 Here, 
again, the form of the rule is inconsequential: a bright line can work 
as well as a collection of independent factors, as the reapportionment 
and redistricting cases make clear. 
To assess the instrumental value of its rule, the Canadian Court 
evaluated a variety of factors. It heeded the "admonition that courts 
must be sensitive to practical considerations in interpreting Charter 
rights."451 Relying in part on Justice Frankfurter's concern with the 
"practical living facts," the Court explained that 
effective representation and good government in this country 
compel those charged with setting electoral boundaries some-
times to take into account factors other than voter parity, such 
as geography and community interests. The problems of rep-
resenting vast, sparsely populated territories, for example, 
may dictate somewhat lower voter populations in these dis-
tricts; to insist on voter parity might deprive citizens with 
distinct interests of an effective voice in the legislative process 
as well as of effective assistance from their representatives in 
their "ombudsman" role. This is only one ofa number offac-
tors which may necessitate deviation from the "one person-
one vote" rule in the interests of effective representation.452 
This approach recognizes that a legislature must have room in which 
to weigh competing values. This is not so much a matter of separation 
of powers or federalism, as the Americans might conceive it, as of 
pragmatism: there are simply too many competing factors that inter-
relate in complicated ways for a court to be able to establish a single 
450 Grey, Holmes, supra note 411, at 805. See alm Lipkin, Constitutional Revolutions, supra note 
411, at 106 ("Pragmatist virtues are generally oriented toward the future, including a concern 
with flexibility, coordination, and doing what is best for the community"). 
451 Ref re: ERCA, 81 D.L.R. at 38. 
452Id. 
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benchmark and expect the legislature to be able to achieve it. This may 
explain the Court's recognition, especially in the context of voting 
righ ts, of "practical considerations" and "the practical living facts. "453 
The Court's review of legislative action yields not simply a command 
to try again to reach some abstract ideal, but a recognition of the 
difficulty of reconciling diverse interests and a grant of the latitude the 
legislature needs in which to experiment. 
Pragmatism's instrumental aspect also helps to explain why the equi-
populosity requirement has worked, even though, by its very rigidity, 
it appears to share some formalist traits. The one person, one vote rule 
worked not because it was enforced mercilessly (it was not with respect 
to the states) or even consistently (that did not happen either since 
state and federal apportionment operate under different standards). 
It worked because it came with its own instruction manual. The Court 
did not merely tell the legislatures to achieve some abstract notion of 
equality, but told them how to achieve it: by apportioning an equal 
number of people in each district. The Court created a rule that could 
be easily implemented in the real world of political districting.454 The 
Court's inconsistency in enforcing the rule-rigidly in some instances, 
flexibly in others-does not detract from its essentially pragmatic qual-
ity even as originally articulated: whatever the districts look like, who-
ever they are intended to benefit, give them the same population. This 
was a rule that could work: legislators knew how to follow it and they 
knew when they were violating it. It did not solve all the problems, but 
it was successful on its own terms. 
The color blindness rule, by contrast, is bound to fail because it does 
not function in the real world. It is neither workable nor effective and 
it therefore has negligible instrumental value. It is not likely to be 
workable because it is simply impossible to implement: legislators can-
not not know the race of voters. As the first Shaw Court recognized, 
"redistricting differs from other kinds of state decision making in that 
the legislature always is aware of race when it draws district lines, just 
as it is aware of age, economic status, religious and political persuasion, 
and a variety of other demographic factors. "455 How is a legislator to 
know when permissible race awareness turns into impermissible race 
consciousness? Moreover, to the extent that racial data is, as an empiri-
453Id. at 33. 
454 In fact, as noted above, one criticism of the rule is that it is so easy to implement that it 
constitutes no constraint at all. 
455 Shaw 1, 509 u.s. at 646. 
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cal matter, useful in predicting how people will vote, line drawers will 
want to use it.456 The computer system used by districters in Texas 
"contained racial data at the block-by-block level, whereas other data, 
such as party registration and past voting statistics, were only available 
at the level of [election precincts]. "457 A requirement oflegislative color 
blindness is essentially an order to computer programmers to exclude 
racial data, or at least to provide it in no more detail than they provide 
other data. But that is not a particularly meaningful rule. Professor 
Kousser has commented that "[s]ince they will always have the infor-
mation and since the knowledge may be crucial to their political 
careers and policy goals, it would be naive to assume that redistricters 
will avoid using it and pointless to spend time and effort proving that 
they do. "458 Prohibiting legislators from being race-conscious (or, more 
precisely, from using race as a predominant consideration) is as futile 
as asking someone to ignore the elephant in the room: so long as race 
is relevant and racial data is available, a legislator who is motivated by 
the desire either to be reelected or to secure fair and effective repre-
sentation of minorities, or something else, cannot be asked to ignore 
it, nor should she be expected to. 
N or can race be extricated from other considerations on the basis 
of which legislators act when they district. As Justice Souter pointed 
out in his thoughtful dissent in Bush, "many of these traditional dis-
tricting principles cannot be applied without taking race into account 
and are thus, as a practical matter, inseparable from the supposedly 
illegitimate racial considerations. "459 Indeed, the strong correlation 
between voters of color and democratic voters makes it difficult to 
determine which trait is a proxy for which.460 
Nor it is clear that permitting legislators to recognize all communi-
ties except those defined by race is even appropriate. Again, Justice 
Souter has argued that: 
456There is no question that race is a useful predictor of electoral outcome, both because of 
racial bloc voting and because people of color tend to vote overwhelmingly democratic. See Bush, 
116 S. Ct. at 1956 (97% of Dallas blacks vote Democrat); see also Kousser, supra note 352, at 688 
n.264 (94% of black registrants in North Carolina were Democrats); Conference, supra note 88, 
at 33 (discussing political utility of racial data). 
457 Bush, 116 S. Ct. at 1953. 
458 Kousser, supra note 352, at 644. 
459 Bush, 116 S. Ct. at 2005 (Souter,]., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
460 See Kousser, supra note 352, at 640 n.61 (citing Whitcomb, 403 U.S. 124, for an example of 
the Court's confusion over whether people were put in districts because of their race or their 
political affiliation). 
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racial groups, like all other groups, playa real and legitimate 
role in political decisionmaking. It involves nothing more 
than an acknowledgment of the reality that our concepts of 
common interest, geography, and personal allegiances are in 
many places simply too bound up with race to deny some 
room for a theory of representative democracy allowing for 
the consideration of racially conceived interests. A majority 
of the Court has never disagreed in principle with this posi-
tion.461 
369 
The Court has previously endorsed the notion that there may be a set 
of values that are more likely to be shared by people of the same race, 
especially given the common culture and common historical experi-
ences.462 Indeed, the only explanation for consistent, identifiable racial 
bloc voting is that race (or things inextricable bound to race) matter 
to people when they make electoral decisions. The Shaw Court has not 
addressed these issues, saying simply that it is "offensive and demean-
ing [for the State to assume] that voters of a particular race, because 
of their race, 'think alike, share the same political interests, and will 
prefer the same candidates at the polls. "'463 Again, the criticism is not 
that the Court did not accept the relevance of racially defined commu-
nities of interest but that it did not even try. There is no attempt to 
distinguish between valid generalizations and archaic and overbroad 
stereotypes, even though abundant evidence exists, much of which was 
presented to the lower courts. The Court's refusal to attend to these 
questions reveals its indifference to whether its new rule works in the 
real world of electoral politics. The Court insists on its formalistic 
absolutism without a convincing justification. 
Even conceptually, color blindness is not a workable standard in the 
districting context. Justice Kennedy equates color blindness with neu-
461 Bush, 116 S. Ct. at 2001 (Souter,]., dissenting). 
462 See Conference, supra note 88, at 52 referring to Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969) as 
recognizing that people of color tend to be more interested in certain types of social legislation 
than whites. See also Karlan, Still Hazy, supra note 133, at 303 n.21 (noting inconsistency between 
focus on racial bloc voting in previous cases and Shaw's refusal to recognize distinctive minority 
interests). For general discussion of how well the North Carolina district functioned by various 
quantifiable standards, see Conference, supra note 88, at 35-40; Parker, A Critique, supra note 
347, at 42. 
463 Miller, 515 U.S. at 912 (quoting Shaw l, 509 U.S. at 647, and citing Metro Broadcasting, Inc. 
v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 636 (1990) (Kennedy,]., dissenting». But see Patricia Williams, The Obliging 
Shell: An Informal Essay on Formal Equal Opportunity, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2128,2141 (1989), on 
how offensive it is to be told what is offensive and demeaning. 
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trality,464 but no legislator in the real world engages in neutral district-
ing. Outside the context of so-called "racial" gerrymandering (where 
the Court is not blinded by race), it has recognized as much: 
The political profile of a State, its party registration, and 
voting records are available precinct by precinct, ward by 
ward. These subdivisions may not be identical with census 
tracts, but, when overlaid on a census map, it requires no spe-
cial genius to recognize the political consequences of drawing 
a district line along one street rather than another. It is not 
only obvious, but absolutely unavoidable, that the location 
and shape of districts may well determine the political com-
plexion of the area. District lines are rarely neutral phenomena. 
They can well determine what district will be predominantly 
Democratic or predominantly Republican, or make a close 
race likely. Redistricting may pit incumbents against one an-
other or make very difficult the election of the most experi-
enced legislator. The reality is that districting inevitably has 
and is intended to have substantial political consequences.465 
Furthermore, labelling the reality as offensive or demeaning does not alter the reality or justify 
ignoring it. The Court's rejection of generalizations, or essentialism, is particularly inappropriate 
in the context of redistricting which is nothing but essentialism: districters make assumptions 
about how people will vote based on certain traits. This is true whether the relevant traits are 
race, area of residence, religious affiliation, or anything else. See Aleinikoff & Issacharoff, supra 
note 3, at 615-16 (arguing that race-as-a-factor might be less offensive to antiessentialists than 
the dispositive use of race). In districting, however, race is not dispositive but useful only insofar 
as it correlates with other factors, such as inclination to vote Democratic, or inclination to vote 
for similar sets of issues or for similar candidates. See generally Weale, supra note 88, at 457 
(discussing assumptions about voting patterns based on group traits). 
464 Compare Miller, 515 U.S. at 904 (The "central mandate [of the Equal Protection Clause] is 
racial neutrality in governmental decision making") with id. at 915 ("race-based decision making 
is inherently suspect"). See also Abrams, 117 S. Ct. at 1934 (court may not allow racial considera-
tions to predominate over "traditional and neutral districting principles"). Previous opinions had 
referred to these only as "traditional districting principles." See, e.g., Bush, 116 S. Ct. at 1952; 
Miller, 515 U.S. at 919-20; Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 642, 647. 
465 Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 128-29 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added). See also id. at 128-29 
n.lO quoting: 
Robert G. Dixon,Jr., one of the foremost scholars of reapportionment, who observed: 
[,] "[Whether] or not nonpopulation· factors are expressly taken into account in 
shaping political districts, they are inevitably ever-present and operative. They influence 
all election outcomes in all sets of districts. The key concept to grasp is that there are 
no neutral lines for legislative districts ... every line drawn aligns partisans and interest 
blocs in a particular way different from the alignment that would result from putting 
the line in some other place." 
Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 128-29 n.l0 (quoting Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Fair Criteria and Procedures for 
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No one knows what a non-gerrymandered plan would look like. States 
do not come with a priori electoral maps. No politician has ever tried 
to draw one. Without a baseline, it is impossible to determine what a 
non-gerrymandered plan would look like. 466 The Court's response that 
traditional districting principles, such as incumbency protection, com-
pactness, and contiguity, are the neutral baseline from which plans 
should be drawn is unsatisfactory because these baselines are seldom 
neutral. For instance, the disproportionately large number of white 
incumbents means that incumbency protection benefits whites over 
people of color. Current residential dispersal of minorities may mean 
that compactness also favors republicans and whites.467 Thus, tradi-
tional districting principles (without corrective attention to race) are 
not necessarily neutral. 
The color blindness rule fails the instrumentality test not only be-
cause it is not workable, but also because it is not particularly effective. 
To judge effectiveness, it is necessary to distinguish between ends and 
means: a rule is effective only insofar as it achieves an identified 
purpose. Unlike the equipopulosity rule, which is one effective means 
to achieve the goal of equality of voting power, color blindness does 
double duty as a mean and an end. The Court says that the ultimate 
goal is a political system in which race no longer matters-that is, color 
blindness-and the best way to achieve the goal is color blindness.468 
But the evidence suggests that the rule may not be self-fulfilling and 
may even be counterproductive. It has been shown that, due to resi-
dential patterns of racial majorities and minorities, districting done 
without attention to race (by disinterested political scientists, not leg-
Establishing Legislative Districts, in REPRESENTATION AND REDISTRICTING ISSUES 7-8 (B. Grofman 
et al. eds., 1982)). Equipopulosity precludes completely neutral districting which would be 
accomplished by drawing a grid on the state. Since districters have to think about the number of 
people in each district, they have to consider which people they will include. If they need an 
extra 30 or 30,000 to meet the equipopulosity requirement, should they go to the north or the 
west? Once discretion is required, neutrality is impossible. 
466 See CAss R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 41-67 (1993), for discussion of the 
arbitrariness of baseline selection. In districting of course, there is no such thing as "status quo 
neutrality." See also Abrams, 117 S. Ct. at 1925 (trying to identify the proper baseline against which 
to measure the judicial districting plan). 
467 "Although there has never been a good empirical study on the subject, Republican and 
Democratic redistricting experts agree that because the most loyal Democrats (blacks, Hispanics, 
Jews, and lower income voters in general) seem to be more geographically segregated than 
Republican voters are, compact districts would tend to minimize the number of seats Democrats 
win." Kousser, supra note 352, at 637 (citing Daniel H. Lowenstein & Jonathan Steinberg, The 
Qp.est fur Legislative Districting in the Public Interest: Elusive ur Illusury?, 33 UCLA L. REv. 1 (1985)). 
468 Shaw 1, 509 U.S. at 657. 
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islators) yields only one-half of the minority-majority districts that race-
conscious districting yields;469 in other words, with race-blind district-
ing, half as many minorities have the opportunity to elect legislators 
of their choice as with race-conscious districting. The evidence is un-
controverted that the only times people of color have been elected to 
Congress in significant numbers have been when the government has 
made particular efforts to achieve that result such as during Recon-
struction and in the 1990s round of redistricting; North Carolina, for 
instance, did not elect any black person to Congress between 1901 and 
1993.470 There is also evidence that integrated minority opportunity 
districts actually dampen persistent racial bloc voting.471 Thus, district-
ing with attention to race yields more minority-preferred candidates 
who, as incumbents, break down racial bloc voting so that race is less 
likely to matter. Race-conscious means, then, are more likely than 
race-blind means to result in actual race-blindness as an end. Simply 
pu t, race-conscious remedies may be needed to cure race-conscious 
voting.472 Or, as Pamela Karlan has written, in a color blind society, no 
one would notice that the legislature is white.473 
469 Conference, supra note 88, at 78. 
470 See Higginbotham et al., supra note 338, at 1648-49 (Appendix A) (showing that the only 
2 periods during which more than 5 blacks served in either house of Congress were during 
Reconstruction (1871-1875) and after 1965, and that during most of the years in between 
Congress included one (1929-1945) or no black members (1901-1929»; see also Abrams, 117 S. 
Ct. at 1945 (Breyer, j., dissenting) (noting that "no African American had represented Georgia 
in Congress since Reconstruction, when Congressman Jefferson Franklin Long briefly repre-
sented the State.") (citation omitted). 
471 Laughlin McDonald, The Counterrevolution in Minority Voting Rights, 65 MISS. LJ. 271, 288 
(1995); see also Bernard Grofman & Lisa Handley, 1990's Issues in Voting Rights, 65 MISS. LJ. 
205, 259 (1995) (showing that the white support for black Congressman Mike Espy grew with 
each election); see also Parker, A Critique, supra note 347, at 19-20 ("creation of majority-minority 
districts and the subsequent election of minority candidates reduces white fear and. harmful 
stereotyping of minority candidates, ameliorates the racial balkanization of American society, and 
promotes a political system in which race does not matter as much as it did before."). Indeed, 
Ruth Shaw, the white named plaintiff in the original case, voted for the black candidate for 
Congress in the 1992 election. Conference, supra note 88, at 51. This helps to explain the 
reelection of black members of Congress who were first elected from minority opportunity 
districts that were invalidated in the Shaw cases. See Abrams, 117 S. Ct. at 1936 (noting the 
reelection of Cynthia McKinney with 23% of the white vote); see also Neil A. Lewis, Ruling Ended 
Use of Race to Redraw Districts, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1997, at B2 ("five black members of Congress 
whose districts were redrawn to eliminate black voting majorities were re-elected easily"). This 
may say more about the value of incumbency than the overnight disappearance of racial bloc 
voting since non-incumbent blacks did not enjoy the same electoral success. 
472Groffman & Handley, supra note 471, at 269. ("In a world of race-conscious voting, race-
conscious remedies are needed"). 
473 Conference, supra note 88, at 75. There is a countervailing argument that it is better for 
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IV. A PRAGMATIC APPROACH TO REDISTRICTING 
A. Pragmatism's Normative Appeal 
Ajurisprudential choice can be selected on the basis of any number 
of criteria. At a minimum, a theory must achieve its own stated objec-
tives. Pragmatism surely withstands scrutiny under this standard. As the 
Canadian EBCA case illustrates, a court can write an opinion that is 
true to pragmatist values in that it considers a range of competing 
interests, is constrained by the society's values, traditions, and needs, 
and substantively is both contextually and instrumentally coherent. But 
a choice may be even more attractive if it also achieves what the 
competing theories set out to do. This section explores pragmatism's 
appeal by measuring it against one approach that shares many of 
pragmatism's values (Dworkin's integrity theory), and one that shares 
few (Scalia's formalism). I conclude that, in the context of redistricting 
cases, pragmatism achieves not just its own stated objectives but also 
those of alternative jurisprudential attitudes at least as well as those 
alternatives do and better than idealism or textualism do. 
Ronald Dworkin argues that an interpretive theory must pass the 
two-dimensional test of fit and justification in order to be legitimate.474 
Dworkin explains the "fit" dimension by equating the process of aclju-
blacks to be a meaningful constituency (if not a majority) in several districts to influence several 
representatives than to be packed into one or two districts where they can count on one or two 
representatives' responsiveness but have no clout whatsoever with the majority of representatives. 
See, e.g., Parker, A Critique, supra note 347, at 55 (discussing the debatable value of "existing 
racially mixed districts which repeatedly elected liberal white Democrats who supported the 
minority legislative agenda"; Parker concludes that the challenged districts did not result in the 
defeat of such liberal Democrats). For instance, one of the reasons for Judge Bork's failure to 
win confirmation from the United States Senate was that even though most Southern Senators 
were white and most of their constituents were white, many had sufficient numbers of blacks in 
their states to whom they felt responsible. See generally MICHAEL PERTSCHUK & WENDY SCHAETZEL, 
THE PEOPLE RISING: THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE BORK NOMINATION (1989). The existence of 
a potential alternative to minority-majority districts shows not that the Court was correct in 
invalidating them but that complex political issues deserve legislative deliberation rather than 
judicial fiat. 
474 There is much debate as to whether Dworkin is or is not a pragmatist. See, e.g., Smith, supra 
note 412, at 410 (referring to Dworkin as an unconfessed pragmatist). This article uses Dworkin's 
theory as a benchmark because, to the extent that he is not a pragmatist, his theory offers an 
important contrast to pragmatism insofar as he rejects pragmatism; to the extent that he is a 
pragmatist, and his integrity theory is a pragmatist theory, his approach to law's justifications 
elaborates on the pragmatic stance that this article endorses. 
Since no recent voting rights case adopts Dworkin's theory, this article does not argue that 
law's integrity would not work for such cases; it is used rather to show how pragmatism achieves 
integrity's objectives. 
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dication with a chain novel. He explains that a judge "cannot adopt 
any interpretation, however complex, if he believes that no single 
author who sets out to write a novel with the various readings of 
character, plot, theme, and point that interpretation describes could 
have written substantially the text he has been given. "475 The Canadian 
Court has shown that the pragmatist attitude is capable of fitting the 
constitutional text in that it requires that judicial decisions be consis-
tent with "the values and principles essential to a free and democratic 
society [such as] respect for [inherent human dignity,] commitment 
to social justice and equality, accommodation of a wide variety of 
beliefs, ... and faith in the social and political institutions .... "476 By 
requiring a court to consider the contextuality of decisions-where the 
law has been, what the purpose(s) of the constitutional command is 
or are, what its values are-a pragmatist court ensures that its interpre-
tation of a constitutional provision fits the overall story being told by 
the constitutional text. The Australian version of textualism, as prac-
ticed in cases like McKinlay and McGinty, probably also meets the 
standard for fit. By relying on the plainest possible meaning of the text, 
the Court is limiting the possible interpretations to those that are 
consistent with the constitutional language. Idealism, however, does 
not require any particular fit but relies instead on the judge'S norma-
tive value system defined by bright lines.477 Whereas an integrity judge 
choosing color blindness would need to show its consistency with what 
some "author" in the "chain" would have written, the idealist judge is 
not so burdened. 
The second dimension of the Dworkinian legitimacy test is justifica-
tion, which refines the "fit" requirement when that requirement pro-
duces more than one possible result. Justification requires the decision-
maker to '~udge which of all these eligible readings makes the work in 
progress best, all things considered. "478 This dimension comprises two 
475RoNALD DWORKIN, LAw's EMPIRE 230 (1986) [hereinafter DWORKIN, LAw's EMPIRE]. 
476 Ref re: EBCA, 81 D.L.R. at 33 (internal quotations omitted). Indeed, the living tree meta-
phor is the arboreal analog to the literary chain novel. In both cases, the image is of building 
upon some developing body in an organic way. 
477 Obviously, no judge who is a part of his or her political culture or interpretive community 
decides a case in a "fit" vacuum and in this sense the normative values of an idealist judge are 
likely to "fit" the constitutional interpretive tradition of which he or she is a part. However, 
idealism does not make fit an independent requirement; in fact, the abstract element of idealism 
seems to reject the value of fit. 
478 DWORKIN, LAw's EMPIRE, supra note 475, at 231; see also Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2168 (''There 
is language in our opinion in Katz.enbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), which could be 
interpreted as acknowledging a power in Congress to enact legislation that expands the rights 
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subparts, one that focuses on the word "best" and the other on the 
proviso "all things considered." Textualism fails the justification prong 
on both counts: textualistjudges are not concerned with creating the 
best text but with interpreting the text provided, and, in general, are 
not interested in considering "all things" except at the margins where 
the meaning of the text is not so plain. By contrast, idealism (in its 
normative aspect), like pragmatism, is concerned with putting the text 
in the best light. But idealism does not consider "all things" in order 
to determine what is best: the idealist judge decides what is best by 
reference to some abstract rule untethered to facts (e.g., that we can 
only achieve color blindness by being color blind). Pragmatism, by 
contrast, is virtually defined by its willingness to consider "all things" 
(as evidenced by the EBCA Court's attention to such diverse factors as 
the practical living facts and the importance of the social mosaic). 
Thus, under integrity's standards of fit and justification, pragmatism 
appears to be normatively superior to both idealism and textualism. 
At the other end of the spectrum from integrity is formalism. The 
argument that pragmatism is normatively more attractive than formal-
ism is a little more complex than the previous argument that pragma-
tism is at least as attractive as integrity theory. Yet pragmatism turns 
out not only to achieve formalism's goals but to do so even better than 
formalism itself. 
In A Matter of Interpretation, Justice Scalia contrasts pragmatism (or 
living constitutionalism) with formalism. Not surprisingly, Scalia's pref-
erence is for formalism. His argumen t against pragmatism is two-fold: 
that it is excessively evolutionary and that it does not contain self-con-
straining standards.479 The argument against Scalia's position is not 
that he is wrong-the conclusions he draws could in some instances 
turn out to be right-but that in the context of voting rights, he is not 
necessarily right. Decisions of the Canadian courts show that there is 
a viable way out of the difficulties Scalia identifies. 
First, Scalia argues that the pragmatist approach is contrary to the 
anti-evolutionary nature of constitutions. "It certainly cannot be said 
that a constitution naturally suggests changeability; to the contrary, its 
whole purpose is to prevent change-to embed certain rights in such 
a manner that future generations cannot readily take them away. "480 A 
contained in Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. This is not a necessary interpretation, 
however, or even the best one."). 
479 Again, I consider these arguments not in the abstract, as Scalia does, but in the limited 
context of the districting claims that are the subject of this article. 
480 SCALIA, supra note 320, at 40. Scalia's version of living constitutionalism is something of an 
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subpart of this argument is that even if evolution were acceptable, this 
evolution is objectionable because it runs in the wrong direction. 
Evolutionism would be persuasive, Scalia explains, "if most of the 
'growing' ... were the elimination of restrictions on democratic gov-
ernment. But just the opposite is true."481 In particular, he argues that 
"in the past thirty-five years, the 'evolving' Constitution has imposed a . 
vast array of new constraints-new inflexibilities-upon administrative, 
judicial, and legislative action. "482 
The main complaint here is that pragmatism permits too much 
change, contrary to constitutionalism's anti-evolutionary nature. Here 
again, Canadian pragmatism seems more consistent with the goal of 
moderation than idealism. In Shaw, the Court announced a brand new 
rule that was "analytically distinct" from either the voting rights cases 
or the discrimination cases the Court had decided before. If the Con-
stitution now permits claims by majority-race voters who can show no 
tangible or even stigmatic harm, surely it is constraining democratic 
government in new and unforeseen ways. By contrast, the Canadian 
and Australian Courts refused to recognize a new cause of action that 
was not clearly warranted by some established legal tradition. These 
Courts acknowledged that a Constitution cannot solve every societal 
problem, but it is not entirely impotent either. Thus, they held that 
while the challenged districting plans seemed justifiable, at some point 
plans might deviate so excessively from the value of relative equality 
that they would have to be invalidated. In the meantime, however, the 
government should be permitted the latitude to solve problems as it 
thinks best. 
In one sense the Shaw Court's decision was anti-evolutionary. Even 
if the Court's constitutional interpretation was radical, the social and 
political ramifications of its ruling were arguably regressive, since strik-
ing down these electoral plans could have resulted in the first reduc-
tion in black Congressional membership ever. 
On the other hand, the complaint may be that pragmatism does not 
permit sufficient change-that it needlessly constrains the political 
branches. While this may be true in some instances, pragmatism has 
oxymoron: he criticizes "devotees of The Living Constitution" for seeking not "to facilitate social 
change but to prevent it," but says the theory'S most glaring defect is "its incompatibility with the 
whole anti-evolutionary purpose of a constitution." [d. at 42, 44. It is not anti-evolutionary, but it 
prevents change. 
481 [d. at 41. 
482 [d. 
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no monopoly here. In the voting rights cases, the pragmatic Canadian 
courts (as well as the textualist Australian Court) were more deferential 
to state governments than the American Supreme Court; both the 
Canadian and the Australian courts explicitly recognized interests of 
separation of powers, federalism, and judicial restraint, none of which 
was acknowledged in the Shaw cases. 
Scalia's concern with unnecessarily fettering the political branches 
seems to rest on preference for rule-making by legislative deliberation 
rather than judicial fiat. Goveniments, he argues, must have sufficient 
flexibility to govern effectively. This goal must recognize, however, that 
a democratic government's muscle-flexing is legitimate only to the 
extent that it is supported by a legitimate electoral process. Otherwise 
it is not so democratic. Scalia seems to acknowledge that some limita-
tions on government are either acceptable or un~lVoidable;483 indeed, 
the purpose of having a constitution is to restrain some government 
action. The limitations that would seem most justifiable, therefore, are 
those that promote governmental legitimacy by ensuring fair electoral 
processes.484 In other words, if what we care about is good government, 
the Reynolds rule, which concededly constrained deliberative decision-
making, might nonetheless be justified because it enhanced effective 
representation.485 Not justified, however, are constraints on govern-
ment that do not ensure better or more efficient or more legitimate 
government. The requirement of color blindness is of this type. Color 
blindness could not cure any political injury because the plaintiffs did 
not allege any.486 It cured only the harm of color consciousness, an 
483 "All government represents a balance between individual freedom and social order." [d. 
484This is, of course, not an original thought. See e.g. United States v. Carolene Products, 304 
U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); ELY, supra note 448; Carl A. Auerbach, The Reapportionment Cases, One 
Person, One Vote-One Vote, One Value, SUP. CT. REv. 1,2 (1964) (arguing that it is "paradoxical 
for the advocates of judicial self-limitation to criticize the Court for helping to make majority rule 
effective, because the case for self-restraint rests on the assumption that the Court is reviewing 
the legislative acts of representatives who are put in office by a majority of the people. Since 
malapportionment destroys this assumption, judicial intervention to remove this obstacle to 
majority rule may be less intolerable than the self-perpetuation of minority rule."). Although we 
may disagree about what additional rights are necessary preconditions to effective political 
processes (such as, for instance, food, shelter, education) most everyone would probably agree 
that voting rights are indispensable. 
485 &alia uses the Reynolds rule as an example of a presumably unjustified evolutionary con-
straint. See SCALIA, supra note 320, at 37. This can be understood as consistent with his argument 
in the sense that although Reynolds did achieve this goal, it was not necessary to achieving it; as 
the dissenters argued in that series of cases, other legitimate conceptions of democracy permit 
malapportionment. 
486 "Only when such placement affects election results and political power statewide has an 
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injury of questionable pedigree, doubtful palpability, and undefinable 
scope.487 Given Scalia's ambivalence about individual rights generally,488 
it is not clear how the creation of a new individual right-the right to 
color blind districting-is justified given that it constrains government 
without any obvious gain.489 
The principle that judicial intervention is especially warranted 
where the legitimacy of the political process is at stake helps to explain 
the correctness of the Reynolds Court's activism, the correctness of the 
EBCA and McGinty Courts' restraint, and the incorrectness of the Shaw 
Court's activism. As discussed earlier, the Baker-Reynolds Court had no 
reason to believe that the extreme malapportionment it confronted 
was self-correcting, and every reason to be skeptical of the repre-
sentativeness of the state legislatures and of their ability to respond to 
a majority of their constituents. Today, in the United States, as well as 
in Canada and Australia, the situation is quite different. The Canadian 
and Australian Courts were justified in deferring to the political proc-
ess where the malapportionment was neither egregious nor intracta-
actual disadvantage occurred." Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 141 (plurality). "[A] threshold showing of 
discriminatory vote dilution is required for a prima facie case of an equal protection violation." 
[d. at 143. 
Nor does Hays clarity the nature of the alleged harm. The Court's reasoning is circular and 
uninformative: the Court held that ''where a plaintiff resides in a racially gerrymandered district 
... [she or he] has been denied equal treatment because of the legislature's reliance on racial 
criteria, and therefore has standing to challenge the legislature's action." Hays, 515 U.S. at 
744-45. The injury is defined not by the harm felt by the plaintiff but solely by the actions of the 
government. That action (reliance on racial criteria) is called a denial of equal treatment but 
neither the plaintiffs nor the Court translates the action into an articulable harm to plaintiffs. 
487 As described by one of the foremost academic advocates ofthe Shaw cases, "[t]he injury was 
the commonly held interest in requiring state government to adhere to racial nondiscrimination 
precepts purportedly embraced in the principles of Equal Protection." Blumstein, supra note 97, 
at 528. This description, however, does not square with the Court's holding in Hays that only 
some voters in each gerrymandered state have standing to raise a Shaw claim. See Hays, 515 U.S. 
at 742-44. If it is so commonly held, why not let everyone who is subject to the state's race 
consciousness sue? It is this failure to describe the Shaw injury coherently that led Justice Souter 
to describe the Shaw cause of action as flawed at "the conceptual bone." Bush, 116 S. Ct. at 1998 
(Souter, j., dissenting). 
488 "[A]nother argument of the proponents of an evolving Constitution [is] that evolution will 
always be in the direction of greater personal liberty. (They consider that a great advantage, for 
reasons that I do not entirely understand .... )." SCALIA, supra note 320, at 42. 
489 The gains are presumably the good feeling we all get when we believe that we have rid 
ourselves of racial strife and that we are all one race. But the Court has not described what it 
hopes to gain in sufficient detail nor has it explained why this generalized and amorphous claim 
is sufficient to confer standing despite otherwise stringent limitations on standing. See gencraUy 
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984) (requiring a personalized, concrete injury that is fairly 
traceable to the alleged conduct and likely to be redressed by the relief prayed for). 
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ble; In Australia, the gaps left open by the democratic system were not 
significant. Five of six states had achieved virtual voter parity without 
any constitutional heavy-handedness, and the sixth-the subject of 
both McKinlay and McGin~was well on its way, having deviated only 
for specific reasons of extraordinary demographic diversity. In Canada, 
too, the deviations were carefully reviewed by the Court but ultimately 
found to be justified by legitimate considerations. 
Like the situation in Australia and Canada, the political landscape 
confronting the Shaw Court did not demand judicial intervention. 
Indeed, after 1990, one could argue that state legislatures were finally 
beginning to respond to claims of underrepresentation by racial mi-
norities and to ameliorate the electoral process. As Justice Souter has 
explained, "[t]he Congress that assembled in 1981 had only 17 black 
representatives out of 435 and no black senator" meaning that "blacks, 
'who constitute 11.1 % of the nation's voting age population, made up 
only 4.9% of the members of Congress.'''490 But after 1990, black rep-
resentation in Congress increased significantly. Justice Souter contin-
ued: "[R]emedies for vote dilution (and hedges against its reappear-
ance) in the form of majority-minority districts account for the fact 
that the 104th Congress showed an increase of 39 black members over 
the 1981 total."491 America in the 1990s, unlike America in the 1960s, 
was acting to redress the imbalance. Judicial involvement is needed to 
correct legislative intransigence, not to impede legislative responsive-
ness. 
The Shaw cases did exactly what Justice Scalia says the Court should 
not do: they needlessly fettered the state governments by imposing 
color-blinders upon them. The fettering was needless by Scalia's own 
terms: he wants to ensure that governments have flexibility and are 
able to function effectively. Indeed, in the context of districting, this 
is the result the Constitution envisions as well.492 The Court's zeal 
to manage these legislative efforts imposes more new constraints on 
democratic government than a pragmatic court could do in these 
490 Bush, 116 S. Ct. at 2000 (Souter,]., dissenting) (citing Statistical Abstract ofthe United States, 
1982-83, p. 490 (103d ed. 1982) (Table 802); BLACK AMERICANS: A STATISTICAL SOURCEBOOK 
142 (L. Hornor ed., 1995) (Table 4.02) and quoting Frank P. Parker, The Damaging Consequences 
of the Rehnquist Court's Commitment to Color-Blindness Versus RacialJustice, 45 AM. U.L. REv. 763, 
770-71 (1996) [hereinafter Parker, Damaging Consequences]). 
491 Minorities in Congress, 52 Congo Q., Supplement to No. 44, p. 10 (Nov. 12, 1994); see also 
Parker, Damaging Consequences, supra note 490, at 771 (noting "a fifty percent increase in the 
number of black members of Congress"); see also Karlan, Still Hazy, supra note 133, at 305. 
492U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 4. 
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circumstances. Whereas idealism impels a Court toward activism, prag-
matism counsels restraint. 
Scalia's second criticism of pragmatism is its standardlessness. 
[T]here is no agreement, and no chance of agreement, upon 
what is to be the guiding principle of the evolution .... As 
soon as the discussion goes beyond the issue of whether the 
Constitution is static, the evolutionists divide into as many 
camps as there are individual views of the good, the true, and 
the beautiful. I think that is inevitably so, which means that 
evolutionism is simply not a practicable constitutional phi-
losophy. The originalist at least knows what he is looking for: 
the original meaning of the text.493 
While pragmatism may be susceptible to standardlessness, the Cana-
dian Supreme Court has shown that constitutional interpretation may 
be constrained in principled ways while still staying true to pragmatist 
values.494 Although it explicitly adopted living constitutionalism, the 
Canadian Court was guided by relatively non-subjective values such as 
history-the nation's traditions and shared experiences-and by the 
Charter's purpose. These two constraints are no less legitimate than 
the original meaning of the text and may be substantially more effec-
tive as constraints and more workable as guides. For instance, it simply 
cannot be said that the Canadian decision was less constrained than 
the American and Australian cases. While the Australian decision was 
bounded, perhaps excessively, by the constitutional text, and the Amer-
ican decision was bounded only by abstract idealism, which in itself is 
not defined by any objective or shared value, the Canadian decision 
was bounded by the jurisprudential conviction that the Charter is a 
living tree, by the nation's history of evolving democracy, and by the 
Court's respect for provincial autonomy and for separation of powers 
between the judicial and the political branches. The most pragmatic 
decision turns out to be the most judicially restrained.495 
By formalist standards, then, an interpretive theory must remain 
faithful to the anti-evolutionary nature of the Constitution and it must 
493 SCALIA, supra note 320, at 45. 
494 "Pragmatism takes stability, reliance and the internalization of constitutional values seri-
ously." Lipkin, Constitutional Revolutions, supra note 411, at 138. 
495 See id. at 135 ("It is simply false to insist that pragmatist judges must be oblivious to 
precedent, legal history, our political traditions, or even to the reflective convictions of our 
citizens. Pragmatism,like conventionalism and [Ronald Dworkin's] integrity, is concerned about 
fit and justification. "). 
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constrain judicial decisionmaking. The decisions of the Canadian and 
Australian Courts show that pragmatism and textualism achieve these 
goals at least as well as idealism. Indeed, the Canadian EBCA case shows 
that pragmatism may be even more successful than formalism at its 
own game. 
B. Redistricting Pragmatism 
This section will briefly sketch what a pragmatic American court 
might do if faced with a Shaw-style wrongful districting claim. 
First, the court's guiding principle would be to recognize that it is a 
player in the process of democratic governance and that its decisions 
should therefore be designed to contribute constructively to the overall 
goal of effective representation. A court, therefore, has a significant 
role to play where legislative action is diminishing the possibility of 
effective representation, but a more marginal role where there is no 
apparent injury to electoral rights. 
Pragmatism counsels restraint on historical grounds as well. Accord-
ing to the Shaw Court, the long history of state deprivation of minority 
voting rights justifies continued judicial oversight.496 But the Court 
misapplies this history to the present situation. Unlike the white su-
premacist legislation of the pre-Civil Rights era, the challenged districts 
drawn after the 1990 Census were the product of negotiation and 
compromise that included representatives of minority interests (not 
the least of which was the federal government in its capacity as enforcer 
of the Voting Rights Act). The result of this process was to enhance 
minority representation in Congress. Reasonable people could argue 
about whether minority-m~ority districts are the best way to enhance 
minorities' power in Congress, but that is a political, not a judicial, 
question.497 The pragmatic court would recognize that enhancing mi-
nority representation means correcting, not reinforcing, the historic 
racial imbalance in legislative halls, and would defer to legislative 
judgments as to the best way to achieve that end, absent a clear 
indication of injury to some group of voters. 
Pragmatism would also require the court to be more realistic in its 
appraisal of electoral processes. As discussed above, voting is both an 
496See, e.g., Shaw, 509 U.S. at 63~1; Hays, 515 U.S. at 740 n.*. 
497 See Karlan, StiU Hazy, supra note 133, at 310 (arguing that the Court should dismiss wrongful 
districting claims as non justiciable political questions since "complainants have suffered no 
particularized injury, but simply object to the prevailing democratic theory"). 
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individual and an associational endeavor. It is among our most private 
acts,49B and yet its meaning is only realized when individuals' votes are 
combined with others'. Both the Canadian and the Australian Courts 
recognized that groups, as well as individuals, ought to have some 
electoral rights. The American Court, by contrast, has recognized only 
individualized interests, since the marginalization of the "effective rep-
resentation" interest identified in Reynolds. Indeed, Justice Souter, in 
particular, has taken the Court to task for failing, in the Shaw cases, to 
recognize what he has called the "basically associational character of 
voting rights in a representative democracy. "499 Many scholars have 
elaborated on this aspect of voting, particularly in the wake of the Shaw 
cases.5OO As Lani Guinier has said, districting is inevitably about gerry-
mandering and gerrymandering is inevitably about groupS.501 A prag-
matic court would therefore presumptively accept the associations that 
a legislature acting in good faith chose to recognize especially where, 
as with the case of racial ties, there is good reason to believe that the 
associational trait may have political significance. 
In following these principles, the hypothetical pragmatic court, 
faced with wrongful districting claims, would recognize a cause of 
action to the extent that plaintiffs could allege and prove some kind 
of tangible injury, but would refuse to intervene where legislative ac-
tion results in obvious tangible gains and no tangible costs. This court 
would have learned from such cases as Gray, Wesberry, and Reynolds 
and would have emerged a smarter and more sophisticated court. It 
would temper the activism, individualism, and absolutism of the earlier 
cases by acting only with theory that is grounded in the realities of the 
political world. By adhering to pragmatist tenets, it would be more 
restrained and moderate than its predecessor of two generations ago 
or than its idealist counterpart today. 
498 See e.g. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992) (upholding Tennessee statute that prohibits 
solicitation of votes and campaign displays within 100 feet of polling place). 
499 Bush, 116 S. Ct. at 2000 (Souter,]., dissenting). See also id. at 1999 (''voting is more than an 
atomistic exercise"). 
500 See, e.g., McDonald, supra note 471, at 271; Martin Shapiro, Gerrymandering, Unfairness & 
The Supreme Court, 33 UCLA L. REv. 227 (1985); Karlan & Levinson, supra note 97; Aleinikoff 
& Issacharoff, supra note 3; Guinier, supra note 86; Issacharoff, supra note 7; Karlan, AU Ouer the 
Map, supra note 89. This has also been recognized intermittently by the Supreme Court, most 
explicitly in Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109. 
501 Guinier, supra note 86, at 1591, 1615 (discussing the "group nature of representation itself, 
especially in a system of geographic districting" and drawing the conclusion that all districting is 
gerrymandering) . 
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V. CONCLUSION: A PROGNOSIS 
It is unlikely that the U.S. Supreme Court will jettison its idealist 
districting jurisprudence and adopt the Canadian approach. In the 
past five years, the Court has reaffirmed its commitment to color blind 
districting in an unbroken line of cases. In each of these cases, the 
majority is slim, but it is as committed to its view as the persistent 
dissenters are to theirs. The only disputes among the majority justices 
are at the margins.502 
Some seeds of a more measured approach, however, have been 
planted by the justices themselves, in a series of dissents by a deter-
mined group of four justices.503 Although there is substantial and le-
gitimate dispute about the propriety and utility of dissents, it does seem 
clear that dissenting opinions may in some cases serve useful nmc-
tions.504 In time, they may even persuade a majority of the Court.505 
If ever a dissenting view were worthy of swaying the Court, this 
collection of dissents deserves the honor. These dissents are long and 
thoughtful and remarkably insistent.506 They tend to attack the majority 
opinion on three levels by arguing against the majority'S charac-
terization of the facts,507 charging the majority with misconstruing the 
502 See, e.g., Bush, 116 S. Ct. at 1968 (Separate Opinion of O'Connor,].) (arguing that compli-
ance with Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act is a compelling government interest whereas the 
plurality (written by O'Connur) only left that possibility open). 
50~ See Shaw I, 509 U.S. 630 Uustices White, Blackmun, Stevens, Souter filing dissenting opin-
ions); Miller, 515 U.S. 900 Uustices Stevens and Ginsburg filing dissenting opinions in which 
Justices Breyer and Souter joined); Shaw I/, 517 U.S. 899, 116 S. Ct. 1894 Uustices Stevens and 
Souter filing dissenting opinions in which Justices Ginsburg and Breyer joined); Bush, 517 U.S. 
952, 116 S. Ct. 194 Uustices Stevens and Souter filing dissenting opinions in which Justices 
Ginsburg and Breyer joined); Abrams, 117 S. Ct. at 1943 Uustice Breyer filing a dissenting opinion 
in which Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburgjoined). The exception is Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 115 
S. Ct. 2431 where a majority held that the particular plaintiffs did not have standing. Justices 
Breyer and Stevens (with Justices Ginsburg and Souter) disagreed to the extent that the majority 
suggested that other plaintiffs would have standing. 
504 See William j. Brennan, Jr., In Defense of Dissents, 37 HASTINGS LJ. 427 (1986). See generally 
Laura K. Ray, Justice Brennan and the Jurisprudence of Dissent, 61 ThMP. L. REv. 307 (1988). See 
also Kevin M. Stack, The Practice of Dissent in the Supreme Court, 105 YALE LJ. 2235 (1996). 
505 Compare, e.g., Garcia, 469 U.S. at 580 (Rehnquist,]., dissenting) ("I do not think it incum-
bent on those of us in dissent to spell out further the fine points of a principle that will, I am 
confident, in time command the support of a majority of this Court") with New York v. United 
States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
506 But see Ray, supra note 504, at 313-14, on the propriety of repeated dissents after the majority 
has decisively ruled. 
507 See, e.g., Abrams, 177 S. Ct. at 1943 (Breyer,]., dissenting) (arguing that the Court's 
mischaracterization of the intent of the Georgia legislature is both a legal and a factual error); 
Bush, 116 S. Ct. at 1980-89 (Stevens, j., dissenting) (challenging the Court's "reading of the 
, 
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law,50s and criticizing the majority'S theory as hollow and incoherent.509 
And the mere fact that four justices reject the idealism of the majority 
may in itselfbe a good sign for pragmatists. The principal contribution 
of the dissenters, however, is to cast doubt on the inevitability of the 
majority position. By their thoroughness, they reveal that on each level 
the majority has made a particular decision-to view the facts in a 
particular way, to characterize the mission of the Equal Protection 
Clause in a particular way, to understand the judicial branch's relation-
ship to the electoral process in a particular way-that one could rea-
sonably challenge. These specific decisions are incidents of the more 
idealist jurisprudential attitude towards voting rights and equality 
rights that the Court has adopted. It is this fundamental choice that 
the dissenters challenge, and to which the Canadian cases present an 
appealing alternative. 
record" with respect to whether the Texas legislature subordinated race-neutral districting prin-
ciples to race). 
508 See, e.g., Bush, 116 S. Ct. at 2001 (Souter, j., dissenting) (challenging the Court's interpre-
tation of Equal Protection law in that "Shaw I . .. broke abruptly with these standards, including 
the very understanding of equal protection as a practical guarantee against harm to some class 
singled out for disparate treatment"). 
509 See, e.g., id. at 1998, 2007 (Souter, j., dissenting) (attributing the Court's failure to define 
the harm in Shaw claims to "reasons that go to the conceptual bone" and describing the claims 
as "incoherent" and "inscrutable"). 
